Gul Khan Naseer in his magnum opus Tahreekh-e-Balochistan (History of Balochistan) wrote that on the 27th of March, 1948, All India Radio reported the press conference of Mr. V. P. Menon in which he claimed that two months earlier, the Khanate of Kalat approached New Delhi with a request for accession but New Delhi rejected the offer. According to Gul Khan Naseer, who was quoting Ahmed Yar Khan, this was a white lie aimed at creating bad blood between Pakistan and Kalat. Another purpose of this false report was to agitate the Pakistani leadership so that they act rashly, giving India an opportunity to move ahead against Hyderabad Deccan. This is not the first time that Kalat and India were mentioned together. Throughout the negotiation between the Khan of Kalat Ahmed Yar Khan and Pakistan, diplomatic circles in Pakistan were rife with reports that Ahmed Yar Khan was using the option of joining India as a bargaining chip in his negotiation with Pakistan. The British High Commissioner to Pakistan wrote, “There is good reason to believe that he (Ahmed Yar Khan) has been flirting with both India and Afghanistan.”
What exactly was the nature of the contact between New Delhi and the Khan of Kalat Ahmed Yar Khan?
During his campaign aimed at the British to accept his position about the independence and sovereignty of the state of Kalat, Ahmed Yar Khan tried to solicit the support of the All India Congress leadership for his case. In 1946, Samad Khan, a prominent pro-Congress Pashtun leader from Balochistan, discussed Kalat’s situation with the top leadership of the Congress. It was reported that Jawaharlal Nehru was not very keen to support it. Baba-e-Balochistan Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, then a leading member of Kalat State National Party, met Imam-ul-Hind Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was the president of All India Congress in New Delhi. Maulana Azad was of the opinion that Kalat cannot survive as an independent state and would have to seek British protection. Such an action would leave a serious question mark on the sovereignty of the Indian Subcontinent.
As it has been noted earlier, at the time of declaring the Khanate of Kalat’s independence, Ahmed Yar Khan claimed that Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah fully supported his position and actions. Despite this claim, the matter was not settled between Pakistan and Kalat. The Khan of Kalat Ahmed Yar Khan was scheduled to meet Quaid-e-Azam in October 1947 to discuss the future of Kalat. In preparation for this meeting, Ahmed Yar Khan held a detailed meeting with Kalat’s prime minister and foreign minister to discuss possible options available regarding the future of Kalat. Inayatullah Baloch, in his book, has provided details about this discussion. In this meeting, five options were discussed: “accede to Pakistan, accede to India, join Afghanistan, join Iran or apply to UK for a protectorate status.” Ahmed Yar Khan considered accession with Pakistan complicated as he claimed public and political opinion was against it. How exactly he gauged it or what exactly he meant by that, we don’t know. It was the unanimous view of the participants that accession to India would be impossible. Other than the fact that there is no direct geographical link between Kalat and India, this action would be considered extremely adversarial by Pakistan and even London was unlikely to approve it. During the discussion, Ahmed Yar Khan brought forward another reason against this option: he claimed that Nehru hated him and All India Congress never trusted him. Kalat’s foreign minister Douglas Fill had a favorable opinion on joining Iran. Elaborating on the historical ties between Iran and Balochistan and the fact that a significant number of Baloch also lived in Iran, Mr. Fell argued that joining Iran would be good for the Baloch and the unity of the Baloch. The Khan of Kalat and a number of family members were positively inclined towards the option of joining Afghanistan. Douglas Fell argued against it on the grounds that Afghanistan was already an unstable state and a close ally of communist USSR. Ahmed Yar Khan, being a devout Muslim, rejected this option. The Khan of Kalat was personally quite keen on the option of applying to the UK for a protectorate status. He considered it most suitable for his personal ambitions and vision for Kalat. Fell, however reminded him that the British consider Kalat an Indian state and would never accept this request. This meeting ended without reaching an agreement on the future course of action for Kalat. However, the details of this meeting clearly suggest that Ahmed Yar Khan was not inclined to - or even willing to consider - New Delhi for accession. It is also important to note that during his negotiation with Pakistan and even later, Khan of Kalat Ahmed Yar Khan consistently denied considering accession with India as an option.
