From 1986-1987, the Pakistani military and the political elites were in a kind of ecstasy about the nuclear deterrence they had acquired because of the development of nuclear weapons technology in its laboratories. Pakistan's scientists, strategic thinkers, writers, media, intellectuals and military experts weaved a story around Pakistani nuclear technology, effectively translating into a military reality of deterring Indian superiority in conventional weapons. In the process, we assumed that the very possession of nuclear weapons technology creates a kind of deterrence for the Pakistani state in its relations with India. With a lot of pomp and show, we started to construct a narrative that our nuclear technology had deterred the Indians from attacking Pakistan in 1987 and 1990 — two military crises which emerged before we finally tested our nuclear devices in 1998.
In the wake of the nuclear explosions, our boasts became more and more intense. Our intellectuals, thinkers and media again pompously boasted that it was our nuclear weapons which had deterred the Indian military from attacking Pakistan during the twin peak crises in 2002. The fact that the Indians didn't attack Pakistan during this period despite provocations reinforced our deterrence beliefs. In 2019, in the wake of the Pulwama terror attack, the Indian Air Force carried out surgical strikes in Balakot, but contrary to the claims made by the Indian government, it was clearly short of any full-fledged military incursion. In the Pakistani imagination, our nuclear weapons simply prevent Indian political and military decision-making apparatus from deciding in favour of crossing the international border with massive military manpower, equipment and weapons. For Pakistani elites, the history since 1986 is enough evidence to support their side of the story.
But there is a flip side to this story — the Indian side, which has been recently reinforced by an objective analysis of what has been happening in the field of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the military and nuclear equation between these two nuclear rivals. This analysis, however, doesn't contradict the historical fact that Indians were always hesitant to attack Pakistan in the period between 1986 and 2020. Two trends that explain the Indian behaviour run parallel in this period of history — first, the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and second, diplomatic interventions by Western capitals to prevent Pakistan and India from coming to blows. Facts about what exactly influenced Indian decision-making during this period are likely to see the light of day when Indian and Pakistani states declassify their government documents sometime in the future.
Pakistan has a declared policy of not engaging in an arms race with India — it will be too expensive and could break the back of Pakistan's fragile economy. But that doesn't mean the Pakistani political and military elites and decision-making processes don't consider the requirements of ensuring the sustainability of its nuclear deterrence
The Indians were never satisfied with the geostrategic and military realities created by the possession of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the hands of the Pakistani military. Since the 2002 Twin-Peak crises, the Indians have made persistent and continuous efforts to undermine what Pakistanis usually dub as nuclear deterrents. Their military and nuclear strategies, their weapons acquisition programmes and their Indigenous missile and missile defence programmes all had the intentional or unintentional consequence of undermining Pakistani nuclear deterrence. India-Pakistan nuclear deterrent relations could have been a simple one if the two countries had existed on Mars, in other words, insulated from the effects of nuclear developments in other parts of the world. India perceives a threat from China, and the Chinese, according to Western online public sources, are in the process of making major developments in its nuclear weapons programme. India will certainly react, and Pakistan will react to Indian developments in turn.
Pakistan has a declared policy of not engaging in an arms race with India — it will be too expensive and could break the back of Pakistan's fragile economy. But that doesn't mean the Pakistani political and military elites and decision-making processes don't consider the requirements of ensuring the sustainability of its nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis Indian conventional nuclear superiority. On September 5, 2013, Pakistan's top decision-makers gathered under one roof inside the Rawalpindi offices of the Strategic Plans Division, which commands Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Besides then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the participants of the meeting included Sartaj Aziz, then=Advisor to Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Tariq Fatemi, then-Special Assistant to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, and the military high command. The agenda in front of them was to approve what an official press release issued after the meeting called "Full Spectrum Deterrence".
