While serving as a teacher at the University of Balochistan for more than a decade, I interacted with my students on a very personal level. We had heart to heart conversations and one could tell that Baloch students are the most vulnerable and cynical. As Maya Angelou said, “There is nothing quite so tragic as a young cynic because it means the person has gone from knowing nothing to believing nothing.” From many pep talks and interactions with them, I have realised that the blame is on us as a society for the crisis in their lives and minds.
From a historical perspective, the source of the Baloch crisis is a narrative of carelessness, needless hostility, erroneous urgency, neglected prospects, and apprehensive actions to say the least. In the meantime the Baloch have been served an assortment of responses to appease their crisis, may it be military operations, killing of tribal heads or negotiations. General Musharaf and Asif Ali Zardari offered them special assistance packages yet no admissible resolution was reached to deal with their crisis. In the recent years, the state has endeavoured strategies of all-inclusiveness, contribution, and token provincial autonomy. Alternatively, the state has increased recruitment of Baloch youth in Pakistan Army. Ideally, such steps should help dispel the sense of exploitation by the state. However, ground realities suggest otherwise. It will not be wrong to suppose that we have not been effective in managing this crisis well.
Scrutiny of this crisis implies a mainstream policy disaster, where central and regional political and administrative structures have not been able to grasp the whole issue. Pronouncement of makeshift resolutions by every successive central and provincial government has estranged the Baloch. The emotional rebellion of the youth in many parts of Balochistan has worn out the social fabric of the province. Dreadful vested interest of political elites, tribal leaders and non-state actors has ominously eroded the resolve for constructive discourse. Along with a lack of political will from the federal parties, the stakeholders in Balochistan are also not keen to mend the crisis. To sincerely address the problems of Baloch, the focus must be inward.
To tackle the crisis at hand we must understand a few pertinent perceptions attached to the Baloch crisis. First, we need to understand how the issues of Balochistan and the crisis of Baloch are two different things. When we talk about Balochistan, it is about various ethnicities living there, may it be Pashtuns, Punjabis or Hazaras. Tackling the Balochistan crisis will not translate to answering the Baloch crisis. Secondly, over the years we have tackled the crisis of the Baloch as a political or economic problem, as adopted by six points of Akthar Mengal. But we never tried to look at the social and structural aspect of this crisis. This calls for examining the social aspect of the Baloch.
Nobert Elias, the German sociologist, explains that society is a web of structured relations created by the association of people to further their interests and goals that would produce effective social institutions. We need to realise, an individual in society is associated with other individuals through political, economic and social relations. This implies the emphasis must be on people and their relationship with institutions but not on tribal chiefs alone as is the case in Balochistan. In the case of Baloch, the state reliance is more on the tribal structure. The appointed agents of the state in the form of nawabs or sardars have minimal association with the masses or else there would have been no crisis.
For the Baloch, the state’s inability to capture their hearts and minds has resulted in no fresh ideas and narratives taking root. One of the major reasons behind the current state of affairs is the absence of strong social fabric that may guide the Baloch youth in the right direction. To put the things in perspective, let me present a few shreds of evidence to show how Balochistan is going in the wrong direction. Most illegal vehicles (we have specialised showrooms for them), will either have a Pakistani flag sitting on their dashboards or pictures of our army chief, crop commanders or IGFC of Balochistan on them. When the worth of our national flag is invoked as patronage by lawbreakers, then how will the youth seek patriotism as a desirable act? When caretaker chief ministers from the rest of Pakistan are a bunch of highly qualified gentlemen and in Balochistan, we give high school graduate, then how will the youth yearn for education?
When a couple of unqualified and undereducated persons will give a lecture at Command and Staff College in Quetta, then educators like myself will certainly feel demotivated in terms of achievement and excellence. Patronage tribalism coupled with a dysfunctional governmental system has led to the spreading of some extraordinary mistrust and misrepresentations in the minds of the Baloch youth (and others as well).
The Baloch are still struggling to construct a cohesive character, as they have to look towards others for credentials as a patriot or a traitor.
We need to think in terms of relationship-building, rather than seclusion. The role of the masses is fundamental in social change, and we must realise it. The state needs to foster relationships directly, not through a third party. Change cannot be forced from an external source; it just has to come from the people. The state must engage the people of Balochistan directly to create a ‘collective will,’ instead of aiming for ‘collective submission’ through tribalism and political elites.
The Baloch youth will hold on to their old narrative as they may think it serves their interests better. The decision to modify their narrative cannot be forced. If they perceive value in the new narrative, they will adopt it. That perception can only be co-created through interaction, so isolation is not a solution. In a politically un-decidable terrain, a decision involves both consensus and influence but in the case of Baloch, the consensus is missing from the process. The narrative must change and we need a force of young and committed people who build a new neutral narrative for an inclusive Pakistan. The need of the hour is an indigenous think tank that can work around the year.
Finally, the state particularly and the Pakistani society at large, has to ensure a new social contract for the Baloch. We need to give the Baloch the benefit of doubt. One must understand that their anger is not against Pakistan but it is against the injustice they are facing in the society. Their loyalty to the state must not be granted through middlemen Their resistance must be regarded as a means to indicate their desire, enthusiasm and need to get involved rather than be a barrier. Their resistance is not some object to be overcome.
