On June 22, 2024, the National Action Plan's apex committee, chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, announced the launch of "Operation Azm-e-Istehkam," aimed at eradicating terrorism in the country. Within a decade, this marked the third major security operation, following Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad. However, unlike previous operations, this announcement was met with significant resistance—not from outlawed groups, but from political and social circles.
The reasons behind this unexpected opposition are complex and merit further investigation. This column seeks to explore the key factors that led to the disagreement and its potential implications.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) issued its note of dissent against the operation asking for its ratification from the parliament. Speaking on the floor of the National Assembly, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, strongly criticised the PTI and accused it of "standing with terrorists" for opposing the newly launched "Operation Azm-e-Istehkam." He also pointed out that the operation was approved by the Central Apex Committee on the National Action Plan (NAP), with top officials from all provinces in attendance, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's (KP) PTI-backed Chief Minister, Ali Amin Gandapur.
PTI lawmakers staged a one-hour walkout in protest of the military operation, only to return later, chanting slogans such as "end the operation" and "we want peace.
In a media briefing on June 25, Advisor to K-P Chief Minister on Information Barrister Saif criticised the federal government for causing confusion regarding Operation Azm-e-Istehkam. He explained that a meeting led by Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur, with members of the National Assembly, had discussed the operation, but the operation’s specifics remained unclear. Saif also pointed out that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as a front-line province in the fight against terrorism, cannot bear additional burdens without more clarity. He revealed that Gandapur had consulted PTI founder Imran Khan, who also opposed the operation due to a lack of details.
PTI lawmakers staged an hour-long walkout to protest the military operation, only to return later, chanting slogans such as "end the operation" and "we want peace." Meanwhile, both the PTI and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) urged political parties to contribute to peace efforts in KP, arguing that military action alone would not resolve the province's security challenges. Though their stance appeared principled, it contained a contradiction: while advocating for a political approach alongside military measures, they implied that only a political solution was the best option. This could have been advantageous to militants, allowing them to pursue their goals without facing military resistance.
In a tribal jirga convened through the combined efforts of JUI-F and PTI, the proposed military operation also became a subject of discussion. Briefing the press, JUI-F, chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman pointed out that the jirga had expressed strong reservations about the operation and highlighted that armed groups have now spread across multiple regions of the province, establishing control over traffic and setting up unauthorised checkpoints. He further noted that police in the southern districts were so fearful that they avoid leaving the safety of their stations at night.
Seeking a political solution through peace negotiations with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has long been a contentious issue. Religious and right-wing political parties have consistently advocated for talks with the TTP, but these efforts have repeatedly failed. In 2014, the PML-N government initiated dialogue with the group but was left with no option but to abandon the effort after the devastating attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, which claimed the lives of 134 students and teachers. The tragedy starkly demonstrated the futility of dialogue with militants who understand only the language of violence.
This year, before the government decided to launch an operation, Maulana Fazlur Rehman visited Afghanistan, aiming to persuade the Afghan Taliban to facilitate a peaceful settlement between Pakistan and the TTP. However, in its January 9, 2024 edition, the Pashto-language daily Worazpanra Wahdat questioned whether the Afghan Taliban would be willing to show flexibility in handing over TTP leaders at Fazlur Rehman's request. The paper noted that the Afghan Taliban had previously refused such demands and, based on current realities, were unlikely to change their stance following Fazlur Rehman's visit.
Despite these challenges, both the JUI-F and the PTI continued emphasising the importance of cultivating strong "brotherly relations" with Afghanistan and advocated for the creation of an economic corridor at key border crossings to enhance economic ties. Their stance was rooted in their ideological view, which consistently treated militants as brothers—a perception that remained unchanged even after the horrific Army Public School (APS) attack.
An ally of the PTI, the Pakhtun Khwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), also took a strong stance against the operation, even threatening to take the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The party argued that decisions like initiating Operation Azm-e-Istehkam must reflect the clear will of the majority. Its leadership emphasised that unilateral military actions risk alienating significant segments of the population, potentially escalating conflict rather than resolving it.
Surprisingly, the Awami National Party (ANP), a left-leaning party that has suffered more from terrorist attacks than any other political group, also opposed the military operation, offering several reasons for its stance. The ANP criticised the operation as a unilateral decision, arguing that it failed to foster public trust in either negotiations or military action. ANP leader Mian Iftikhar questioned the operation's strategy, asserting that the roots of terrorism lay in Punjab, and challenged the legitimacy of previous peace talks. He demanded to know under whose authority former spy chief General (retired) Faiz Hameed had initiated negotiations with the terror outfit and how 40,000 terrorists had 'infiltrated' the country. Iftikhar also called for both the national and provincial assemblies to be consulted before any military action proceeded.
