This is the second part in a series of articles on PTV. Read Part 1 here.
PEMRA was formed under a Presidential Ordinance in 2002. Private television channels also started their transmission. The freedom starved nation soon found unbridled access to voices all over the spectrum. Many of these voices earned credibility and an audience.
This meant that PTV under state control, like always, was unable to compete. It faced a two-fold challenge now. PTV had to maintain its status and character as a national broadcaster – not as a commercial television channel – at least in principle. One the other hand, ironically, it strived to make a profit because of the inadequate revenue from TV licence fees, and because of the direction set by advertising and marketing professionals in the driving seats. Their policies had set PTV off target as a national broadcaster – no one seemed to shoulder the responsibility to promote national identity, and giving voice to matters of national interest. Both these core values of PTV were compromised since its inception, anyway, by the self-interests of successive governments.
However, the rise of private TV channels brought new tests and trials.
These channels had split the ads kitty. Consequently, PTV relied more on government sponsored advertising campaigns – in a way withdrawing from competition on the open market. Thanks to the advertising and marketing professionals in the top slots – PTV was now seriously handicapped by the quality of production and resources. It did enjoy some advantages over commercial TV channels that were only available on satellite or local cable systems. In addition to cable and satellite, PTV was also available on the terrestrial system. It helped PTV maintain a higher rate of commercial ads on its screens. But its financial balance sheet always looked bad.
This much was admitted by the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Sheikh Rasheed, in a public statement in 2004. Rasheed had frankly remarked that if the government didn’t impose adding the TV licence fee to the power bills – regardless of whether the consumers of electricity owned a TV set or not – PTV would have to sell the cameras to run its affairs. The Business Recorder on August 7, 2004 reports that ‘Pakistan Television is estimated to earn Rs 3.1 to 3.2 billion only through TV licence fee in this fiscal year.’
Where have those over three billion rupees been going every year – in addition to the revenue from commercial ads?
The overstaffing through political inductions had sent PTV into a nose-dive in the 1990s. Such employees were naturally either incompetent or just lazy, or both. One can dig deeper into this by asking the PTV authorities to provide details of how many hours of programs have been made by each producer annually – especially by those appointed from 1988 to 1999. I’m sure the figures will be very interesting. The quality of the programs is yet another area of interest, which readers can probably determine themselves. That is how billions of rupees have been wasted, every year – on doing nothing, or doing it so ineptly that it looks outrightly embarrassing. Such a TV channel could do anything but earn praise and profit.
The corruption did the rest of it.
PTV earned notoriety in the procurement of programs – the real fruits of the outsourcing policy that the marketing and advertising professionals had brought to the institution. Any private drama producer knows well that what no other channel will buy, they could sell it to PTV at an insanely higher price. This is a solid fact. Irrefutable. The market knows it.
Even the talk-shows are not clean of corruption. Favorites were hired on inflated salaries, the same as anchors and analysts, which God knows how they justified, apart from their political or personal connections. It only grew to become a PTV norm with time, and consequently revenues fell. The infrastructure continued to deteriorate. PTV buildings that were posh once, now looked delipidated – broken furniture, unkempt interiors, outdated equipment and old-fashioned methods of production. PTV became totally ill-equipped to compete with fast-changing technologies and style of programs.
The private channels thrived.
Interestingly, the top positions in many private channels were occupied by the former PTV producers and executives – mostly from the early batches. As they had served PTV well, and they proved their metal in establishing the private channels as well. This explains how the real problem with PTV in the post-2000 era was the calibre of the human resource – those who had been inducted in the previous decade – the 1990s. But they were probably better than those who came later. Their calibre and abilities are evidently visible from the quality of programs on PTV screens that we witness on a daily basis.
In March 2022, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Fawad Chaudhry announced that PTV had earned a 4 billion rupees profit. He boasted that during his tenure as minister, PTV had digitized two channels in its network. But he was probably unaware that his digital PTV was airing programs in 720p – the lowest digital quality. He was probably also not aware of the obsolete DV-cameras that even the smallest production houses have discarded still in use at PTV.
Seriously, you can find one of those cameras on any second-hand online shop for under Rs. 5000. So, even selling that equipment wouldn’t do any good to PTV, as the former broadcasting minister, Sheikh Rasheed had once thought. Fawad Chaudhry was probably also not quite aware of the condition in which all five PTV Stations are. Even a simple uplift and decent maintenance of those buildings would cost PTV a lot more than the sum Fawad was feeling so elated about.
The story, nevertheless, doesn’t end here.
PEMRA was formed under a Presidential Ordinance in 2002. Private television channels also started their transmission. The freedom starved nation soon found unbridled access to voices all over the spectrum. Many of these voices earned credibility and an audience.
