Just like our political institutions, our military structures and military and strategic thought is a product of Cold War compulsions. Our military structures started taking shape during the Cold War—it was American weapons systems, training, strategic advice and financial assistance that manufactured our military conceptions, strategic thought and military structures.
Pakistani armed forces are no longer in a formative phase as they have quite developed military structures and institutions. Their strategic thought exists in quite a developed form. But the inductions of new Chinese weapon systems will, however, crucially and critically introduce new strategic ideas and concepts in our strategic thinking.
The induction of Type-54AP Frigates into Pakistan Navy’s inventory is primarily aimed at enhancing the Interoperability between Pakistan Navy and Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN). The practical manifestation of this enhanced inter-operability is the eight Pak-China joint and multinational counter terrorism Naval Exercises in Arabian Sea.
On the other hand, Pakistan Air force (PAF) has been evaluating the purchase of state of the art J-10 fighters into its inventory. According to experts, J-10 is ideally suited for a maritime role, especially in light of new thinking in the Pakistani Navy to venture deep into the Arabian Sea. No existing aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory has the ideal capacity to carry out the maritime role. PAF wants to replace its Mirage fleet and J-10, according to experts, is ideally suited to replace the Mirage Fleet. It can carry heavy payloads and could therefore become a carrier of strategic weapons. One expert said that the JF-17 doesn’t have the capacity to carry heavy payloads.
F-16 and other western technology based aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory don’t come without technical restrictions, especially when it comes to strategic weapons. JF-17 is a joint production of China and Pakistan and it doesn’t carry technical restrictions. However it is light aircraft and could not carry heavy payloads. J-10 could carry Pakistan’s strategic weapons and penetrate deep into Indian Territory. Officials said that the government of Pakistan was in the final stage of negotiations with the Chinese government when the plan to purchase 150 J-10 aircraft was shelved, “The reason was the financial and economic crunch of those days," he said. The J-10 is mainly designed for air-to-air combat, but can also perform strike missions.
The induction of these two weapon systems into the inventory of Pakistan's armed forces will ensure the deep sea role of the Pakistan Navy. Pakistani experts say that Pakistan Navy is in the process of developing new strategic concepts and ideas according to which it would be able to play a deep sea role in Arabian Sea and Indian ocean—a strategic development that would be in line with Chinese ambitions to increase its footprints in the Indian Ocean. First difference between American military assistance to the Pakistan armed forces during the Cold War and Chinese military assistance in the present day is that the former's strategic objectives were directly in conflict with the defense strategy of Pakistan, whereas the latter’s strategic objectives are completely in line with Pakistan’s defense requirements.
During the Cold War Americans were playing on both sides of the International border between Pakistan and India—they were providing military assistance to Pakistan and in the wake of 1962 India-China war American military assistance started landing at New Delhi Airport as well. Americans even placed a condition on Pakistan Army that the weapons they were receiving from Washington could not be used against Indian adversaries. This also translated into a strategic divergence between Islamabad and Washington gradually widened into two completely distinct strategic world views.
Both the Cold War Allies accused each other of betrayal. Pakistani never completely reconciled itself with Washington’s anti-communist agenda, while anti-Indian agenda of Pakistani military elite was anathema to Washington. At the time of the Chinese military's assistance to the Pakistan armed forces, the situation was completely different. Both Chinese and Pakistani strategic elites are equally anti-India. Pakistan military’s hostility towards India is matched by People’s Liberation Army (PLA)'s doctrines that see India as a military adversary. Unlike flow of arms from Washington which was discontinued during 1965 and 1971 wars, there is little chance that Chinese will discontinue flow of Arms into Pakistani inventory.
Ironically, there has been no debate in Pakistani media and political circles about the induction of these weapon systems into Pakistani Armed Forces. More ironic is the fact that the Pakistan political and media elite is completely oblivious towards what strategic implications these weapons would bring about in Pakistan’s military and strategic thought. The fact of the matter is that the outside world, especially our military adversaries, see the induction of these weapons systems into Pakistani inventory and corresponding extensions of Pakistan Navy’s role into deep Arabian Sea as Pakistan’s voluntary inclusion into Chinese military and naval orbit. For the world, we will just be changing the masters—during Cold War we were receiving weapons and finances from Americans and they were our military masters. Now we will be receiving weapon systems at subsidsed rates from China and the Chinese will be our military masters.
This is a big political step—we again are becoming a little military pawn in the big games of big powers. Defending our land, air and sea frontiers requires us to follow a limited logic of military needs. Playing a pawn in a Chinese game in the Indian Ocean we will stretch ourselves thin just like the 1950s when we signed both SEATO and CENTO—two defense treaties that extended our defense from South West Asia to South East Asia. We had spread ourselves thin then. Are we stretching ourselves thin again? Somebody rightly pointed out that defense procurement should be a political decision primarily.
