Almost a year long speculation about whether or not Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif will retire on time ended this week when army spokesperson Lt-Gen Asif Bajwa tweeted that the chief had begun his farewell visits from Lahore.
At the start of 2016, Gen. Raheel had categorically stated that he would neither ask for nor accept an extension in service. His words did not, however, quell the speculation, which only petered out when photos of his farewell visits started making the rounds. One can’t blame the media and public for their skepticism because they have not seen an army chief retire on time for the last 20 years. The last one to retire on schedule was Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakar in 1996, and he too reportedly refused an extension offer from the government.
When Gen. Raheel passes on the baton as the commander of the powerful army to his successor next week, he will not only have lived up to his promise, but have also revived the tradition of an uninterrupted transition which was necessary to uphold both the military’s professionalism and its public image, particularly in a country where the institution has become deeply involved in governance. The general obviously deserves full marks for taking this route and will be remembered for it. It was by no means an easy and straightforward decision for someone who had been immensely popular with the people, and at a time when the army is not only fighting militancy within the country, but is also confronting hostilities from a belligerent neighbour on the east.
Besides retiring on time, Gen. Raheel’s three-year tenure will be defined by a number of other actions he took, or those he avoided.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan is one of his main achievements. The plans for the North Waziristan Operation had been drawn up long before Gen. Raheel took over command in November 2013. The stage was set to enter the agency, otherwise known as terror’s headquarters, by first clearing the other tribal agencies. But Gen. Raheel’s predecessor had balked at starting the NW offensive out of fear of a militant backlash in the mainland. That indecisiveness came at a huge cost. On average, about 7,300 people have been killed every year in terrorist attacks in Pakistan from 2008 to 2013. At that point, even the civilian government was hesitating from giving the operation a green light because of apprehensions there would be a bigger price to pay. Here the general showed his resolve and within six months of taking the reins at GHQ, his men were marching into the viper’s pit. Fighting was one challenge, and another was dealing with its fall-out. Intelligence-based operations came as the answer and the backlash of going after the terrorists was to a large extent averted, notwithstanding high-profile attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its affiliates. Broadly speaking, the country got its much-needed respite from the attacks that had become a feature of daily life. The death toll so far this year is 1,700, well down from the peaks during Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s time as COAS.
Despite this success, there are concerns, some well-founded, that the clean-up, particularly in the mainland was not as broad-based as people thought it should be. There are concerns that apart from entities such as the Taliban and its splinter Jamaatul Ahrar, or to some extent a few FATA-based outfits, the groups that have been responsible for perpetuating violent extremism were not touched by either the much-talked about intelligence-based operations or the recently started ‘combing operations’. The results are in front of us and some of those entities are emerging with greater virulence after ganging up with external terrorist organizations. Whether the local extremist groups were left untouched for some tactical reason or they did not fit the criteria adopted for those operations, it was a deadly mistake to not go after them. This could blow apart whatever legacy Gen. Raheel had been trying to build for himself. Karachi too is far from having been rid of its terrorism woes.
International skepticism has lingered about Zarb-e-Azb targeting what Lt-Gen. Bajwa says are “terrorists of all hues and shades”. Losing F-16s or deductions from the Coalition Support Fund testifies to this no matter what the military or government continues to claim about the international acknowledgement of the operation. At best, fighting terrorism is a job half done as Gen. Raheel leaves GHQ. This will be his successor’s main challenge.
Gen. Raheel’s tenure will also be defined by the military’s relations with the civilian government. It has been a tenuous relationship throughout the country’s history and it has tilted in favour of the military. Under Gen. Raheel the relationship remained on edge and the military’s influence arguably grew in the domains of security, foreign policy and defense. The government had to cede more space to the military more because of its inherent weaknesses, poor judgment and incompetence than the army’s out-maneuvering. The government repeatedly failed to assert itself and was seen as succumbing to military pressure whether it was foreign relations, Gen. Musharraf’s trial or security-related decisions from Zarb-e-Azb to operations in the Punjab. As a result, the people just looked more towards Gen. Raheel as the messiah. The chief also had to intervene to defuse political crises be they the meetings with the PTI and Tahirul Qadri leadership during the 2014 dharna or the government’s Panama leaks issue. Indeed, Gen. Raheel deserves credit for not falling to temptation and internal pressure, particularly during the 2014 dharna, and refraining from taking any extraordinary steps which would have affected the continuity of the democracy project.