As detailed in an earlier piece, once Kharan, LasBela and Makran joined Pakistan, Ahmed Yar Khan’s ambition to rule an independent state of Kalat became almost impossible. Now Kalat became a landlocked state without any direct access to the outside world. Reacting to this development, Ahmed Yar Khan indicated that he might appeal to the United Nations and that if Kalat was forced into accession, this accession would not be a voluntary one. It was never made clear what exactly he meant by that. The government of Pakistan, on its part, accused the Khan of Kalat of plotting against it and seeking British protection, all the while approaching India through an agent. These allegations echoed the discussion which Ahmed Yar Khan earlier had with his prime minister and foreign minister and the chatter in the diplomatic circles.
The way Ahmed Yar Khan analysed this development in his autobiography raises a number of questions about his thinking and strategising. Ahmed Yar Khan in his biography Inside Baluchistan, totally ignoring the timeline and historical facts, stated that it was the accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Makran to Pakistan that adversely affected Pakistan’s regional relations. He listed four major adverse effects: firstly, relations with Afghanistan soured; secondly, the ‘humiliation’ of the Baloch persuaded the Nizam of Hyderabad to accept accession with India; thirdly, the Maharaja of Kashmir changed his decision of acceding to Pakistan and joined India; fourthly, the sheikhs of Gulf states who had initially favored Pakistan, aligned themselves with India.
What options did Ahmed Yar Khan have at this point? In view of the minimal options left, Baloch nationalist historians have argued that the Khan of Kalat, at this juncture had two choices: to accede to Pakistan or to refuse to accede and prepare for any eventuality including armed resistance. Before he could have opted for either of these options, on March 27, 1948 All India Radio Delhi broadcasted a report that in January 1948 the Khan of Kalat approached New Delhi to discuss accession with India. The radio report stated that New Delhi rejected the request or offer. Denying that he ever made such a request, Ahmed Yar Khan sent a telegram to the Governor-General of India to protest this false report and asked New Delhi to release any communications they had, if he had truly approached them. In his biography, denying that he ever intended to accede to India, he claimed that the moment when he heard the report on All India Radio, he decided to accede to Pakistan. Ironically, before acceding to Pakistan, he did not call an emergency session of his council or the parliament to debate or discuss the matter in light of the All India Radio report.
While it had an effect on Ahmed Yar Khan’s decision on deciding the future course for the Khanate of Kalat, the report caused a stir in New Delhi where a number of questions were raised. What exactly had happened? When and how did the Khan of Kalat contact New Delhi, if at all? As it turned out, the issue was also discussed in the Indian parliament and during an Indian cabinet meeting. On the floor of the house, Balkrishna Sharma raised this issue and asked the government to provide details. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, responding to this question, stated:
“I am glad to have this opportunity to clear up a misapprehension that has unfortunately arisen. I greatly regret that owning to an error in reporting, the All India Radio announced on the night of the 27th March that His Highness, the Khan of Kalat, had approached the Government of India about two months ago through his agents to seek permission to accede to India, but the Government of India did not agree. This statement is incorrect. No mention had been made at any time either by the representative of the ruler of Kalat or by the Government of India to the accession of Kalat state to India. In view of the geographical position of Kalat state, the question did not arise at all. I might also add that certain reports, which have appeared in the foreign press about political negotiations between the government of India and Kalat state, are also completely without foundation. The statement that any sum of money has been paid to Kalat state on behalf of the government and that the government have sought airbases in Kalat are also wholly without foundation. The facts are as follows: In August last, soon after the declaration of independence in India, the government of Kalat drew the attention of the government of India to a press communique in which it was said that the government of Pakistan had recognized Kalat as an independent sovereign state, in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status different from that of the Indian states. They invited the government of India to make a similar declaration. Some time later, a request was made on behalf of Kalat state for permission to establish a trade agency of the state in Delhi. No formal reply was sent to either of these requests. Informally, the representative of Kalat state was informed that these requests could not be considered then. No further communication of any kind has been passed between the government of India and the government of Kalat.”
When the issue was discussed in a meeting of the Indian cabinet on the 29th of March, 1948, according to reports, it was claimed that the statement attributed to V. P. Menon was a distortion of what he said and that he made no such claim or statement. This scribe is still researching for any clarification of what exactly Mr. V.P Menon said and who was responsible for this distortion and why.
Having said that, the All India Radio broadcast has been projected as the decisive factor in pushing Ahmed Yar Khan into acceding to Pakistan. Ahmed Yar Khan himself gave the same impression.