In response to criticism of the proposed military operation, the ruling party launched a counter-narrative to mitigate the negative impact stirred by its opponents. During an interview with Voice of America (VoA), Defense Minister Khawaja Asif emphasised that the decision to initiate the operation was well-considered and not rushed. While the government remained resolute, Asif acknowledged the challenge posed by political opposition. He, however, unequivocally ruled out the possibility of negotiations with the banned TTP, asserting, "There is no ground for dialogue." Asif also criticised the previous PTI government's attempt to reintegrate some 4,000 to 5,000 TTP militants, arguing that had the effort succeeded, the current unrest might have been averted.
While political parties debated the military operation, outlaws continued their violent activities, prompting security forces to launch counter-offensives. In just three months (July to September 24), the fatalities among security personnel rose to 187 from 105 in the previous quarter (April to June). Civilian fatalities also surged, increasing from 122 to 275 over the same period. Meanwhile, 227 outlaws were killed, compared to 144 in the previous quarter. Despite this, the combined fatalities of civilians and security personnel—462—were nearly 45% higher than those of the outlaws. This drastic escalation in terrorism, however, failed to raise alarm among the opponents of the military operation.
In October, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) organised a three-day Pashtun Jirga in Jamrud, which was eventually backed by the government and drew a large turnout, including representatives from various political parties and professional organisations. On the final day of the gathering, participants issued a declaration opposing military operations and calling for the withdrawal of both the army and militant groups, such as the TTP and Da'esh, from the region within two months.
Following the conclusion of the jirga, the Afghan Taliban accused the Pashtun jirga of being orchestrated by "contractors and mercenaries." This stance from the Afghan Taliban was unexpected, especially given that its long-standing ally, the TTP, had backed the jirga with the ceasefire
In addition to these demands, the PTM shared sobering statistics on the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism operations in their ares. According to their data, some 5.7 million people had been displaced, with 2.3 million still homeless. The movement also claimed that over the past two decades, some 76,584 people had been killed, including 1,375 tribal elders and 3,000 religious figures, in bomb blasts and targeted attacks. Moreover, at least 6,700 individuals have gone missing during this period.
There are several aspects of this grand jirga that warrant closer examination and need to be placed in the proper context. Initially, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government had banned the PTM, warning the public against any affiliation with the movement. However, PTM was later allowed to proceed with the jirga, and even the KP Chief Minister participated.
In an unexpected show of support for the Pashtun jirga, the TTP announced a five-day ceasefire on October 6. Yet, following the conclusion of the jirga, the Afghan Taliban accused the Pashtun jirga of being orchestrated by "contractors and mercenaries" of Pakistani security services. This stance from the Afghan Taliban was unexpected, especially given that its long-standing ally, the TTP, had backed the jirga with the ceasefire.
In addition to the tacit support and criticism surrounding the jirga, the statistics shared by the PTM suggested that KP alone bore the brunt of terrorism and counter-terrorism atrocities. However, the figure of 76,584 fatalities cited by the PTM, was inaccurate. Comprehensive data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal indicates that some 68,969 people lost their lives in such incidents across Pakistan between March 2000 and October 19, 2024. Of these, 34,958 were identified as terrorists, while the rest were civilians and security personnel. If we equate outlaws with civilians and security personnel, we either need to redefine the term 'terrorist' or wait until they succeed in establishing their rule in the country. Mind it, this number represents the entire country, not just KP.
According to the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), from 2013 to June 2024, a total of 28,044 fatalities resulted from terrorism and counterterrorism operations nationwide. Of these, 14,037 were in KP, 6,453 in Sindh, 5,664 in Balochistan, 1,674 in Punjab, and 216 in Islamabad, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Out of the 28,044 deaths, 11,872 were militants and Baloch separatists. Civilians made up the largest group of victims, with 11,638 deaths, while 4,523 security personnel also lost their lives.
Undoubtedly, the provinces of KP and Balochistan have suffered the most from violence, largely due to the legacy of the jihad that began against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and later shifted to opposing the US occupation. After the fall of the Afghan government, jihadists refocused their efforts on Pakistan, especially targeting areas near the Afghan border. While KP and Balochistan, were the primary victims, the violence is now gradually spreading to other regions of the country as well.
To effectively combat the scourge of terrorism, a unified national strategy is essential, rather than relying on regional or narrow responses. The fight against terrorism requires collective resolve from all segments of Pakistan. To expect that a jirga's demands would compel militants to peacefully abandon the region is a mere fantasy. Just a week after the jirga's conclusion, militants from the outlawed TTP and Lashkar-e-Islami set up parallel courts in pockets of the Tirah Valley, a mere 12 kilometers from Jamrud, where the PTM Jirga was held. These militants have begun collecting Ushr from local drug dealers, openly challenging the government's authority and showing their disregard for the jirga's demands.
The question now is: will the PTM take action against these militant groups, who are extorting money from Pashtun businessmen and drug dealers, or will they rely on the security forces to intervene? The reality on the ground suggests that the militants remain undeterred and continue to exert their influence, raising concerns about the efficacy of local initiatives in tackling this growing threat.