America’s forgotten war

Over the last few months, amid all the coverage that the Trump Administration’s doings have received on domestic issues (health care, tax reform) and on relations with NATO, with China and above all the alleged Russian interference in US elections, there has been little space for South Asia. But in the past two to three weeks Afghanistan has come to the fore in media attention and to a certain extent in Congress.

Much has been made of the fact that this is America’s longest war and yet it received little attention in the election campaign. It is America’s forgotten war. It appears to be a war without end. Some 2,400 Americans have lost their lives in Afghanistan and even today, with a much-reduced presence, the Americans are expending $3 billion a month in Afghanistan while the total cost over the last 16 years comes close to a trillion dollars. How does continuous and expensive involvement in Afghanistan jive with the famous Trump slogan of “Put America First”?



Trump’s take

Trump did not speak on Afghanistan during the campaign and has not done so in the first few months of his presidency, but people recall that in 2012 he had written, “It is time to get out of Afghanistan. We are building roads and schools for people [who] hate us. It is not in our national interests.” Yet, he has been deeply involved, according to Defence Secretary James Mattis, in considering policy options for Afghanistan and has thereafter authorised Mattis to determine the number of troops the US should send to Afghanistan. Has he, in one of his famous reversals, changed his mind perhaps, having been convinced that an abandoned Afghanistan, currently home to 20 of the 78 identified terrorist organisations could become the principal safe haven for terrorists planning attacks on the US and its western allies? After all, he has made it clear that fighting terrorism is his highest priority.

Is he then prepared to undertake the formidable task of trying to set all things right in a country that has seen a flurry of attacks not just by Taliban forces but by Taliban or ISIS infiltrators in the ranks of the Afghan armed forces who have carried out “green on blue attacks” on American forces?

Senator John McCain perhaps best summed up the feeling of frustration among experts—the American public even now largely remains uninvolved—saying that, “After nearly 16 years of war, we are at a stalemate in Afghanistan. Worse, we have no strategy to end that stalemate and achieve victory. The recent deaths of three brave American soldiers underscore the urgency for a new strategy to turn the situation around in Afghanistan.”

How far has this strategy been decided upon? What do we know so far from the statements and testimony of key administration officials about the policy that the Defence Secretary is formulating and will present to the President by mid-July?

First, Mattis says that he has been authorised by the President to determine the level of troops to be sent to Afghanistan. Unidentified US officials have been quoted as saying that the number will be 4,000 to bolster the 8,400 currently in Afghanistan. One report suggests that, in fact, there are an additional 2,000 US troops in Afghanistan but they are not counted since they are regarded as temporary even though they have been there for months. This troop increase will, it seems, be reinforced by additional airpower and artillery so that, when advisers at the battalion level so advise, additional firepower can be brought to bear on identified targets. A contribution from NATO allies numbering roughly half of what what the Americans are sending will be expected, bringing the total foreign troop level in Afghanistan to almost 20,000, excluding the contracted personnel who too number in the thousands.



Second, Mattis has told Congress that “[r]econciliation remains the goal” along with reducing government corruption. He said that “[they] are not looking at a purely military strategy” but what exactly is planned in the non-military strategy, apart from promoting reconciliation, is not clear and will perhaps emerge only when the policy review is complete.

Third, and perhaps most important from Pakistan’s point of view is the assertion that the focus is now on the regional dimensions of the conflict. He posited a “more regional strategy” so that action be “connected to the geographic reality of where this enemy is fighting from”. “It’s not just Afghanistan,” he said. “We would have to change the priorities, we would have to put it in a more regional construct...” This, of course, was music to the ears of Afghan hardliners. General Sher Muhammad Karimi, a former top Afghan soldier, said that, “One of the problem we always encountered was that the US and Pakistan were old allies, which prompted Washington to look at things from Islamabad’s perspective while preventing it from addressing Afghan concerns… Now if they really want to defeat terrorism, they need to include Pakistan in their strategy and recalibrate their pressures and relations with the country.”

On the other hand, when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was pressed in his congressional testimony to cut off all aid to Pakistan and hold the ISI responsible for Afghanistan’s ills, he emphasised that the US had a complex relationship with Pakistan of which the Afghanistan issue was one facet. He did ominously say that he shared the congressman’s concerns.

Pakistan

Media reports suggest that in the regional approach there is not only Pakistan but also India and Iran and perhaps China. Other reports, quoting US officials, also talk of Russia and the Central Asian republics all concerned like the US about Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for terrorists. But there is little doubt that the focus of the regional construct is Pakistan. There was not much media coverage, but there is speculation that the drone attack in which a Haqqani group leader was killed in Fata’s Hangu was the first indication of what form this regional approach may take. Pakistan’s army chief has protested the attack, warning that such “unilateral actions like drone strikes are counterproductive and against [the] spirit of ongoing cooperation and intelligence-sharing being diligently undertaken by Pakistan”. In Washington, of course, this drone attack was seen as coming after our Ambassador in Washington had maintained, while addressing a gathering of South Asia experts, that the Haqqani network no longer existed in Pakistan, eroding such little credibility as did exist.

There will have to be some hard and extensive discussions between the US and Pakistan. Perhaps the resumption of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group meetings agreed upon by PM Nawaz Sharif and President Ashraf Ghani in their meeting in Astana, can provide the forum for doing so, even while the Pakistanis and Afghans talk further about how verified action can be taken against terrorist groups/individuals identified by the other side. There is also some solace to be derived from the fact that President Ghani has not only invited Pakistan for talks to determine what Pakistan wants but has also invited the Taliban to open an office for discussions with his administration.