Relations with the US and Iran and the Afghan peace process were some of the missed opportunities. Gen. Raheel may not be solely blamed for these failures, but since he was playing a major role on these fronts, he cannot avoid criticism either. When President Ashraf Ghani visited him in GHQ at the start of his first visit to Pakistan it looked as if things were set for a change. But, somehow that cordiality and goodwill was not built on even though there were repeated attempts to salvage it. Clearly mistakes were made on both sides.
The US too pinned its hopes on him. He was awarded the US Legion of Merit medal in 2014 during his first visit to Washington. During the second trip in 2015, which took place a month after PM Nawaz Sharif’s visit, he was given an unprecedented welcome. According to a US diplomat, in Gen. Raheel they clearly saw a “dependable partner” and “honest broker”. But he failed to win them over with his strategy for the Haqqani network and Taliban.
The Afghan peace process also suffered its own hiccups and as a matter of fact, Gen. Raheel himself carried a message to the Afghan government that the Taliban were ready to talk. There could be several reasons why the reconciliation did not take off. The Taliban first refused to associate with the process when it resumed and then the Americans took out their leaders Mullah Mansour Akhtar, effectively killing it.
An opening in Pakistan-Iran relations came after Tehran signed the nuclear deal in 2015. There were signs Islamabad wanted to capitalize on it. The general’s negative view of the Iranians at the end of the day influenced progress on that count. His undiplomatic encounter with President Hassan Rouhani during his visit to Islamabad over R&AW spies using Iranian soil is seen as the spoiler in retrospect. Adviser on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz dashed to the airport at the end of Rouhani’s visit to explain but it was not enough.
To sum it up, Gen. Raheel has tried his hand at many things, but is leaving behind a lot of unfinished business. He might have been seen off with a higher rating had it not been for his over-ambitious media managers, who created a larger than life image of the general and inflated the expectations.
The writer is a freelance journalist based in Islamabad and can be reached a mamoonarubab@gmail.com and @bokhari_mr
At the start of 2016, Gen. Raheel had categorically stated that he would neither ask for nor accept an extension in service. His words did not, however, quell the speculation, which only petered out when photos of his farewell visits started making the rounds. One can’t blame the media and public for their skepticism because they have not seen an army chief retire on time for the last 20 years. The last one to retire on schedule was Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakar in 1996, and he too reportedly refused an extension offer from the government.
When Gen. Raheel passes on the baton as the commander of the powerful army to his successor next week, he will not only have lived up to his promise, but have also revived the tradition of an uninterrupted transition which was necessary to uphold both the military’s professionalism and its public image, particularly in a country where the institution has become deeply involved in governance. The general obviously deserves full marks for taking this route and will be remembered for it. It was by no means an easy and straightforward decision for someone who had been immensely popular with the people, and at a time when the army is not only fighting militancy within the country, but is also confronting hostilities from a belligerent neighbour on the east.
Whether local extremist groups were left untouched for some tactical reason or they did not fit the criteria adopted for those operations, it was a deadly mistake to not go after them. This could blow apart whatever legacy Gen. Raheel had been trying to build for himself
Besides retiring on time, Gen. Raheel’s three-year tenure will be defined by a number of other actions he took, or those he avoided.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan is one of his main achievements. The plans for the North Waziristan Operation had been drawn up long before Gen. Raheel took over command in November 2013. The stage was set to enter the agency, otherwise known as terror’s headquarters, by first clearing the other tribal agencies. But Gen. Raheel’s predecessor had balked at starting the NW offensive out of fear of a militant backlash in the mainland. That indecisiveness came at a huge cost. On average, about 7,300 people have been killed every year in terrorist attacks in Pakistan from 2008 to 2013. At that point, even the civilian government was hesitating from giving the operation a green light because of apprehensions there would be a bigger price to pay. Here the general showed his resolve and within six months of taking the reins at GHQ, his men were marching into the viper’s pit. Fighting was one challenge, and another was dealing with its fall-out. Intelligence-based operations came as the answer and the backlash of going after the terrorists was to a large extent averted, notwithstanding high-profile attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its affiliates. Broadly speaking, the country got its much-needed respite from the attacks that had become a feature of daily life. The death toll so far this year is 1,700, well down from the peaks during Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s time as COAS.