Translated in simpler words, it means the introduction of small nuclear weapons in the Pakistan Army's war plans. Such approval was deemed necessary in view of some major developments in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal over the last few years. In April 2011, Pakistan had flight-tested the short-range, surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic missile Nasr, which has a range of 60 kilometres. Soon afterwards, another missile called Abdali -- best suited for carrying small nuclear warheads swiftly to a short-range target and hitting that target accurately -- was test launched. At the time of the launch, officials had said Abdali was part of a quick response system to strengthen the deterrence value of Pakistan's bigger nuclear weapons. Experts, however, saw the development of these missiles as indicating a complete departure from the country's nuclear policy, which originally saw nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort. The Pakistanis, however, started to see nuclear weapons as a means for fighting a war with India.
India's focus on developing a missile defence system and its progress in acquiring sea-based submarine-launched second-strike capability could push it in the direction of flirting with the dangerous idea of preemptive strikes
The development on the Indian side of the border during the last three to four years has, in the words of experts, considerably undermined the Pakistani nuclear deterrent. Pakistan's own strategic experts and think tanks have been underlying this development on account of India's acquisition of disruptive military technologies like Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. India's focus on developing a missile defence system and its progress in acquiring sea-based submarine-launched second-strike capability could push it in the direction of flirting with the dangerous idea of preemptive strikes. Another development that can push India toward contemplating pre-emptive strikes is the testing of the hypersonic BrahMos II cruise missiles.
A report by a Pakistani think tank notes: "India's interest in the hypersonic domain can be traced back to 2007, when President Abdul Kalam Azad discussed the idea of BrahMos II hypersonic cruise missiles. Later, in 2009, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Russia and India in the field of hypersonic missiles. On September 7, 2020, India tested the High-Speed Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) and thus became the fourth country to develop such technology besides Russia, China, and the US."
"The defining characteristic of BrahMos II is its hypersonic speed, which provides several advantages, including reduced reaction time for adversaries. Hypersonic missiles travel at the speed of at least Mach 5 (4,000 miles per hour). There are two categories of Hypersonic missiles - Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCM). The HGV uses a rocket as a launch platform before gliding to the target, while the HCM is powered by air-breathing engines known as scramjets. Hypersonic technology is completely different from ballistic missiles as hypersonic missiles do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can manoeuvre on the way to targets. These weapons have the potential to avoid detection due to their speed, manoeuvrability, and low-altitude flight; Hypersonic weapons are capable of travelling at speeds greater than Mach 5."
Indian plans to acquire sea-launched ballistic missile capability are part of its efforts to make Pakistani nuclear weapons capability and its delivery systems redundant by developing a ballistic missile defense and its development and induction of the MIRV technologies into its military formations
"The speed Makes their interception difficult. These weapons can penetrate advanced air defense systems due to their high speed, manoeuvrability, and low-altitude flight paths," reads a report from Islamabad-based semi-official think-tank ISSI. "The development and deployment of hypersonic weapons have strategic implications, as they can deliver rapid, precise strikes on high-value targets, potentially altering the balance of power."
With Indian plans to acquire sea-launched ballistic missile capability, its efforts to make Pakistani nuclear weapons capability and its delivery systems redundant by developing a ballistic missile defense and its development and induction of the Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technologies into its military formations. This all indicates that India is not satisfied with the shape of deterrence relations with Pakistan that came into existence after the May 1998 nuclear explosions. Pakistan has also developed Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology and is making efforts to equip its conventional submarines with cruise missiles that can be mounted with nuclear warheads. So far, Pakistan has not shown any interest in ballistic missile defense. There are experts who believe that Pakistan's development of the MIRV technology is an answer to India's ballistic missile defense capability as this technology allows Pakistani missiles to carry multiple warheads that could be simultaneously launched. Can Pakistani submarines, equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, give it second-strike capability is debatable. So far, I have not come across any answer from Pakistani experts.
Why Pakistani think tanks, experts and research organisations are talking about new military developments on the Indian side of the border which has the potential to undermine Pakistani nuclear deterrent? Now it is clear that there is a growing polity in the country which fears that the Indian acquisition of disruptive military technology will negatively impact Pakistani nuclear deterrent. I was totally flabbergasted by the reaction of military quarters to one of my pieces on Pakistani nuclear deterrence in recent days — they conveyed their annoyance over my writings on this issue and how I mentioned the semi-official ISSI reports in this connection in my piece. I failed to understand and still don't understand why we should deny that India is treading a dangerous path. I believe we are long past the era when the slow-moving and unguided Ghauri missiles could pose a threat to Indian military and nuclear installations.
