Former US senator Larry Pressler, author of the infamous Pressler Amendment, has written a book documenting his political struggles. Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator’s Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear Subcontinent has just been published in India with that audience in mind and it carries a dual message: Pakistan is the root of all evil that India has to endure and the US-India nuclear agreement is the best thing that has ever happened to India if only it were implemented. Pressler concerns himself with answering the questions of what encourages Pakistan’s so-called unruly behavior towards India on one hand and what dilutes the spirit of the US-India nuclear deal on the other.
According to Pressler, the answers lie in the ‘Octopus’. The Octopus is “the great-grandchild of the ‘military-industrial complex’,” which Pressler sees as a giant ‘organism’ that has evolved over time with ‘multiple tentacles’. This Octopus is aggressive and disruptive and aims at making money through arms sales around the world. The Octopus makes its way forward by disrespecting universal democratic values, crushing nuclear non-proliferation norms and all that stands for integrity and morality in politics.
In each of the Octopus’s tentacles, Pressler sees the Pentagon, the CIA, the lobbyists, the arms manufacturers, the military-industrial complex, and the Congressmen/politicians who push for arms sales and make deals. He believes that the Octopus has had a favourable and special relationship with Pakistan, and over the years, Pakistan’s ‘hostile’ behaviour towards India has been encouraged by it.
Larry Pressler
The book begins with a foreword from an Indian politician and former diplomat, Dr Shashi Tharoor and an introduction from Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani. Both Dr Tharoor and Ambassador Haqqani share Pressler’s assessment of Pakistan being the state that has benefitted the most (financially and militarily) by the Octopus. It is the Octopus that saved Pakistan from the drastic consequences of the Pressler Amendment and exploited a legal loophole to benefit Pakistan during the Clinton administration. It is the Octopus that ignored the intelligence estimates about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development and turned a blind eye. In essence, for Pressler, the Octopus and Pakistan are the greatest sources of instability in the South Asian region. He advises India to be wary of these two evil forces that are not letting India reach its full potential as a rising great power in the region.
His background
Let me begin this review by introducing the former Senator Pressler for a Pakistani audience since very little is known about his background. The chapters about Pressler’s life history and early years as a senator are in the middle order, starting from chapter 9 and going till 16. (There are thirty short chapters in the book, set in no particular order.) In them we learn that he hails from the town of Humboldt in South Dakota, is a devout Catholic and belongs to a modest farming family. Mention of the righteous values that his parents gave him turns into a refrain that runs throughout his book as Pressler says they helped him make the right decisions in difficult times even when the not-so-righteous path was less costly and more beneficial.
Pressler, by his own admission, was not particularly bright but was hardworking, had entrepreneurial interests and loved reading books about other countries and traveling to them. Ambitious and eager to become someone, Pressler graduated from University of South Dakota and won the prestigious international Rhodes Scholarship to study at the University of Oxford in 1964. During his time at Oxford, Pressler befriended a Pakistani and an Indian who became his lifelong friends. His Indian friend, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, rose to become a top civil servant and served as the deputy chairman of India’s planning commission from 2004 to 2014. His Pakistani friend was Wasim Sajjad, a politician who served as the chairman of Pakistan’s senate and also twice served as Pakistan’s interim President. Pressler writes that Wasim Sajjad, while friendly at Oxford, maintained his distance from Pressler post-Pressler amendment fame—and understandably so. Subsequently, Pressler was drafted in the US military for the Vietnam war, graduated from Harvard Law School and went on to become the first Vietnam veteran to be elected to the US Congress. He was elected Senator in 1979 at the age of thirty-six and his legislative career began, leading up to the drafting of the Pressler Amendment and its passage by Congress in 1985, which brought him a much-desired international reputation (ill or otherwise). The Pressler Amendment was, however, preceded by other key legislation.
Together, the Symington-Glenn Amendments modified the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to ban all US military and economic aid to any country that either acquired or transferred nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology or tested a nuclear device
Pre-Pressler Amendment
The first two American non-proliferation laws passed by Congress were the Symington Amendment in 1976 and the Glenn Amendment in 1977. Together, the Symington-Glenn Amendments modified the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to ban all US military and economic aid to any country that either acquired or transferred nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology or tested a nuclear device.