After the accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Makran to Pakistan, Ahmed Yar Khan’s dream of becoming the ruler of an independent kingdom of Kalat shattered and as it was stated, he had only two options: to accede to Pakistan or lead a struggle against Pakistan. As he lacked the will and resolve to lead a guerrilla struggle, he was left with only one option. In this backdrop, the significance of the All India Radio broadcast is nothing more than that it provided Ahmed Yar Khan with a way out. Political negotiations are often equated with chess and in retrospect, it could be argued that Ahmed Yar Khan was generally an unwise player.
Rizwan Zeb is associate editor of the peer-reviewed quarterly Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, a research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad and Associate Professor at Iqra University, Islamabad
What exactly was the nature of the contact between New Delhi and the Khan of Kalat Ahmed Yar Khan?
During his campaign aimed at the British to accept his position about the independence and sovereignty of the state of Kalat, Ahmed Yar Khan tried to solicit the support of the All India Congress leadership for his case. In 1946, Samad Khan, a prominent pro-Congress Pashtun leader from Balochistan, discussed Kalat’s situation with the top leadership of the Congress. It was reported that Jawaharlal Nehru was not very keen to support it. Baba-e-Balochistan Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, then a leading member of Kalat State National Party, met Imam-ul-Hind Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was the president of All India Congress in New Delhi. Maulana Azad was of the opinion that Kalat cannot survive as an independent state and would have to seek British protection. Such an action would leave a serious question mark on the sovereignty of the Indian Subcontinent.
The Khan of Kalat was personally quite keen on the option of applying to the UK for a protectorate status
As it has been noted earlier, at the time of declaring the Khanate of Kalat’s independence, Ahmed Yar Khan claimed that Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah fully supported his position and actions. Despite this claim, the matter was not settled between Pakistan and Kalat. The Khan of Kalat Ahmed Yar Khan was scheduled to meet Quaid-e-Azam in October 1947 to discuss the future of Kalat. In preparation for this meeting, Ahmed Yar Khan held a detailed meeting with Kalat’s prime minister and foreign minister to discuss possible options available regarding the future of Kalat. Inayatullah Baloch, in his book, has provided details about this discussion. In this meeting, five options were discussed: “accede to Pakistan, accede to India, join Afghanistan, join Iran or apply to UK for a protectorate status.” Ahmed Yar Khan considered accession with Pakistan complicated as he claimed public and political opinion was against it. How exactly he gauged it or what exactly he meant by that, we don’t know. It was the unanimous view of the participants that accession to India would be impossible. Other than the fact that there is no direct geographical link between Kalat and India, this action would be considered extremely adversarial by Pakistan and even London was unlikely to approve it. During the discussion, Ahmed Yar Khan brought forward another reason against this option: he claimed that Nehru hated him and All India Congress never trusted him. Kalat’s foreign minister Douglas Fill had a favorable opinion on joining Iran. Elaborating on the historical ties between Iran and Balochistan and the fact that a significant number of Baloch also lived in Iran, Mr. Fell argued that joining Iran would be good for the Baloch and the unity of the Baloch. The Khan of Kalat and a number of family members were positively inclined towards the option of joining Afghanistan. Douglas Fell argued against it on the grounds that Afghanistan was already an unstable state and a close ally of communist USSR. Ahmed Yar Khan, being a devout Muslim, rejected this option. The Khan of Kalat was personally quite keen on the option of applying to the UK for a protectorate status. He considered it most suitable for his personal ambitions and vision for Kalat. Fell, however reminded him that the British consider Kalat an Indian state and would never accept this request. This meeting ended without reaching an agreement on the future course of action for Kalat. However, the details of this meeting clearly suggest that Ahmed Yar Khan was not inclined to - or even willing to consider - New Delhi for accession. It is also important to note that during his negotiation with Pakistan and even later, Khan of Kalat Ahmed Yar Khan consistently denied considering accession with India as an option.
As detailed in an earlier piece, once Kharan, LasBela and Makran joined Pakistan, Ahmed Yar Khan’s ambition to rule an independent state of Kalat became almost impossible. Now Kalat became a landlocked state without any direct access to the outside world. Reacting to this development, Ahmed Yar Khan indicated that he might appeal to the United Nations and that if Kalat was forced into accession, this accession would not be a voluntary one. It was never made clear what exactly he meant by that. The government of Pakistan, on its part, accused the Khan of Kalat of plotting against it and seeking British protection, all the while approaching India through an agent. These allegations echoed the discussion which Ahmed Yar Khan earlier had with his prime minister and foreign minister and the chatter in the diplomatic circles.