There is also some solace to be derived from the fact that President Ghani has not only invited Pakistan for talks to determine what Pakistan wants but has also invited the Taliban to open an office for discussions with his administration

These are positive elements that need to be built upon and Pakistan, despite the political crisis through which we are passing and despite the absence of the Prime Minister, now performing Aitkaf, must now be ready with its own policy formulation to coincide with or before the completion of the American review. This is an imperative need which brooks no delay. This is not to say that such a review, and hopefully some agreement between the US and Pakistan, will resolve the problem; but it may serve, in small part, to insulate Pakistan from the adverse developments and ground realities in Afghanistan.

These realities will probably emerge as US experts undertake their review, albeit woefully limited in number given the inability of the Trump administration to fill senior posts in the Defence and State Departments. It is fortunate that Defence Secretary Mattis and National Security Adviser Lt-Gen HR McMaster have both served in Afghanistan over long periods and know first hand the problems that Afghanistan is now facing largely because of power struggles, the continued interest of many in fomenting instability and endemic corruption. These are the problems that the Americans will have to seek to rectify at least in part if they want to be able to leave it as a relatively stable country.

Pakistan must now be ready with its own policy formulation to coincide with or before the completion of the American review. This is an imperative need which brooks no delay. The Defence Secretary is formulating a policy and will present it to the US President by mid-July

Corruption

Mattis has talked about corruption. This permeates every level of government. No job can be secured without a bribe, nor can simple tasks requiring government sanction be completed without one either. This is not unique to Afghanistan, but in the warlike conditions it is extremely demoralising, contributing to the exodus of young Afghans who sell whatever they have to try to secure asylum in Europe. Job creation (there is an estimated 40% unemployment rate in Afghanistan today) and a relatively clean administration is needed but that would require the various warlords to be curbed or eliminated, a formidable task and part of nation-building that is anathema for influential Trump officials.

The National Unity Government has not been able to in the many years since Secretary John Kerry brought it into existence to make Abdullah Abdullah an executive prime minister. Preparations for elections remain stymied both at the local level and therefore for parliament as well. Drastic measures will be needed to bring about change and then to ensure that no ethnic fissures occur.

Government control of territory is declining. The Taliban have not been able to capture provincial capitals but a number have remained under threat. Some analysts in America have suggested that this should be seen in a different context, arguing that according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s most recent quarterly report to Congress, the Taliban has “control or influence” in only eleven out of 407 districts, equalling only 9% of the country’s population. By contrast, 66% of Afghanistan’s population lives under the “control or influence” of the Afghan government. The remaining 25% lives in “contested” areas. This, they say, is not unusual in the region, pointing out that India is fighting two insurgencies, and going on to add that in the Pushtun heartland changing tribal alliances and the problems they bring are the norm. It is nevertheless clear that the battle for heart and minds is not being won and the Taliban message has greater resonance despite serious reservations entertained by most urban Afghans about the Taliban’s system of governance and their harsh implementation of their version of Islamic law.

ISIS & opium

The Islamic State of Khorasan was supposedly decimated by the ‘Mother’ of all bombs when 92 of them were reportedly killed. This came in addition to those who the Taliban had eliminated. It came as a surprise, then, that these Islamic State adherents were captured from the redoubtable Tora Bora caves that had gained fame as the famous hideout for Osama bin Laden before he fled to Pakistan with the aid of Afghans paid by the Americans to keep him holed up. (As we went to press there were claims by the Afghan forces that they have retaken Tora Bora from the Islamic State. Let us hope that this is borne out by independent reports.) The Afghan government now says that it is launching an operation against them. How successful they will be one cannot say and this may then become one of the tasks the reinforced US forces will have to undertake.

The last item on the NUG government’s list of problems, and one important for Pakistan, is opium production and growing addiction in Afghanistan. Last year opium production rose 43% to 4,800 tons. By 2015 there were 3 million users or 12% of the population in Afghanistan. Pakistan, even more so than any of Afghanistan’s other neighbours, is the conduit through which opium flows to western markets. As the flow increases so too will the number of addicts in Pakistan. While this problem cannot be tackled in the short term, without extremely deleterious consequences, it must be a priority for the medium and long terms for all those wishing to help Afghanistan and the region.

Taliban

There is also a problem on the Taliban side. One has known of dissatisfaction among both the leaders and the rank and file with the way the news of Mullah Omar’s death was kept hidden. There are now various groups, each with varying ambitions. How cohesive are those that have accepted at least ostensibly Haibatullah Akhund’s leadership? Rumours are rife that most of the Taliban in Helmand, from which much of the opium-funded financing comes, no longer share this revenue with Haibatulllah.

There is a split of another kind also, according to a more recent report which the NUG government is seeking to exploit. Mullah Mohammad Rasoul, who split with the main Taliban group after revelations in 2015 that the former Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar had long been dead, is the leader of what are called the Renouncers. The government assists them and according to one official, the Afghan intelligence agency pays the fighters salaries equivalent to $150 to $300 a month, and supplies them food, weapons and vehicles. While the group in Helmand is the best known, such groups are said to exist and fight the Taliban in Herat, Farah and Ghor provinces. One cannot say how numerous they are, but they do appear to be a force that cannot be ignored. Who will negotiate their elimination if negotiations are conducted with the Haibatullah-led Taliban?

One can hope that Pakistan will get its act together and do what it can to promote reconciliation while doing away with sanctuaries. But that will only be a small, albeit significant, step towards the larger task of bringing a modicum of stability to Afghanistan.

The writer is a former foreign secretary and has served as ambassador to the US and Iran, among other key appointments. He lectures at NDU and has written extensively on Pakistan and international relations