The author is an assistant professor at the University of Balochistan and can be reached on Twitter @sonybaloch
From a historical perspective, the source of the Baloch crisis is a narrative of carelessness, needless hostility, erroneous urgency, neglected prospects, and apprehensive actions to say the least. In the meantime the Baloch have been served an assortment of responses to appease their crisis, may it be military operations, killing of tribal heads or negotiations. General Musharaf and Asif Ali Zardari offered them special assistance packages yet no admissible resolution was reached to deal with their crisis. In the recent years, the state has endeavoured strategies of all-inclusiveness, contribution, and token provincial autonomy. Alternatively, the state has increased recruitment of Baloch youth in Pakistan Army. Ideally, such steps should help dispel the sense of exploitation by the state. However, ground realities suggest otherwise. It will not be wrong to suppose that we have not been effective in managing this crisis well.
Scrutiny of this crisis implies a mainstream policy disaster, where central and regional political and administrative structures have not been able to grasp the whole issue. Pronouncement of makeshift resolutions by every successive central and provincial government has estranged the Baloch. The emotional rebellion of the youth in many parts of Balochistan has worn out the social fabric of the province. Dreadful vested interest of political elites, tribal leaders and non-state actors has ominously eroded the resolve for constructive discourse. Along with a lack of political will from the federal parties, the stakeholders in Balochistan are also not keen to mend the crisis. To sincerely address the problems of Baloch, the focus must be inward.
To tackle the crisis at hand we must understand a few pertinent perceptions attached to the Baloch crisis. First, we need to understand how the issues of Balochistan and the crisis of Baloch are two different things. When we talk about Balochistan, it is about various ethnicities living there, may it be Pashtuns, Punjabis or Hazaras. Tackling the Balochistan crisis will not translate to answering the Baloch crisis. Secondly, over the years we have tackled the crisis of the Baloch as a political or economic problem, as adopted by six points of Akthar Mengal. But we never tried to look at the social and structural aspect of this crisis. This calls for examining the social aspect of the Baloch.
Nobert Elias, the German sociologist, explains that society is a web of structured relations created by the association of people to further their interests and goals that would produce effective social institutions. We need to realise, an individual in society is associated with other individuals through political, economic and social relations. This implies the emphasis must be on people and their relationship with institutions but not on tribal chiefs alone as is the case in Balochistan. In the case of Baloch, the state reliance is more on the tribal structure. The appointed agents of the state in the form of nawabs or sardars have minimal association with the masses or else there would have been no crisis.
For the Baloch, the state’s inability to capture their hearts and minds has resulted in no fresh ideas and narratives taking root. One of the major reasons behind the current state of affairs is the absence of strong social fabric that may guide the Baloch youth in the right direction. To put the things in perspective, let me present a few shreds of evidence to show how Balochistan is going in the wrong direction. Most illegal vehicles (we have specialised showrooms for them), will either have a Pakistani flag sitting on their dashboards or pictures of our army chief, crop commanders or IGFC of Balochistan on them. When the worth of our national flag is invoked as patronage by lawbreakers, then how will the youth seek patriotism as a desirable act? When caretaker chief ministers from the rest of Pakistan are a bunch of highly qualified gentlemen and in Balochistan, we give high school graduate, then how will the youth yearn for education?
When a couple of unqualified and undereducated persons will give a lecture at Command and Staff College in Quetta, then educators like myself will certainly feel demotivated in terms of achievement and excellence. Patronage tribalism coupled with a dysfunctional governmental system has led to the spreading of some extraordinary mistrust and misrepresentations in the minds of the Baloch youth (and others as well).
The Baloch are still struggling to construct a cohesive character, as they have to look towards others for credentials as a patriot or a traitor.
We need to think in terms of relationship-building, rather than seclusion. The role of the masses is fundamental in social change, and we must realise it. The state needs to foster relationships directly, not through a third party. Change cannot be forced from an external source; it just has to come from the people. The state must engage the people of Balochistan directly to create a ‘collective will,’ instead of aiming for ‘collective submission’ through tribalism and political elites.
The Baloch youth will hold on to their old narrative as they may think it serves their interests better. The decision to modify their narrative cannot be forced. If they perceive value in the new narrative, they will adopt it. That perception can only be co-created through interaction, so isolation is not a solution. In a politically un-decidable terrain, a decision involves both consensus and influence but in the case of Baloch, the consensus is missing from the process. The narrative must change and we need a force of young and committed people who build a new neutral narrative for an inclusive Pakistan. The need of the hour is an indigenous think tank that can work around the year.
Finally, the state particularly and the Pakistani society at large, has to ensure a new social contract for the Baloch. We need to give the Baloch the benefit of doubt. One must understand that their anger is not against Pakistan but it is against the injustice they are facing in the society. Their loyalty to the state must not be granted through middlemen Their resistance must be regarded as a means to indicate their desire, enthusiasm and need to get involved rather than be a barrier. Their resistance is not some object to be overcome.
The author is an assistant professor at the University of Balochistan and can be reached on Twitter @sonybaloch