The way Ahmed Yar Khan analysed this development in his autobiography raises a number of questions about his thinking and strategising. Ahmed Yar Khan in his biography Inside Baluchistan, totally ignoring the timeline and historical facts, stated that it was the accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Makran to Pakistan that adversely affected Pakistan’s regional relations. He listed four major adverse effects: firstly, relations with Afghanistan soured; secondly, the ‘humiliation’ of the Baloch persuaded the Nizam of Hyderabad to accept accession with India; thirdly, the Maharaja of Kashmir changed his decision of acceding to Pakistan and joined India; fourthly, the sheikhs of Gulf states who had initially favored Pakistan, aligned themselves with India.
What options did Ahmed Yar Khan have at this point? In view of the minimal options left, Baloch nationalist historians have argued that the Khan of Kalat, at this juncture had two choices: to accede to Pakistan or to refuse to accede and prepare for any eventuality including armed resistance. Before he could have opted for either of these options, on March 27, 1948 All India Radio Delhi broadcasted a report that in January 1948 the Khan of Kalat approached New Delhi to discuss accession with India. The radio report stated that New Delhi rejected the request or offer. Denying that he ever made such a request, Ahmed Yar Khan sent a telegram to the Governor-General of India to protest this false report and asked New Delhi to release any communications they had, if he had truly approached them. In his biography, denying that he ever intended to accede to India, he claimed that the moment when he heard the report on All India Radio, he decided to accede to Pakistan. Ironically, before acceding to Pakistan, he did not call an emergency session of his council or the parliament to debate or discuss the matter in light of the All India Radio report.
The All India Radio report caused a stir in New Delhi
While it had an effect on Ahmed Yar Khan’s decision on deciding the future course for the Khanate of Kalat, the report caused a stir in New Delhi where a number of questions were raised. What exactly had happened? When and how did the Khan of Kalat contact New Delhi, if at all? As it turned out, the issue was also discussed in the Indian parliament and during an Indian cabinet meeting. On the floor of the house, Balkrishna Sharma raised this issue and asked the government to provide details. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, responding to this question, stated:
“I am glad to have this opportunity to clear up a misapprehension that has unfortunately arisen. I greatly regret that owning to an error in reporting, the All India Radio announced on the night of the 27th March that His Highness, the Khan of Kalat, had approached the Government of India about two months ago through his agents to seek permission to accede to India, but the Government of India did not agree. This statement is incorrect. No mention had been made at any time either by the representative of the ruler of Kalat or by the Government of India to the accession of Kalat state to India. In view of the geographical position of Kalat state, the question did not arise at all. I might also add that certain reports, which have appeared in the foreign press about political negotiations between the government of India and Kalat state, are also completely without foundation. The statement that any sum of money has been paid to Kalat state on behalf of the government and that the government have sought airbases in Kalat are also wholly without foundation. The facts are as follows: In August last, soon after the declaration of independence in India, the government of Kalat drew the attention of the government of India to a press communique in which it was said that the government of Pakistan had recognized Kalat as an independent sovereign state, in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status different from that of the Indian states. They invited the government of India to make a similar declaration. Some time later, a request was made on behalf of Kalat state for permission to establish a trade agency of the state in Delhi. No formal reply was sent to either of these requests. Informally, the representative of Kalat state was informed that these requests could not be considered then. No further communication of any kind has been passed between the government of India and the government of Kalat.”
When the issue was discussed in a meeting of the Indian cabinet on the 29th of March, 1948, according to reports, it was claimed that the statement attributed to V. P. Menon was a distortion of what he said and that he made no such claim or statement. This scribe is still researching for any clarification of what exactly Mr. V.P Menon said and who was responsible for this distortion and why.
Having said that, the All India Radio broadcast has been projected as the decisive factor in pushing Ahmed Yar Khan into acceding to Pakistan. Ahmed Yar Khan himself gave the same impression.
After the accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Makran to Pakistan, Ahmed Yar Khan’s dream of becoming the ruler of an independent kingdom of Kalat shattered and as it was stated, he had only two options: to accede to Pakistan or lead a struggle against Pakistan. As he lacked the will and resolve to lead a guerrilla struggle, he was left with only one option. In this backdrop, the significance of the All India Radio broadcast is nothing more than that it provided Ahmed Yar Khan with a way out. Political negotiations are often equated with chess and in retrospect, it could be argued that Ahmed Yar Khan was generally an unwise player.
Rizwan Zeb is associate editor of the peer-reviewed quarterly Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, a research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad and Associate Professor at Iqra University, Islamabad