The Gaza crisis has erupted once more. Rockets are being fired at Israeli cities, just like in 2012, 2009 and 2006, and the Israeli ground offensive is now underway as well. Heavy civilian causalities are being reported as a consequence of the continuous bombardment of Gaza. But the question is, how is the present Israeli operation, named Protective Edge, different than the 2012 operation Pillar of Defense, and the Israeli-Lebanon/Hezbollah war of 2006?
While the present crisis seems to be a repeat of the past, the geopolitical situation of the region is much different. The Arabs are deeply divided. The Middle East Peace Process lies in stalemate with the US having withdrawn from its role of the primary interlocutor. Moreover, the emergence of the Palestinian unity government, represented by Hamas and Fatah, is perceived as quite threatening by Israel. The most important variation, however, is that Iran is for the first time engaged in negotiations with the global powers (P5+1). Lastly, Hezbollah has other war theaters to worry about, mainly Syria and Iraq, than to get involved with Israel.
[quote]There is synergy of interests between the regional Sunni Arab States and Israel[/quote]
This may represent an opportunity for Israel to deal with Hamas when the Arabs, Iranians and the Turks are distracted by IS (formerly ISIS) threat, and the conflict of Syria and Iraq. However, with the region being so volatile, there are other unpredictable tangents.
The Arab Transformation
The Gulf nations, especially Qatar and the Saudis, are caught in their own battle for supremacy in the region, and to establish their influence over one or the other Palestinian faction. While Qatar, along with Turkey and Iran, has economically supported Gaza and by default Hamas, Saudis and Israelis see this as detrimental to the two-state solution.
Differences also exist over the affairs of Syria and which opposition fighters to support there – the moderates or the Al Qaeda and IS linked extremists. Then there is divergence over the future of Egypt, where Saudi Arabia went out of its way to back al-Sisi, who had earlier removed Muslim Brotherhood supported Morsi government. On the other hand, Qatar, Turkey and Iran, criticized the removal of Morsi from power. Among other matters, Morsi was attempting to develop better relations with Iran and this had greatly worried the Gulf States. As the Gaza crisis unfolds, it is quickly becoming apparent that one of the major casualties of the changes in Egypt was its traditional role of playing a peacemaker between Hamas and Israel. With the crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood, al-Sisi seems to have lost this influence.
[quote]If the Arab state actors do not live up to their role, Iran and non-state actors will fill that vacuum[/quote]
While Saudis and Turkey do not see eye-to-eye over the future of Gaza and Egypt, they coincide over how to handle the Syrian quagmire, where Iran is supporting the Assad government.
The evolving situation of Iraq has complicated and added pressures on the Saudis and on the positions of other Gulf States as well. On the one hand, they loathed the Iranian supported Nouri al-Maliki regime, but on the other hand they fear the IS onslaught, whose direction could easily change towards Arab states that are already reeling under the stress of Arab Awakening.
Iranian Détente and Israeli Operation
The underlying theme in the whole Middle East affair is the surging influence of Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, over Iraq and Syria. While the West is fighting a war against the Sunni non-state actors, the Shia non-state actors are playing a dual role; firstly by countering Sunni extremists and secondly by enhancing Iranian influence.
Iran’s budding detente with the West also tilts matters in its favor, which is perceived as a dangerous turn of events by the Sunni Arab states, and by Israel as well. The approach adopted by US towards Arab Spring afflicted nations, especially Egypt, and against military strikes against Syria, has furthered the paranoia in Arab capitals.
In short, and ironically, there is synergy of interest between the regional Sunni Arab States and Israel. They both support Fatah over Hamas, the secular set up in Egypt, reversal of Iran’s regional resurgence and its endeavor towards acquiring nuclear weapons.
Last time Gaza erupted in 2012, and Lebanon in 2006, the West had not yet engaged Iran in negotiations over its nuclear program, and the regional Sunni and Shia non-state actors were not as influential as they are today.
For the first time negotiations have helped engage Iran while creating leverage for the West. Now Iran has to seriously prioritize its interests and evaluate if it is more important to achieve a permanent nuclear deal and normalization of ties with the West. Or, will it continue with activities in Syria, and in support of Hezbollah and Hamas that are considered highly detrimental. From western perspective, Iran’s cooperation and constructive role in these areas, including in Iraq, can be highly conducive in achieving peace between Israel and Palestine.
Where differences still exist on reaching a final deal, the reason the talks have been extended beyond July 20th is probably because engagement with Iran is already helping to control its behavior and influence vis-à-vis various regional flashpoints. However, this approach requires managing anxieties of Israel and Sunni Arab nations.
