The recent confrontation between Pakistan’s increasingly assertive superior court judges and the current establishment marks a notable shift from when a pliant judiciary served as an establishment tool. However, it also reflects polarisation within the establishment as well as the power of digital lynch mobs on social media platforms.
The ruling coalition, leveraging a “brute majority,” reclaimed the power to appoint judges— a power elected representatives/executives lost after 2009—arguing that this change addresses instances of partisan judicial behaviour and unconstitutional rulings by certain judges. Yet, despite the sound rationale for the 26th Constitutional Amendment, questions about the government's legitimacy persist. This debate, however, is far from new. For those involved in democratic and nationalist movements across Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, these dynamics are all too familiar, recalling history beyond recent years or specific political milestones.
Amid popular media's heated discussions around the 26th Amendment, the issue calls for a broader perspective. Ideally, the judiciary should refrain from involvement in political disputes and economic policy, a norm even in established democracies. Judicial activism in Pakistan, however, has frequently contributed to political entanglements.
In April 2023, Supreme Court Justice Athar Minallah, In a detailed judicial note in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa elections case, called for exercising “extreme restraint” in entertaining political questions, since “public trust is eroded when the court is perceived as politically partisan and its judges are seen as politicians in robes”.
Advocates of adopting judicial models from developed nations, such as the UK, should consider the context in Pakistan. Historically, the UK transitioned only in 2006 to a Supreme Court distinct from Parliament, following centuries of evolution. The judiciary's success in the UK stems not only from structural reforms but also from the British culture of tolerance and high standards in legal education and training. This success, therefore, cannot be superficially attributed to the trichotomy of power—a notion often oversimplified in Pakistan.
Historical context
With over two-thirds of Pakistan’s population under 30, many lack context for Pakistan’s complex political history, compounded by low literacy rates and reduced press freedom, especially since Imran Khan’s tenure, when Pakistan ranked 145 out of 180 in press freedom globally. Some analysts link Imran Khan’s February 2024 “victory” to a rising middle class, weakened traditional authorities, and the influence of social media—a combination not unfamiliar in Pakistan’s political history.
This pattern was evident in Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) wins in the 1979 local elections when PPP-backed candidates, known as “Awam Dost” (people friendly), prevailed without even mentioning Bhutto’s name, a silent but significant rejection of the establishment. The PPP also won the largest share of the popular vote in 2002 general elections. Similarly, Nawaz Sharif’s 1993 “I won’t take dictation” speech propelled him to popularity. The electorate, historically, often favours underdog parties opposing the establishment.
Imran’s opposition strategy faced criticism, especially after leaked audio tapes revealed former Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin urging Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa finance ministers to withdraw from the IMF deal, exploiting provincial flood crises as justification
Imran Khan, a charismatic figure, enjoys strong support among Pakistan’s youth, though it remains uncertain if his recent electoral performance reflects only these long-standing trends. His popularity waned near the end of his rule, with some Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) members initially opposing the no-confidence motion in 2022, anticipating he would lose electoral ground without their intervention. Yet, Imran’s removal in April 2022 came amid escalating economic pressures driven by the Ukraine conflict, energy price surges, and record inflation. This, coupled with the steepest inflation in half a century, enabled him to frame the economic crisis as evidence of the ruling coalition's mismanagement and corruption. However, his narrative was full of lies.
Imran’s opposition strategy faced criticism, especially after leaked audio tapes revealed former Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin urging Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa finance ministers to withdraw from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal, exploiting provincial flood crises as justification. Such overt efforts to undermine an IMF arrangement were unprecedented in Pakistan’s history.
The PTI founder’s rhetoric included allegations that the United States orchestrated a conspiracy to remove him from power. By appealing to the anti-American sentiment, he promised Pakistanis “real freedom,” claiming that only he could end the nation’s perceived subservience, with his opponents and military leaders cast as traitors. This rhetoric even led some fervent supporters to dangerously liken him to religious figures like Imam Mehdi, amplifying his populist appeal amid economic struggles.