In April 1979, based on intelligence reports about the construction of a uranium enrichment facility in Kahuta, the Carter administration invoked the Symington Amendment whereby all military and economic aid to Pakistan was cut off. Pressler writes that the Symington-Glenn Amendments were “clearly directed at Pakistan”, however this is an incorrect statement. At the time the Symington and Glenn Amendments were passed, Pakistan’s nuclear programme was in its embryonic stages. South Africa was, however, in a position in 1977 to conduct a nuclear explosion. The preparations for the South African nuclear weapons model and test sites are detailed by Or Rabinowitz in her book Bargaining on Nuclear Tests. Additionally, Senator John Glenn’s most influential staffer at the time, Prof. Dr Leonard Weiss, has stated to me in a conversation that the Glenn Amendment was not drafted with specifically Pakistan in mind. It was concern for reprocessing technology and proliferation—and not Pakistan—that prompted the thinking that trade of such technology needed to be discouraged, which led to the passage of the Glenn Amendment. The Symington-Glenn Amendments were not ‘Pakistan specific’, unlike the Pressler Amendment, which was. It so happened, however, that Pakistan became the first and the only country to ever be sanctioned under the Symington Amendment in 1979 since it was building a uranium enrichment facility and the intelligence on Kahuta was definitive.
Pressler writes that after sanctioning Pakistan under Symington in April 1979, Carter offered Pakistan F-16s for he was “convinced that providing the Pakistani government conventional arms would deter it from pursuing a nuclear weapons programme”. Furthermore, “the United States justified renewed military aid to Pakistan as an instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation policy.” Pressler is right. However, this offer was not made in a vacuum. Carter’s offer for the fighter jets was coupled with the promise of lifting the Symington sanctions in a bid to ensure Pakistan’s support in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1980. In fact, both Ford and Carter tried to establish this quid pro quo with Pakistan but remained unsuccessful for one basic reason: they ignored Pakistan’s threat perception vis-à-vis India that was the driving force behind Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons with or without sanctions. So no amount of military aid would have bought or altered Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. And thus, a misreading of Pakistan’s threat perceptions and resolve to secure itself in the absence of security guarantees from the United States earned the world its seventh nuclear weapon state. Pressler is right when he writes that, “the boys in the Pentagon…the Defense Department, the CIA, the National Security Council and all other Octopus forces” helped Pakistan get the bomb. Pressler rightly asserts that despite considerable intelligence on Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear activities, “containing Communism was far more important to him [President Reagan] than Pakistan’s efforts to get a nuclear weapon”. Let history be the witness that the Cold War objectives took precedence over the US non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan, allowing the latter to continue with the development of its nuclear weapons programme. It took two to nuclear tango.
Pressler Amendment
In 1981, a one-time presidential waiver in the Symington-Glenn Amendments had allowed Congress to authorise a $3.2 billion package of military and economic aid to Pakistan. In order for the Reagan administration to help Pakistan continue to be the US proxy in Afghanistan, it sought a permanent waiver in the Symington-Glenn Amendments. Pressler writes that, “the only way the administration could get Congress to go along with this permanent waiver was to include language in a new law that would punish Pakistan if it were determined that Pakistan actually possessed a nuclear weapon.” This language, according to Pressler, would have made the Glenn-Symington waiver more “politically feasible” to those in Congress who were “working hard on non-proliferation issues”. This is true; it would have, but the simplicity of Pressler’s explanation does not absolve Pressler et al of deliberately compromising on their non-proliferation principles. It is much easier to point fingers at Pakistan and accuse it of developing nuclear weapons than acknowledge the role various US administrations and Congress played in helping Pakistan get away with the bomb.
The initial amendment to introduce the new language and waiver was introduced in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator Alan Cranston and Senator John Glenn, both Democrats. Their proposed amendment stipulated that “no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan unless the President could first certify that Pakistan did not possess nor was developing a nuclear explosive device, and that it was not acquiring products to make a nuclear explosive device.” This proposed amendment was not adopted, however, Pressler gives no details as to why it wasn’t, except for saying that since the Republican party was in control, they wanted a Republican name on the amendment. The revised amendment that was adopted was proposed by Senators Pressler, Mathias and Percy. It was very similar in content to the Cranston-Glenn Amendment but with two certification conditions: “(1) that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid ‘will reduce significantly the risk’ that Pakistan would possess such a device.” Senators Pressler, Mathias and Boschwitz revised the text further by adding that, “the proposed US assistance [to Pakistan] will reduce significantly the risk of Pakistan possessing such a [nuclear] device.” Although Pressler thought that it would be ‘impossible’ for any President to certify, Reagan assured him that he would do so. And he did provide three annual certifications even though there was credible evidence with the Reagan administration that Pakistan was well on its way to developing nuclear weapons.