Despite this success, there are concerns, some well-founded, that the clean-up, particularly in the mainland was not as broad-based as people thought it should be. There are concerns that apart from entities such as the Taliban and its splinter Jamaatul Ahrar, or to some extent a few FATA-based outfits, the groups that have been responsible for perpetuating violent extremism were not touched by either the much-talked about intelligence-based operations or the recently started ‘combing operations’. The results are in front of us and some of those entities are emerging with greater virulence after ganging up with external terrorist organizations. Whether the local extremist groups were left untouched for some tactical reason or they did not fit the criteria adopted for those operations, it was a deadly mistake to not go after them. This could blow apart whatever legacy Gen. Raheel had been trying to build for himself. Karachi too is far from having been rid of its terrorism woes.
International skepticism has lingered about Zarb-e-Azb targeting what Lt-Gen. Bajwa says are “terrorists of all hues and shades”. Losing F-16s or deductions from the Coalition Support Fund testifies to this no matter what the military or government continues to claim about the international acknowledgement of the operation. At best, fighting terrorism is a job half done as Gen. Raheel leaves GHQ. This will be his successor’s main challenge.
Gen. Raheel’s tenure will also be defined by the military’s relations with the civilian government. It has been a tenuous relationship throughout the country’s history and it has tilted in favour of the military. Under Gen. Raheel the relationship remained on edge and the military’s influence arguably grew in the domains of security, foreign policy and defense. The government had to cede more space to the military more because of its inherent weaknesses, poor judgment and incompetence than the army’s out-maneuvering. The government repeatedly failed to assert itself and was seen as succumbing to military pressure whether it was foreign relations, Gen. Musharraf’s trial or security-related decisions from Zarb-e-Azb to operations in the Punjab. As a result, the people just looked more towards Gen. Raheel as the messiah. The chief also had to intervene to defuse political crises be they the meetings with the PTI and Tahirul Qadri leadership during the 2014 dharna or the government’s Panama leaks issue. Indeed, Gen. Raheel deserves credit for not falling to temptation and internal pressure, particularly during the 2014 dharna, and refraining from taking any extraordinary steps which would have affected the continuity of the democracy project.
Relations with the US and Iran and the Afghan peace process were some of the missed opportunities. Gen. Raheel may not be solely blamed for these failures, but since he was playing a major role on these fronts, he cannot avoid criticism either. When President Ashraf Ghani visited him in GHQ at the start of his first visit to Pakistan it looked as if things were set for a change. But, somehow that cordiality and goodwill was not built on even though there were repeated attempts to salvage it. Clearly mistakes were made on both sides.
The US too pinned its hopes on him. He was awarded the US Legion of Merit medal in 2014 during his first visit to Washington. During the second trip in 2015, which took place a month after PM Nawaz Sharif’s visit, he was given an unprecedented welcome. According to a US diplomat, in Gen. Raheel they clearly saw a “dependable partner” and “honest broker”. But he failed to win them over with his strategy for the Haqqani network and Taliban.
The Afghan peace process also suffered its own hiccups and as a matter of fact, Gen. Raheel himself carried a message to the Afghan government that the Taliban were ready to talk. There could be several reasons why the reconciliation did not take off. The Taliban first refused to associate with the process when it resumed and then the Americans took out their leaders Mullah Mansour Akhtar, effectively killing it.
An opening in Pakistan-Iran relations came after Tehran signed the nuclear deal in 2015. There were signs Islamabad wanted to capitalize on it. The general’s negative view of the Iranians at the end of the day influenced progress on that count. His undiplomatic encounter with President Hassan Rouhani during his visit to Islamabad over R&AW spies using Iranian soil is seen as the spoiler in retrospect. Adviser on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz dashed to the airport at the end of Rouhani’s visit to explain but it was not enough.
To sum it up, Gen. Raheel has tried his hand at many things, but is leaving behind a lot of unfinished business. He might have been seen off with a higher rating had it not been for his over-ambitious media managers, who created a larger than life image of the general and inflated the expectations.
The writer is a freelance journalist based in Islamabad and can be reached a mamoonarubab@gmail.com and @bokhari_mr