With a robust social media campaign, Imran’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) used tactics reminiscent of Goebbels’ propaganda methods, intensifying vicious and false attacks on critics and promoting his narrative with an army of online supporters, some of them were once supported and trained by the army’s media wing. Meanwhile, amid the worsening economy, Imran appeared confident that mass protests might induce a coup, hoping he would emerge as the establishment’s preferred leader.
While Pakistan’s military establishment exercised restraint, likely influenced by Imran’s popularity within military-affiliated communities, Imran’s harsh criticisms of the army and certain judges lacked any real conviction in any principles. His vendetta, rooted more in personal ambition than democratic principles, must be examined in the context of his past collaborations with the military, particularly since 2011, to undermine Pakistan’s democratic structures.
Pakistan's power politics: A turbulent decade
In 2013, Pakistan experienced its first peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to another. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Asif Ali Zardari, completed its term despite strained ties with the military establishment and a judiciary indirectly influenced by it. Then-Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, influenced by both domestic unrest following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in 2007 and external pressure from the US, took steps to reduce the army’s overt involvement in politics, allowing the PPP government to operate relatively unimpeded, albeit for a short period. However, tensions remained high.
According to leaked WikiLeaks cables, General Kayani briefly considered pressuring Zardari to resign in 2009 during a political crisis, hinting at a potential “soft coup.” Nevertheless, the government persisted, and in 2010, the PPP successfully passed the 18th Amendment, marking a crucial moment in Pakistan's constitutional history. This amendment limited presidential powers, restructured the Supreme Court’s judicial appointments, and aimed to prevent future constitutional breaches by the military. The 18th Amendment’s provisions also devolved administrative responsibilities to provinces, although it left central authorities with some oversight. This substantial decentralisation marked a historic shift but unsettled the establishment, which was gradually positioning Imran Khan as an alternative political force.
The 19th Amendment in 2010, spurred by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry’s activism, cemented the judiciary’s authority, enabling an era of what many saw as judicial overreach. This period led to the disqualification of Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani in 2012 and positioned the judiciary as a critical counterbalance, often at odds with elected officials. Imran Khan, along with Nawaz Sharif, vocally endorsed this judicial assertiveness, capitalising on the political fallout.
In May 2011, the US raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad further strained civil-military relations. Public outrage targeted both civilian and military leaders, who convened in a high-level meeting to address the security failure. This tension was further exacerbated by the Memogate scandal, where businessman Mansoor Ejaz claimed that Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, sought US support to prevent a military coup. This claim later debunked and discredited, fueled political narratives questioning civilian loyalty to Pakistan’s “national interest,” ultimately serving to destabilise Zardari’s government.
Imran Khan capitalised on the public sentiment generated by Memogate and bin Laden’s capture, galvanising support at a major rally in Lahore in October 2011. His fiery rhetoric against corruption and promises of rapid reform gained traction, further eroding PPP’s public standing. Khan portrayed PPP leaders as corrupt, boosting the military’s image and diverting public discontent. Bolstered by the establishment’s favor, Khan’s “tsunami” movement surged.
2013 elections and the return of Nawaz Sharif
The 2013 elections ushered Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) into power with significant public support, despite Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) alleging election rigging—a claim later proved to be baseless. The elections, with a record turnout of 60%, were deemed largely fair by international observers. The European Union noted Pakistan’s “strong democratic commitment” despite procedural shortcomings and escalating militant threats.
However, tensions with the military resurfaced after Sharif’s government pursued charges against former President Pervez Musharraf. The army, now led by General Raheel Sharif, saw this as an affront, straining civil-military relations. In 2014, Imran Khan’s prolonged sit-in protests against alleged election fraud put additional pressure on Sharif’s government, signaling the establishment’s renewed influence over political proceedings.