Fighters step on and point weapons at a poster of Bashar Al-Assad in Aleppo, Syria
At this point, two outcomes are likely to further aggravate their concerns. First, the centrality of the nuclear talks, especially how Iran interprets it, is on the containment of its nuclear program, not elimination. Will this be acceptable to Israel is yet to be seen. Moreover, the negotiations seem to increase Iran’s leeway in the long run, and at the same time, eliminate the threat of a military strike against it. The debate continues if a ‘full spectrum’ approach to the talks with Iran is feasible. Israel has supported a stance that negotiations with Iran should also encompass its support for terrorism, human right abuses, and ballistic missile development etc. Iran has resisted such a broad approach.
How Israel Benefits
While the rise of Iran and its proxies is threatening towards Israel, in the long run, it also has a positive impact in the short term. Israel benefits when the attention of major regional players is not focused towards it. Nothing accomplishes this more than the Shia-Sunni state and non-state struggles. Hezbollah is already engaged in saving the Assad regime in Syria and is also thinking of getting involved in Iraq. In this environment, it would hardly want to get entangled with Israel. Similarly, the Sunni non-state actors are also not yearning to shift their focus away from diminishing the influence of Iran and its proxies in the region.
The present schism in the region and Iran’s engagement in nuclear talks with the West, allows Israel the opportunity to act without liability against Hamas and Gaza. Although this approach is not without consequences, the direction of the storm brewing in the Middle East can turn at a moments notice. If Israel is not careful, it can become a magnate that attracts the attention of Sunni non-state actors in the region. This is why Mursi’s Muslim Brotherhood government was viewed with such fear in Egypt.
As reflected by the loss of Egyptian influence, if other state actors continue to fail in playing a balanced approach, they too will start to loose relevance. Every time Israel launches aerial bombardments and ground operations and acts with impunity, the Arab and Gulf States appear more and more impotent, leading to more loss of credibility while making peaceful settlement more elusive.
Respected Saudi journalist and editor-at-large of Saudi Gazette, Khaled Almaeena, wrote in Al Arabia News recently:
“The Arab masses see images of dead bodies of men, women and children. They observe the total disregard for the sanctity of places of worship and hospitals. They see orphanages being blown to bits. Above all they see the complete paralysis and helplessness of Arab governments which cannot even pressure their so-called friends in the West to ask Israel to stop this aggression.”
It was the 2009 Gaza blockade that eventually led to 2010 Freedom Flotilla incident and the resurgence of Turkish image as the champion of Muslim causes. This Arab political and social weakness is also linked to the Arab Awakening that got underway in late 2010 and arrived in Egypt in 2011.
Future Prospects
Irrespective of the stated aims of the operation Protective Edge, the present crisis will do the same; shift the pendulum even more against regional state actors. Rationally thinking, this could hardly be the strategic aim of Israel in the long-term. As the Middle East Peace Process lies in impasse, the quandary for Israel is if it would want to negotiate peace with the state actors now, or non-state actors in the future. Obviously, the non-state actors options will not involve a negotiated solution. If the Arab state actors do not live up to their role, Iran and non-state actors will fill that vacuum. Barring a miracle, the ground situation indicates that it may already be too late for the Arab regimes.
Whether it is lack of governance, corruption, or war against terror, religious conservatism is increasing across the regional landscape. A trend noted in PoliTact’s forecast. In this environment, attempts to maintain a status quo or reverting to the past models will only lead to more bloodshed. This is what happened in Egypt, while Saddam loyalist in Iraq and former military figures in Libya, are also attempting to reverse the clock.
In a recent report “Losing Syria and Iraq to Jihadists’ the argument was summed up well by a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, Faysal Itani:
“When assessing the field of candidates, the United States must also place rebel actions, statements, and beliefs in Syria’s wider social and political contexts. Not all moderate Syrians are secular; not all devout Syrians are Islamists; and not all Islamists pose a threat to the United States.”
A senior associate at the Middle East program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Frederic Wehrey, puts its this way:
“The most disturbing picture is this introduction of a narrative of a war on terror, that the space for actual opposition is closing and all Islamists of all stripes are being tarred as extremists or jihadists or al-Qaeda.”
The dilemma alluded to above is linked to the fundamental societal transformation that is taking place in the Islamic regions, stratifying it amongst the liberals, moderate Islamists, and extremists. Regardless of the reasons why this is occurring, the balance is shifting towards religious conservatism, which is greatly unnerving for global powers. Especially, when there exists an untested hypothesis that if moderate Islamists were to gain power, they will ultimately join hands with the extremists.
It is this context; the engagement with Iran takes on added emphasis. If a deal over its nuclear program is reached in the near future, it conveys that if properly engaged, even theocracies can act rationally. While this may be true in the short term, the fear remains how this may turn out in the long run.
Arif Ansar is chief analyst at PoliTact, a Washington-based futurist advisory firm (www.PoliTact.com). He can be reached at: aansar@politact.com, and on Twitter at: @ArifAnsar
