Gulf War Log: The Making Of Operation Desert Storm - Part II

Gulf War Log: The Making Of Operation Desert Storm - Part II

Gen. Kelley and his staff worked throughout the weekend to prepare for the execution of the operational plan “90-1002.” The first unit to be dispatched were 48 F-15 jet fighters from the first tactical fighter wing at the Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, followed by 2,300 men from the 82nd airborne division. Hosnie Mubarak agreed to allow the passage of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower, through the Suez Canal on its way to the Gulf.


On August 6, the UN passed resolution 661 establishing the embargo against Iraq. On August 8, Bush addressed the nation on TV stating: “We seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.”


The next day the UN adopted resolution 662 which declared the annexation of Kuwait null and void, and on August 12, the first elements of British air power began landing in Saudi Arabia. On the same day, Bush was again briefed by Gen. Colin Powell with the help of charts and graphs, explaining the deployment of 2,50,000 troops.


Cheney flew back to Saudi Arabia on August 17, and his journey included Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Egypt, where he won not only political support but also landing rights for the US forces, specially air force fighters, bombers and cargo planes.


Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein had been condemned by the Arab Summit in Cairo on August 10. On August 25, the Security Council voted to give the navies of the coalition the authority to enforce the embargo against Iraq.


By now there were over 35,000 US ground forces in Saudi Arabia, and another 20,000 naval forces on ships in the Gulf, including the aircraft carriers Independence and Eisenhower, along with the big battleships Wisconsin and Missouri. On September 17, the US air force Chief of Staff General Michael J. Dugan was sacked for his interview to the Washington Post.



Bush made the announcement on November 9 in Washington, “I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of US forces committed to Operation Desert Shield.” Neither did he mention numbers nor divulged details. The UN Security Council met on the November 29 to authorize the coalition to use force for expelling Iraq from Kuwait.

During the sixth week of the crisis on September 21, 1990, the Revolutionary Command Council issued a statement from Baghdad claiming, “There is not a single chance of a retreat. Let everybody understand that this battle will become the mother of all battles.”


The exiled Emir of Kuwait had his first meeting with George Bush in the Oval Office on September 28, and later Dick Cheney and Colin Powell had separate meetings with the Emir. By now, it had become more obvious in Washington and other capitals of the coalition states that economic sanctions and embargo against Iraq will not achieve the desired results -- that is, the liberation of Kuwait. The need of the hour was a military offensive to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and to eliminate the danger of an invasion of Saudi Arabia. Then-US army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono had landed in Saudi Arabia on October 6. Gen. Schwarzkopf was now ordered to prepare an offensive military plan and to send someone to Washington within 48 hours to brief the president and the Pentagon brass on his offensive strategy. On October 10, Major General Robert B. Johnston, Chief of Staff to Schwarzkopf, arrived in Washington.


Presentation of the war plan was made in the situation room of the White House on October 11. The plan had four different phases. First three phases consisted of a massive and relentless air campaign, while the fourth phase was a ground assault on the Iraqi forces. The air campaign would knock out the Iraqi command, control, and communications network, while at the same time wiping out the Iraqi air force and air defense system. Subsequent phases of the air attack will take care of the munitions depots, roads, and bridges and the final phase would be aerial attack on the ground troops numbering 4,30,000 men, including the elite Republican Guards Units.


On October 21, General Colin Powell dashed to Saudi Arabia, and held detailed discussions with Schwarzkopf, regarding his offensive plan. Schwarzkopf wanted to double the air force strength, increase the number of aircraft carriers from three to six, double the army and marine forces -- and his final and stunning demand was for the inclusion of the Seventh Corps. This corps consisted of three of the finest divisions in the entire US army. It was based in Europe as the most vital deterrent for the Warsaw Pact forces. With the absence of any threat from the Warsaw pact countries, it was now possible to shift this force from Europe to Saudi Arabia. Colin Powell also agreed to send the first infantry-mechanised division or the famous “Big Red One” from the US.


Around the same time, James Baker started his trips to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, London, Paris, and Moscow to win support for increasing forces to more than double their existing strengths. Bush made the announcement on November 9 in Washington, “I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of US forces committed to Operation Desert Shield.” Neither did he mention numbers nor divulged details. The UN Security Council met on November 29 to authorize the coalition to use force for expelling Iraq from Kuwait. Intense political and diplomatic activity continued behind the scenes. Baker carried on with his meetings in various world capitals. Any of the five permanent members of the Security Council could veto the resolution. China agreed not to veto. Britain and France were already in full agreement. Only the Russians were the unknown factor in this crucial equation. After lengthy consultations, the Soviets finally agreed, when the words, “Use of Force” were changed to “All necessary means”. The resolution was passed with a vote of 12 to 2. Yemen and Cuba voted against it. China abstained.


This resolution 678 was the only authority for war granted by the UN since Korea in 1950. The deadline fixed for Iraq’s compliance was January 15, 1991. When questioned by David Frost about his intentions after January 15, George Bush replied, “I have not made a determination”. Saddam had now agreed to receive James Baker in Baghdad on January 12 but this was firmly rejected by Bush.



Prince Bandar immediately called King Fahd, and said: “Our old friend Suleiman is coming at 3am. He is sick and I will ship him out. He will get there at 3am.”

On December 19, Cheney, Powell, and Wolfowitz landed in Saudi Arabia for a final study of the war plan. Schwarzkopf was told to be fully prepared by January 15. In Washington, George Bush had a final meeting with ambassadors of all the member countries of the coalition on December 21. A full cabinet meeting was held in the Oval Office on January 6, 1991, and a letter to Saddam Hussein was drafted, to be hand carried by James Baker. This was the last ditch effort to avert war.


In Geneva on January 9, Baker met Tariq Aziz for six and a half hours. The Iraqi foreign minister refused to accept the letter from George Bush, complaining that it was, “Rude and undiplomatic”.


Baker now flew to Saudi Arabia to ask for King Fahd’s permission for the start of the offensive operations. This permission was necessary because of a top-secret agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia. King Fahd immediately gave his permission with only one condition that he should receive prior warning before the start of war, and the code word “Suleiman” was agreed upon as the signal for the start of the offensive. On January 12, George Bush received the authority to go to war from the US Congress. The vote in the Senate was 52 to 47, while the House gave approval with a vote of 250 to 183.


On January 15, 1991, at 10.30am, Bush held a meeting in the White House, attended by Quayle, Baker, Cheney, Gates, Scowcroft, Sunnunu and Colin Powell. The final order to turn “Operation Desert Shield” into “Operation Desert Storm” was signed and faxed “Eyes Only” on the top secret fax circuit to Gen. Schwarzkopf.


Prince Bandar immediately called King Fahd, and said: “Our old friend Suleiman is coming at 3am. He is sick and I will ship him out. He will get there at 3am.”


The die was cast. There was no turning back now.