2018 elections and Imran Khan’s ascendancy
In 2018, the PTI emerged victorious, but allegations of military interference surfaced. The EU Election Observation Mission criticised the political environment leading up to the election, pointing to the targeted disqualification and arrest of PML-N leaders, including former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, weakening the democratic fabric. Despite securing only 31.82% of the popular vote, Imran’s PTI formed the government, cementing the military’s hand in politics.
Once in office, Imran’s administration saw significant turnover and struggled with governance. His approach leaned heavily on centralised control, using the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to target political opponents. Foreign relations also suffered, with Pakistan’s historically robust relationship with China strained by Imran’s policies, which China reportedly viewed as critical and unpredictable.
Imran’s downfall and crisis post-2022
After Imran’s ouster, he urged his supporters to stage protests if he were arrested. Following his May 2023 arrest, PTI supporters launched protests that led to extensive property damage, including attacks on military installations. Subsequently, the military dismissed senior officers for their failure to prevent these incidents. The state responded with mass arrests of PTI members, leading rights groups to decry the government’s actions as politically motivated crackdowns.
The establishment thwarted PTI's electoral ambitions in February 2024, further marginalising Imran’s influence. A resurgent economy, coupled with PTI’s weakened organisation, bolstered the military’s position, with speculation mounting around Bilawal Bhutto Zardari as the establishment’s favoured future leader.
Imran does not seek the restoration of genuine democratic order as Benazir Bhutto once did. Instead, he desires an army chief and chief justice who would facilitate his return to power, allowing him to wield authority akin to that of Putin or the Saudi Crown Prince
Current landscape
Today, the PML-N and PPP appear to have abandoned aspirations for civilian supremacy, accepting the dominance of the establishment. However, internal divisions persist, with some factions supporting Imran, the once-promoted saviour who now appears sidelined. Former allies and retired military figures continue to back him, even considering extreme measures such as judicial interventions or possible coups.
Ironically Imran, who now demands a neutral judiciary, was a strong ally of former chief justice Saqib Nisar who had supported Imran’s policies during his tenure and was instrumental in shaping the political landscape in 2018. Now, however, Imran faces a judicial system that has grown increasingly antagonistic. Former generals involved in political meddling, including Faiz Hameed, now face military investigations and potential court-martial for allegedly destabilising the state in pursuit of political ambitions.
A struggling democracy
This crisis within the establishment and ruling elites is primarily responsible for undermining Pakistan’s democratic structure. To cast PTI’s current stance as a push for democratic restoration overlooks its role in destabilising parliamentary supremacy. Today’s political landscape reflects not a struggle for democracy but the enduring influence of personal vendettas and individual ambitions on Pakistan’s fragile institutions.
Imran does not seek the restoration of genuine democratic order as Benazir Bhutto once did. Instead, he desires an army chief and chief justice who would facilitate his return to power, allowing him to wield authority akin to that of Putin or the Saudi Crown Prince, all while attempting to eliminate opposition as he tried to do during his rule. This is why he insisted on retaining Faiz Hameed as the ISI chief, but by then, relations between Gen Bajwa and Lt Gen Hameed had soured. Hameed’s ambition led him to continue his activities even after retiring in November 2022, while new judges were appointed to the Supreme Court under pro-PTI Chief Justice Umar Ata Bandial.
This current situation can be viewed as a pushback from within the establishment against the alliances Imran, Gen Bajwa, and some Supreme Court judges formed, between 2016 and 2022, which seriously damaged Pakistan’s struggling and flawed democracy and undermined Pakistan's prospects for restoring parliamentary supremacy that it ceased to have since 1977. Targeting ex-CJP Qazi Faez Isa for a minor role in this crisis is misguided; the characters truly responsible for this political turmoil are Imran Khan and the former army generals. To frame PTI's struggle for power as a quest for democratic restoration is as absurd and historically wrong as characterising the Taliban’s blowback and terrorist attacks as a form of Jihad.