Chinese Nationals Facing Violence In Pakistan

Over the past decade, attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan have increased, with separatist and militant groups targeting them due to their involvement in CPEC projects. The violence reflects broader political and ideological tensions.

Chinese Nationals Facing Violence In Pakistan

Over the past decade, nearly 47 Chinese nationals have become the target of terrorism in Pakistan which left at least 30 Chinese dead and 17 wounded, primarily due to the perception that the development projects they are involved in are not align with the objectives of militant and separatist groups.

This year alone, two suicide attacks and an armed clash with private security guards claimed the lives of seven Chinese nationals and left two others injured. The most audacious attack occurred at the Karachi airport on October 7, 2024, when a suicide bombing killed two Chinese nationals and wounded 11 Pakistanis. This incident took place just a week before the high-level Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) took place in Islamabad. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group, claimed responsibility for this attack.

This marked the second suicide attack this year and the seventh during the last six years which had targetted Chinese nationals in Pakistan. The first suicide attack this year occurred when a convoy of Chinese engineers, en-route to the Dasu Dam in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Shangla district, was attacked in the Besham area. Unlike the Karachi airport attack, no group claimed responsibility for the Dasu incident. However, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa implicated the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the attack. Both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban, however, denied involvement.

Since China was the first country to formally appoint an ambassador to Kabul, and given the Taliban's expressed interest in joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the likelihood of the TTP, which has found refuge in Afghanistan, directly targeting Chinese nationals appears low. However, the unofficial alliance between the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the TTP raises concerns. This collaboration could incentivise the TTP to pursue actions aligned with the BLA’s broader objective: undermining the CPEC initiative and straining the Pakistan-China relationship. For the BLA, the CPEC program is incompatible with their separatist ideology, as they view it as an exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources to benefit others.

In a move that may disappoint Baloch separatists, China and Pakistan recently announced plans to conduct their first joint anti-terrorism drill in five years, with Chinese troops expected to arrive in Pakistan by the end of the month. Additionally, China has reportedly sought the Afghan Taliban's cooperation in curbing the activities of Baloch separatists who use Afghanistan as a base for anti-China and anti-Pakistan operations.

The history of targeting Chinese nationals in Pakistan dates back to May 3, 2004, when a car bomb in Gwadar killed three Chinese engineers and injured 11 others. At the time, nearly 400 Chinese engineers and construction workers were involved in a $250 million project. This incident marked the first targeted attack on Chinese nationals in the country.

According to data compiled by the Center for Research and Security Studies, by November 21, 2024, at least 19 terror attacks and street crimes targeting Chinese nationals had occurred in Pakistan

Two days after the bombing, police apprehended 13 suspects believed to be involved in the attack. Former Home Secretary Abdul Rauf Khan confirmed that two of the suspects were Bengalis, one was from Gilgit, and the rest hailed from Turbat and Tando Adam.

Timeline of attacks on Chinese nationals

Data compiled by the Centre for Research and Security Studies by November 21, 2024, at least 19 terror attacks and street crimes targeting Chinese nationals had occurred in Pakistan. A detailed timeline of these incidents, along with information on the perpetrators involved, would provide a clearer understanding of the nature of these crimes and the groups responsible.

On July 8, 2007, three Chinese workers were killed, and one was injured in an attack near Peshawar, Pakistan. Officials attributed the incident to terrorism linked to the Lal Masjid siege, though initial police reports suggested a possible robbery. Witnesses, however, stated that the masked assailants shouted religious slogans during the attack at a motorcycle factory in Khazana, 8 km from Peshawar. The victims were employed in the production of three-wheeled auto-rickshaws.

On May 30, 2016, a remote-controlled explosion in Karachi's Gulshan-i-Hadeed area targeted a Chinese engineer but caused only minor injuries to the engineer's driver. A pamphlet from the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Party (SRA), opposing foreign control over Sindh's resources and projects like the CPEC, was found at the site. This was the first attack claimed by a Sindhi separatist group. The Chinese engineer, traveling without security, remained unharmed. Hundreds of Chinese workers were involved in projects like CPEC and the Thar coal power project in Pakistan.

On December 15, 2016, a remote-controlled bomb exploded near a Chinese engineer’s convoy, escorted by the paramilitary Rangers, within the remits of Rohri’s Patni police station. Following the blast, police and Rangers detained around four dozen individuals during a combing operation. The detainees included activists from banned Sindhi nationalist groups Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM) and Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (Bashir), as well as Bugti clansmen working at a Chinese-run crushing plant in Sukkur.

On May 24, 2017, gunmen disguised as police officers abducted two Chinese nationals in Quetta's Jinnah Town, while a third escaped. The Islamic State (IS) later claimed responsibility for the incident and released a video on June 8 showing their alleged murder, which the government denied. Then-Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan revealed that the victims were Christian missionaries who had entered Pakistan on business visas but were reportedly preaching Christianity in Quetta under the guise of learning Urdu from a Korean national. The incident highlighted a significant security lapse.

On December 30, 2017, in Islamabad, a robbery at a Chinese family's house in Sector G-10 in Islamabad escalated when the family resisted, leading to a Chinese woman being shot and injured.

On February 7, 2018, In Karachi's upscale Defence area, a Chinese national was critically injured in a gun attack by unknown assailants, with no group claiming responsibility.

On August 11, 2018 in Quetta's Chagai district, a suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying Chinese engineers near Dalbandin, injuring six people, including three engineers. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility. This was the first suicide attack against Chinese nationals.