With each passing day, Indian conventional superiority is increasingly becoming relevant to the military and nuclear balance between the two countries. Secondly, we have failed to stabilise and ultimately introduce cuts in our expenditure on defense
When Pakistani officialdom was considering the option of nuclear testing after Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, two arguments were persistently presented by the nuclear hawks. First, nuclear weapons would make the conventional imbalance between Pakistan and Indian militaries irrelevant. Second, Pakistan would be able to stabilise its defense spending as nuclear weapons would ensure Pakistan's defense and security. Both these arguments have patently been proven wrong. With each passing day, Indian conventional superiority is increasingly becoming relevant to the military and nuclear balance between the two countries. Secondly, we have failed to stabilise and ultimately introduce cuts in our expenditure on defense.
In this very dangerous period, Pakistan has twice introduced something new in the military and nuclear equation between the two countries. First, in 2013, Pakistani inducted tactical nukes in its inventory. This was not in response to any weapons system India had first introduced. So, technically speaking, this could not be described as part of an arms race. Pakistan introduced tactical nukes in response to the Indian Cold Start doctrine — a doctrine under which Indian military planners envisaged a limited war with Pakistan to punish and damage its military capability without provoking a nuclear response. Secondly, Pakistan developed a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology and tested it two years ago. This, according to experts, was the response to India developing its Missile Defense system (MDS). So, this could be described as a part of the arms race. All these military developments are not a good omen for Pak-India deterrent relations. Experts say we are no longer in an era where possession of nuclear weapons and their delivery system could automatically result in deterrent relations between two South Asian nuclear rivals. Precision strikes against strategic assets are becoming a more and more viable and more realistic option. And in the case of India, its military planners could flirt with having an effective defense against Pakistan's ballistic missiles.
The Ukraine war could be described as a drone war — with the Ukrainian military effectively employing the strategy of swarm drones against Russian military machines. Swarm drones could neutralise the enemy's air defense system. Indians have learned this from the Ukrainian war and are now in the process of developing a swarm drones technique in their war plans against Pakistan. A US-based think-tank that reports on Indian and Pakistani drone technologies notes, "The rapid proliferation of drones in South Asia threatens to negatively impact strategic stability. As drones become more integrated into military strategies, their potential to disrupt traditional deterrence dynamics becomes increasingly apparent. In nuclearised South Asia, the ability of drones to conduct precision strikes on strategic targets, including nuclear assets, raises the stakes in any conflict," reads a report by the Henry L Stimson Center, a Washington-based think-tank. The Pakistani military is using Chinese and Turkish drones and is in the process of developing its own systems.
At one level, all these acquisitions and military development appear to be nothing else but madness. Nuclear weapons are meant to deter war, and once you have deterred war, one should be satisfied with this state at the psychological and material levels. Then why should one keep on developing newer weapon systems whose use could simply mean suicide. Suppose, in case of war, the Indian missile defense system succeeds in preventing slow-moving Pakistan ballistic missiles from reaching Indian cities, but only one ballistic missile passes through the MDS. Could India absorb the impact of even one nuclear warhead? What kind of casualties are we talking about here? Isn't it madness to talk about normal civic life if one part of your country is just wiped out of existence? And a similar logic applies to Pakistan: suppose you succeed in destroying one Indian city, how would the Indians respond? Can Pakistan survive an Indian nuclear response? All this is purely hypothetical. These weapons and the logic of their employment exist only in the minds of strategic thinkers and military planners. No civilised country, no civilised society can ever contemplate their use. In the end, it is all madness. The conclusion should be that we must survive, and the Indian and Pakistani societies must continue to exist. If we start to consider this as our final and overarching logic, it will obviate and devour all military requirements and military logic to spend billions of dollars on ever newer weapon systems.