The amendment was passed by Congress on August 8, 1985. Pressler writes that the policy of providing Pakistan with military and economic aid in lieu of reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation was counter-intuitive but it didn’t work with Pakistan. He proclaims that “with the help of the Octopus. Pakistan took our [US] aid and flagrantly ignored the Pressler Amendment restrictions.” This is a convenient argument. It brings us back to the basics: Pakistan’s threat perceptions were ignored. Pakistan asked the United States for security guarantees against India in lieu of not developing nuclear weapons. In the absence of such security guarantees, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons. As for ‘taking the US money’, Pakistan took what it was offered to become the US proxy in Afghanistan. Pakistan was paid for its services. It is as simple as that. Non-proliferation guarantees from Pakistan were not made conditional by the Reagan administration. The deal was that as long as General Zia-ul Haq did not embarrass Reagan publicly by conducting a nuclear test, the US would literally ‘look the other way’. Zia kept his end of the bargain and Reagan did the same. Pressler claims to have been closer to Reagan and understood him at a personal level but perhaps Zia had better chemistry with Reagan after all. Pressler blames the Octopus for blocking his access to Reagan and denying him the space to ‘influence’ Reagan on holding Pakistan accountable for nuclear proliferation under the Pressler Amendment. One does not know how much truth there is in that statement, but foreign policy decisions are not based on who gets to influence the Executive. They are based on hardcore calculations about national interests and each time Reagan provided a waiver to Pakistan, he knew exactly what Pakistan was offering in return. I doubt that any amount of ‘influence’ or personal relationship would have altered the Cold War dynamics that dictated the Pakistan-US relations in the final decade of the Cold War. With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Pressler himself correctly points out that the United States “had no foreign policy rationale for ignoring Pakistan’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons”. What lay ahead in Pakistan-US relations under subsequent administrations (HW Bush and Clinton) would, however, further startle Pressler.
Set aside
In October 1989, President HW Bush certified, as per the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and that the aid provided to Pakistan continued to minimize the risk that it would acquire nuclear weapons. One year later, in October 1990, Bush did the opposite: he did not certify Pakistan’s non-possession of nuclear device and Pressler sanctions were enforced on Pakistan. But what had changed in a year? The prevalent narrative in Pakistan suggests that since Pakistan had delivered on US foreign policy objectives of the Cold War it was no longer needed and thus sanctioned. Pressler attributes this decertification to the 1990 Indo-Pak crisis after which it became clear that both countries were threshold nuclear weapon states and therefore the US could no longer have continued to provide certifications on non-possession for Pakistan.
Along with a suspension of economic and military aid, the shipment of 28 F-16 combat jets was also blocked even though Pakistan had paid for them. The US had kept Pakistan’s money and jets. This must still please Pressler even today. However, his happiness post-Pressler sanctions on Pakistan was short lived. He learned that the Bush administration and the Octopus had found a legal loophole in the Pressler Amendment to continue licensing commercial sales of military parts and technology to Pakistan. It turned out that while the Pressler Amendment called for a suspension of all economic and Foreign Military Sales to Pakistan, licensing of arms exports pursuant to private sales was not suggested, thereby exempting private transactions and allowing commercial sales to take place. The Octopus had struck again.
Pressler’s heartache over the Octopus favouring Pakistan did not end with the Bush administration. The Clinton administration, during its two terms from 1993 to 2001, tried everything from attempting to repeal the Pressler Amendment to weakening it by softening its language to provide Pakistan some relief. The Brown Amendment, passed in 1995, finally provided a one-year waiver to the Pressler Amendment certification, releasing 368 million dollars worth of missiles and military equipment to Pakistan. Additional waivers to the Glenn and Pressler amendments were added post-Indo-Pak nuclearization with the passage of the Defense Appropriations Act 2000 (also known as the Brownback II Amendment). This was the death of the Pressler Amendment. The Octopus had delivered yet again.
Pressler’s hate speech against Pakistan is incredible throughout the book. He calls Pakistan ‘dishonest’ and ‘dangerous’ and ponders why are India and Pakistan ever treated as equals in US foreign policy. He further writes that, “Pakistan’s nuclear bombs are built in such a way that they can be hauled in a pickup truck across any terrain and any border into a neighbouring country. Potentially, they could be put on a boat, transported to Mexico, and transported across the US border.” These lines are so outrageously ridiculous that they do not even warrant a response. It just makes one think that perhaps Pressler would have been better off as a farmer like his father; his knowledge about hybrid breeds of hogs, cattle and plants is certainly more than what he knows about Pakistan and its nuclear weapons.
Senator Pressler is perhaps oblivious that no Pakistani particularly cares if he never forgives the Octopus for enabling Pakistan to have nuclear weapons. He may have passed the Pressler Amendment but even he knew what bargain was being struck with Pakistan. He was complicit in what he accuses the Octopus of which makes it all the more spectacular that he has the audacity to call himself a “non-proliferation purist” and Pakistan evil. Pakistan, Senator Pressler, may find is likely to be rather grateful that he has written this book as it not only exposes him but also the fiction of non-proliferation ideals.
One administration after the other since President Ford’s has known exactly what Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ambitions were. It is time to own it. There is no escaping history. The heartache that Pakistan once felt is no more—JF-17s have compensated the loss we once felt for those 28 F-16s that were so sanctimoniously detained. Pakistan has since moved on. Perhaps Mr Pressler should too.
Dr Rabia Akhtar is a nuclear historian. She is Director at the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at University of Lahore. She tweets @Rabs_AA
