One thing is clear: the Syrian flames are not going to be extinguished anytime soon.
It all began in 2011 with the Arab Spring and reached the point of total disaster on 8 December 2024, with the toppling of the Bashar al-Assad regime – a rule that lasted 54 years, including that of his father, Hafez al-Assad. A Financial Times story published on 21 December 2024 provides details of Assad’s cowardly escape to Russia along with his son, Hafez, who had recently completed his PhD at Moscow State University. Both father and son left their family and friends uninformed, bewildered, as various groups seized control of different parts of Syria.
Now, the country is divided among various factions, each controlling specific territories. This includes Israeli forces, who took the opportunity to capture the Golan Heights and the adjacent buffer zone – the Southern Operations Room. In the southeast is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, while the Turkish military-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) controls the northwestern region. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control most of the northeast. The south is occupied by unidentified rebel groups, along with the Al-Tanf deconfliction zone, where a US base is situated. On 20 December, DAWN newspaper reported the de facto leader of post-Assad Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, as saying, “Now, after all that has happened, sanctions must be lifted because they were targeted at the old regime. The victim and the oppressor should not be treated in the same way.” While Sharaa calls for help, it remains uncertain whether his group alone can form a stable government in Syria.
The disability in the region is far from over
The downfall of the Assad regime is widely regarded as a blow to Iran’s influence in the region and its efforts to support its proxies in Lebanon and Gaza – Hezbollah and Hamas. The situation is further complicated when considering other rivalries in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have long been at odds, with both nations striving to extend their influence by promoting and supporting Shia and Wahhabi versions of Islam, respectively. Turkey’s occupation of significant parts of Syria is seen as part of its ambition to revive the Caliphate, abolished after the First World War, and coinciding with the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – whose monarchs assumed the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (Khadim al-Haramain al-Sharifain).
While Saudi Arabia reportedly sought to establish diplomatic relations with Israel prior to the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks, Iran continues to support Hamas (and Hezbollah) in their resistance against Israel. The United States has aligned itself with Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, while Russia has historically supported regimes in Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and Syria – the latter now in turmoil.
As Trump takes office, he may find himself compelled to confront this intricate situation, despite his promises. In other words, the war in the Middle East is far from over – and the same might hold true for Eastern Europe
Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, stated recently that Assad’s ousting does not signify a defeat for Russia in the region. “You want to present what is happening in Syria as a defeat for Russia,” Putin remarked. “I assure you it is not … we have achieved our goals,” Al Jazeera reported. Putin is expected to meet Assad, now in exile in Moscow. It remains to be seen how the Assad-led Baath regime came to such a sudden end.
But let us not overlook the timing of these events
These developments have unfolded just over a month before the Trump administration assumes office in the United States. Notably, Trump has pledged to end ongoing wars upon taking power. Could these events be interpreted as manoeuvres by the outgoing Biden administration and the broader US establishment to preempt Trump’s agenda? This possibility cannot be dismissed, especially given the rumoured tensions between Trump and the US establishment over the Ukraine conflict, which allegedly did its utmost to propel Trump’s rival, Kamala Harris, to the Oval Office. As Trump takes office, he may find himself compelled to confront this intricate situation, despite his promises. In other words, the war in the Middle East is far from over – and the same might hold true for Eastern Europe.
And now to Pakistan
As the world watches anxiously to see which factions in Syria will reach an agreement to form a government, Pakistan’s foremost concern should be the groups excluded from such a coalition. Since Assad’s departure on 7 December, approximately 4,000 armed personnel from his army have fled to Iraq, potentially to join militant groups. Should any armed factions fail to secure their place in Syria’s future government, they may also choose to ally with militants in Iraq or Afghanistan. If this happens, they could regroup in Afghanistan’s regions bordering Pakistan, where they might receive financial and logistical support from India’s intelligence agency, RAW, to further destabilise Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
All these factors contribute to an environment ripe for regional forces to exploit opportunities to further destabilise Pakistan's security situation
We have witnessed this phenomenon before
Following the collapse of regimes in the Middle East after the Arab Spring of 2011, numerous warring factions coalesced into militant groups such as ISIS or aligned themselves with Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. These groups quickly became proxies for various powers, including India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which allegedly gained some foothold along Pakistan’s borders in Afghanistan, ostensibly with the consent or tacit approval of the Afghan government in Kabul. The spillover of armed groups from Syria presents a similar risk of seeking refuge in regions adjacent to Pakistan.
The timing of the events unfolding in the Middle East is particularly precarious from Pakistan’s perspective.
Not long ago, a politically dismayed Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), led by Manzoor Pashteen, planned to hold a jirga in the Jamrud tehsil of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This move was astutely curtailed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the assistance of the provincial government. Meanwhile, the Balochistan Liberation Army continues to perpetrate attacks on Pakistani military and civilian targets with the not-so-invisible support of RAW and other foreign entities. With such turmoil in the two western provinces, the federal capital of Pakistan is grappling with political unrest and economic challenges.
All these factors contribute to an environment ripe for regional forces to exploit opportunities to further destabilise Pakistan's security situation. Additionally, China's security concerns regarding their workers in Pakistan must not be overlooked, particularly as both China and Pakistan work towards making the Gwadar Port fully operational. This project, viewed with disfavour by both India and the United States, poses potential competition to Iran’s Chabahar Port and the UAE’s status as a regional trading and business hub. One cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that a deteriorating security situation could, in some way, benefit these nations. They can possibly provide enough fuel to the flames in Syria to reach Pakistani territory.
Pakistan, therefore, must remain vigilant, keeping its eyes and ears attuned to developments in the region in the days ahead.