Pakistani armed forces are no longer in a formative phase as they have quite developed military structures and institutions. Their strategic thought exists in quite a developed form. But the inductions of new Chinese weapon systems will, however, crucially and critically introduce new strategic ideas and concepts in our strategic thinking.
The induction of Type-54AP Frigates into Pakistan Navy’s inventory is primarily aimed at enhancing the Interoperability between Pakistan Navy and Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN). The practical manifestation of this enhanced inter-operability is the eight Pak-China joint and multinational counter terrorism Naval Exercises in Arabian Sea.
On the other hand, Pakistan Air force (PAF) has been evaluating the purchase of state of the art J-10 fighters into its inventory. According to experts, J-10 is ideally suited for a maritime role, especially in light of new thinking in the Pakistani Navy to venture deep into the Arabian Sea. No existing aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory has the ideal capacity to carry out the maritime role. PAF wants to replace its Mirage fleet and J-10, according to experts, is ideally suited to replace the Mirage Fleet. It can carry heavy payloads and could therefore become a carrier of strategic weapons. One expert said that the JF-17 doesn’t have the capacity to carry heavy payloads.
F-16 and other western technology based aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory don’t come without technical restrictions, especially when it comes to strategic weapons. JF-17 is a joint production of China and Pakistan and it doesn’t carry technical restrictions. However it is light aircraft and could not carry heavy payloads. J-10 could carry Pakistan’s strategic weapons and penetrate deep into Indian Territory. Officials said that the government of Pakistan was in the final stage of negotiations with the Chinese government when the plan to purchase 150 J-10 aircraft was shelved, “The reason was the financial and economic crunch of those days," he said. The J-10 is mainly designed for air-to-air combat, but can also perform strike missions.
The induction of these two weapon systems into the inventory of Pakistan's armed forces will ensure the deep sea role of the Pakistan Navy. Pakistani experts say that Pakistan Navy is in the process of developing new strategic concepts and ideas according to which it would be able to play a deep sea role in Arabian Sea and Indian ocean—a strategic development that would be in line with Chinese ambitions to increase its footprints in the Indian Ocean. First difference between American military assistance to the Pakistan armed forces during the Cold War and Chinese military assistance in the present day is that the former's strategic objectives were directly in conflict with the defense strategy of Pakistan, whereas the latter’s strategic objectives are completely in line with Pakistan’s defense requirements.
During the Cold War Americans were playing on both sides of the International border between Pakistan and India—they were providing military assistance to Pakistan and in the wake of 1962 India-China war American military assistance started landing at New Delhi Airport as well. Americans even placed a condition on Pakistan Army that the weapons they were receiving from Washington could not be used against Indian adversaries. This also translated into a strategic divergence between Islamabad and Washington gradually widened into two completely distinct strategic world views.
During the Cold War Americans were playing on both sides of the International border between Pakistan and India—they were providing military assistance to Pakistan and in the wake of 1962 India-China war American military assistance started landing at New Delhi Airport as well.
Both the Cold War Allies accused each other of betrayal. Pakistani never completely reconciled itself with Washington’s anti-communist agenda, while anti-Indian agenda of Pakistani military elite was anathema to Washington. At the time of the Chinese military's assistance to the Pakistan armed forces, the situation was completely different. Both Chinese and Pakistani strategic elites are equally anti-India. Pakistan military’s hostility towards India is matched by People’s Liberation Army (PLA)'s doctrines that see India as a military adversary. Unlike flow of arms from Washington which was discontinued during 1965 and 1971 wars, there is little chance that Chinese will discontinue flow of Arms into Pakistani inventory.
Ironically, there has been no debate in Pakistani media and political circles about the induction of these weapon systems into Pakistani Armed Forces. More ironic is the fact that the Pakistan political and media elite is completely oblivious towards what strategic implications these weapons would bring about in Pakistan’s military and strategic thought. The fact of the matter is that the outside world, especially our military adversaries, see the induction of these weapons systems into Pakistani inventory and corresponding extensions of Pakistan Navy’s role into deep Arabian Sea as Pakistan’s voluntary inclusion into Chinese military and naval orbit. For the world, we will just be changing the masters—during Cold War we were receiving weapons and finances from Americans and they were our military masters. Now we will be receiving weapon systems at subsidsed rates from China and the Chinese will be our military masters.
This is a big political step—we again are becoming a little military pawn in the big games of big powers. Defending our land, air and sea frontiers requires us to follow a limited logic of military needs. Playing a pawn in a Chinese game in the Indian Ocean we will stretch ourselves thin just like the 1950s when we signed both SEATO and CENTO—two defense treaties that extended our defense from South West Asia to South East Asia. We had spread ourselves thin then. Are we stretching ourselves thin again? Somebody rightly pointed out that defense procurement should be a political decision primarily.