On April 21, 2019, police recovered the body of a young Chinese man who had been missing for four days and was suspected to have been kidnapped. According to police, 29-year-old Li Jin Qiang had disappeared from the Jinnah Super Market area on April 15. His friend filed a missing person’s report, suspecting that Li had been kidnapped.

On May 11, 2019, gunmen attacked the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar, Pakistan, killing five people, including a security guard, four hotel employees, and a Pakistan Navy soldier. The attackers, three armed men, were stopped while attempting to enter the hotel. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist group seeking Balochistan’s independence, claimed responsibility. The group stated the attack targeted Chinese and other foreign investors staying at the hotel.

On July 14, 2021, a suicide attack targeted a bus near the Dasu hydropower plant in Pakistan's Upper Kohistan district, killing 12 people, including nine Chinese engineers and two Frontier Corps personnel, and injuring several others. The attackers used an explosive-laden car to strike the bus. Pakistan initially blamed the attack on TTP, but the group denied involvement. Later, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister accused Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies of orchestrating the bombing.

On July 28, 2021, a gun attack in Karachi injured a Chinese engineer working at a factory. Two masked assailants on a motorbike fired at a car carrying two Chinese nationals in the SITE area. One passenger sustained an arm injury, while the other Chinese national and their local driver escaped unharmed. The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), claimed responsibility for the attack.

On August 21, 2021, a suicide bombing targeted a convoy carrying Chinese nationals on the Gwadar Expressway near a fishermen's colony. The attack failed to directly hit the convoy but resulted in the deaths of two children and injuries to three others, including a Chinese national. The bomber, a young boy, detonated the explosives approximately 15-20 meters from the convoy after being intercepted by plainclothes Pakistan Army soldiers providing security.

On April 26, 2022, a suicide bombing outside Karachi University's Confucius Institute killed four people, including three Chinese nationals, and injured four others. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility, marking its first attack using a female suicide bomber. Shari Baloch, an MPhil student with two master’s degrees, carried out the attack. She was a member of the Baloch Students Organisation and came from a prominent family, with her husband a dentist and her father a government director[13].

On September 28, 2022, a shooting at a clinic in Karachi's Saddar area targeted a Chinese dentist couple and a Chinese cashier. A man posing as a patient, wearing a surgical mask, entered the clinic and opened fire, killing the cashier and critically wounding the couple. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a banned separatist group, claimed responsibility for the attack[14].     

On March 26, 2024, a suicide bombing targeted a convoy of Chinese engineers in Besham, Shangla District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. An explosive-laden vehicle struck a bus heading to the Dasu Hydropower Project, killing five Chinese nationals and their Pakistani driver. Initially, the Afghan Taliban refuted Pakistan's claims of Afghan involvement, calling it an internal issue. Pakistan's military emphasised safeguarding 29,000 Chinese nationals working on infrastructure projects. On April 30, 2024, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) confirmed that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) orchestrated the attack, identifying Javed alias Sami as the mastermind and Gul Nisa as his facilitator.

On October 7, 2024, A suicide bombing near Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport killed two Chinese nationals and injured at least 10 people. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, which targeted Chinese engineers working on a coal power plant project.

The following table provides a summary of these events, highlighting the evolving trends and nature of violence against Chinese nationals over the years. It reflects a progression from the use of explosives to more targeted methods such as suicide attacks, carried out by various actors driven by their distinct ideologies and motivations.

 

Attacks on Chinese infrastructure and investment projects in Pakistan

In addition to incidents directly targeting Chinese nationals, several attacks have focused on Chinese infrastructures and investment projects in Pakistan.

On November 23, 2018, an armed assault on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi’s Clifton area led to a prolonged shootout in which three attackers were killed. Two policemen and two Pakistani civilians sacrificed their lives defending the facility, successfully preventing any harm to Chinese nationals. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

On June 29, 2020, BLA targeted the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) due to China’s 40% ownership of the institution. The attack resulted in the deaths of three security guards and a police officer before the assailants were neutralised.

Additionally, on April 16, 2023, a mob of Pakistani labourers at the Dasu Dam site attempted to lynch a Chinese engineer over alleged blasphemy. The incident reportedly stemmed from tensions after the engineer asked workers to expedite their tasks during the holy month of Ramadan, which they perceived as disrespectful to Islamic practices.

While Pakistan has made multiple attempts to negotiate peace with Jihadi militants, separatist movements have been largely overlooked

Noteworthy in these incidents are the regions, perpetrators, and the nature of the violence. These incidents were concentrated in four regions: Balochistan, Islamabad Capital Territory, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Sindh, while Punjab, the country’s most populous province, remained unaffected. The perpetrators came from diverse backgrounds, including Sindhi separatists, Baloch separatists, Jihadi militants, and religious extremists. These actors are byproducts of state policies shaped by the demands of global powers, which inadvertently created these "monsters." Over time, this menace has evolved into a Hydra, extending its tentacles in various forms and directions.

To counter this colossal threat, Pakistan must go beyond conventional counter-terrorism strategies and critically reassess the policies that have fostered a societal inclination toward militancy over tolerance. All stakeholders must unite on a single platform and take decisive action against all forms of extremism in the country, avoiding the pitfalls of selective politics that condemn some forms of militancy while tolerating others. A selective approach will not achieve lasting peace.

While Pakistan has made multiple attempts to negotiate peace with Jihadi militants, separatist movements have been largely overlooked. Even peaceful voices from Balochistan, such as the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) and the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), have faced indifference, despite their persistent and peaceful protests to highlight their grievances and appeal to the government for resolution.

The author is a freelance journalist and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research & Security Studies