The government, opposition, and media focus on Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf's (PTI) protests distracts from severe sectarian clashes and terrorist acts devastating peripheral regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. This oversight highlights a critical disconnect in addressing the country's most pressing security concerns.
The last couple of years have seen an escalation in attacks on security forces, resulting in the deaths of scores of Pakistani soldiers, police officers and members of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) at various checkpoints and border locations. The Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for these attacks. Some attacks were carried out by the Islamic State of Khurasan (ISIK), using the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as a base, targeting areas within FATA and elsewhere in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Many experts link the surge in insecurity in former FATA to the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US-led NATO forces in August 2021.
On November 22, 2024, the savage attack on a Shia convoy, under the protection of security forces, travelling from Parachinar, resulted in over 40 deaths, including women and children, and left many others severely injured. In response, the Shia militant group Zainabyon has been attacking and burning Sunni villages in Kurram. This violence stems from longstanding tribal and sectarian conflicts, further fuelled by competition over scarce resources like land and water, which often exacerbates tribal tensions and intensifies sectarian animosity.
The poor security situation is mainly due to the weak government writ in these areas and the local population's limited exposure to modern state services, such as the rule of law and their trust in the formal justice system. These deficiencies stem from a governance model left by British colonial rule, which persisted for over seven decades post-independence and was only dismantled in 2018 through the 25th Constitutional Amendment.
Following the 25th Constitutional amendment, the government made several commitments to develop the region with infrastructure, extend formal laws and the justice system, strengthen local security forces — such as by transforming the Khassadar and Levies into a formal police force — and introducing other modern state institutions. In essence, the merger sought to integrate the tribal region into Pakistan's mainstream political, administrative, and legal frameworks to remedy historical marginalisation.
The TTP views the FATA merger as a threat to its influence in the region and is actively pushing for a return to the pre-merger status, which will provide greater autonomy and less state control
However, six years later, these promises remain largely unfulfilled. This ongoing failure has reignited debate over whether merging FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was a prudent decision. Vested interest groups have increasingly argued — sometimes compellingly — for reversing the merger and restoring the previous administrative structure, despite the persistent insecurity in the region. In recent months, I have personally observed seminars, symposiums and other discussions where tribal elites and bureaucrats are pushing to undo the merger, a move that could undermine Pakistan's efforts against militancy.
The TTP is also a significant stakeholder in the ongoing unrest, with one of its primary demands being the reversal of the FATA merger. The group views the merger as a threat to its influence in the region and is actively pushing for a return to the pre-merger status, which will provide greater autonomy and less state control.
This piece theoretically, and briefly, explores how the pre-merger FATA provided sanctuaries to militants, and argues that reversing the merger would recreate ungoverned spaces, benefiting TTP and other terrorist groups to unstable the region. The concept of "unprotected" or ungoverned spaces in FATA is crucial to understanding the conditions that gave rise to militancy in the region. These areas were characterised by indirect governance by the tribal chiefs (Maliks) and minimal direct control by the Pakistani state, effectively allowing them to become sanctuaries for terrorist groups. On the other hand, the socio-political landscape of FATA—marked by tribal hierarchies, alienation, unemployment, and historical injustices—facilitated the growth of militant ideology.
To understand the persistence of militancy in FATA, Kalyvas Stathis' (2006) work on the 'logic of violence in civil wars' is instructive, particularly his "control-collaboration" model. Kalyvas argues that militant groups thrive in areas with weak state control, where they exploit governance vacuums, establish influence, and build legitimacy through local collaboration. In such "unprotected" spaces, militants often function as de facto authorities, sometimes more effectively, though coercively, than formal governance. This model is especially relevant to FATA, where the Pakistani state historically exercised minimal direct governance, relying instead on informal tribal systems.
In the early days in former FATA, the Taliban exploited these unprotected spaces by filling in governance gaps—providing an alternative justice system through Sharia courts that many found more efficient and less corrupt than the state's formal or tribal justice mechanisms. This allowed them to establish control over the population, who — faced with a choice between a corrupt and distant state apparatus and an active militant group providing some form of governance — often opted for the latter, either out of convenience or coercion.
This dynamic helps explain why militancy flourished in the former FATA. The state's indirect control through tribal Maliks, and reliance on quasi-military forces such as the Khassadars, was inconsistent and often divided. This weak institutional presence created an environment where militant groups could gain influence without much resistance. The Taliban's strategy of targeting and eliminating Maliks —traditional powerholders in the tribal system — further weakened the state's indirect influence, allowing the insurgents to carve out stronger pockets of control.
Disillusioned with the state's inaction, many locals are now increasingly willing to take up arms against the militants themselves, risking an escalation into a civil conflict — similar to the current situation in Kurram
Despite over six years having passed, the government has not fully extended its authority in those areas, due to either limited financial resources or weak capacity. Some argue that the real issue is the government's lack of political will to develop the area and bring it on par with the rest of Pakistan.
The interplay between "unprotected" spaces and the Taliban's tactical use of violence and social control made FATA a base for militant activities. These pockets of Taliban control expanded and became entrenched not just due to their military strength but because they managed to create a form of territorial control with localised collaboration.
The Taliban's governance relied on both coercion and their ability to offer what the state could not — dispute resolution, security for supporters, and a semblance of stability in a neglected region. However, this was short-lived as the local population soon recognised their mistake and aligned with the Pakistani military to expel the TTP and other militant groups, culminating in the success of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014-15. The people of former FATA have faced government neglect in recent years. Disillusioned with the state's inaction, many locals are now increasingly willing to take up arms against the militants themselves, risking an escalation into a civil conflict — similar to the current situation in Kurram.
Kalyvas' "control-collaboration" model thus sheds light on the resilience of militancy in FATA, demonstrating that the Taliban's success was not just due to their military capabilities but also a result of the structural weakness of state control in these unprotected areas. The potential reversal of the FATA merger threatens to undo years of efforts to bring the region into Pakistan's socio-political mainstream. Undoing the merger could mean reverting to the same conditions that allowed Taliban groups to thrive in the first place — an environment where governance is indirect, security is fragmented, and local discontent can easily be channelled into militant recruitment. The socio-political alienation of the youth, combined with a vacuum of effective governance, would once again create fertile ground for the TTP and other militant groups.
The federal and provincial governments must fulfil their six-year-old promises and collaborate to implement both short-term and long-term strategies for effectively mainstreaming FATA, ensuring security is paramount, as it will help the population feel safe and build trust in the state's justice and security systems
If FATA reverts to its pre-merger status, the risk is that the Taliban would regain "unprotected" spaces, which historically enabled them to conduct operations with minimal resistance. Given the support from the Afghan Taliban and the complexity of securing these terrains, reversing the merger would ultimately make FATA a haven for militancy—a base of operations against Pakistan.
Instead, the federal and provincial governments must fulfil their six-year-old promises and collaborate to implement both short-term and long-term strategies for effectively mainstreaming FATA, ensuring security is paramount, as it will help the population feel safe and build trust in the state's justice and security systems. Initial steps should include modernising the police force and accelerating the extension of the full judicial system to the region, followed by focused efforts on local development, improving education, and creating employment opportunities—particularly for the youth, who are most vulnerable to recruitment by militant groups. Additionally, the government must resolve longstanding land disputes, which are a key driver of violent conflict between Shia and Sunni tribes in Kurram.
These tasks are understandably daunting, given the government's limited resources and its focus on other so-called pressing issues. However, it is crucial that they take the first steps without further delay, as progress in these areas will pave the way for broader development.