This meant that PTV under state control, like always, was unable to compete. It faced a two-fold challenge now. PTV had to maintain its status and character as a national broadcaster – not as a commercial television channel – at least in principle. One the other hand, ironically, it strived to make a profit because of the inadequate revenue from TV licence fees, and because of the direction set by advertising and marketing professionals in the driving seats. Their policies had set PTV off target as a national broadcaster – no one seemed to shoulder the responsibility to promote national identity, and giving voice to matters of national interest. Both these core values of PTV were compromised since its inception, anyway, by the self-interests of successive governments.
However, the rise of private TV channels brought new tests and trials.
These channels had split the ads kitty. Consequently, PTV relied more on government sponsored advertising campaigns – in a way withdrawing from competition on the open market. Thanks to the advertising and marketing professionals in the top slots – PTV was now seriously handicapped by the quality of production and resources. It did enjoy some advantages over commercial TV channels that were only available on satellite or local cable systems. In addition to cable and satellite, PTV was also available on the terrestrial system. It helped PTV maintain a higher rate of commercial ads on its screens. But its financial balance sheet always looked bad.
The overstaffing through political inductions had sent PTV into a nose-dive in the 1990s. Such employees were naturally either incompetent or just lazy, or both.
This much was admitted by the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Sheikh Rasheed, in a public statement in 2004. Rasheed had frankly remarked that if the government didn’t impose adding the TV licence fee to the power bills – regardless of whether the consumers of electricity owned a TV set or not – PTV would have to sell the cameras to run its affairs. The Business Recorder on August 7, 2004 reports that ‘Pakistan Television is estimated to earn Rs 3.1 to 3.2 billion only through TV licence fee in this fiscal year.’
Where have those over three billion rupees been going every year – in addition to the revenue from commercial ads?
The overstaffing through political inductions had sent PTV into a nose-dive in the 1990s. Such employees were naturally either incompetent or just lazy, or both. One can dig deeper into this by asking the PTV authorities to provide details of how many hours of programs have been made by each producer annually – especially by those appointed from 1988 to 1999. I’m sure the figures will be very interesting. The quality of the programs is yet another area of interest, which readers can probably determine themselves. That is how billions of rupees have been wasted, every year – on doing nothing, or doing it so ineptly that it looks outrightly embarrassing. Such a TV channel could do anything but earn praise and profit.
The corruption did the rest of it.
PTV earned notoriety in the procurement of programs – the real fruits of the outsourcing policy that the marketing and advertising professionals had brought to the institution. Any private drama producer knows well that what no other channel will buy, they could sell it to PTV at an insanely higher price. This is a solid fact. Irrefutable. The market knows it.
Interestingly, the top positions in many private channels were occupied by the former PTV producers and executives – mostly from the early batches. As they had served PTV well, and they proved their metal in establishing the private channels as well. This explains how the real problem with PTV in the post-2000 era was the calibre of the human resource
Even the talk-shows are not clean of corruption. Favorites were hired on inflated salaries, the same as anchors and analysts, which God knows how they justified, apart from their political or personal connections. It only grew to become a PTV norm with time, and consequently revenues fell. The infrastructure continued to deteriorate. PTV buildings that were posh once, now looked delipidated – broken furniture, unkempt interiors, outdated equipment and old-fashioned methods of production. PTV became totally ill-equipped to compete with fast-changing technologies and style of programs.
The private channels thrived.
Interestingly, the top positions in many private channels were occupied by the former PTV producers and executives – mostly from the early batches. As they had served PTV well, and they proved their metal in establishing the private channels as well. This explains how the real problem with PTV in the post-2000 era was the calibre of the human resource – those who had been inducted in the previous decade – the 1990s. But they were probably better than those who came later. Their calibre and abilities are evidently visible from the quality of programs on PTV screens that we witness on a daily basis.
In March 2022, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Fawad Chaudhry announced that PTV had earned a 4 billion rupees profit. He boasted that during his tenure as minister, PTV had digitized two channels in its network. But he was probably unaware that his digital PTV was airing programs in 720p – the lowest digital quality. He was probably also not aware of the obsolete DV-cameras that even the smallest production houses have discarded still in use at PTV.
Seriously, you can find one of those cameras on any second-hand online shop for under Rs. 5000. So, even selling that equipment wouldn’t do any good to PTV, as the former broadcasting minister, Sheikh Rasheed had once thought. Fawad Chaudhry was probably also not quite aware of the condition in which all five PTV Stations are. Even a simple uplift and decent maintenance of those buildings would cost PTV a lot more than the sum Fawad was feeling so elated about.
The story, nevertheless, doesn’t end here.
… tender is the night,
And haply the Queen-Moon is on her throne,
Cluster'd around by all her starry Fays;
But here there is no light
Ode To A Nightingale, John Keats
This is the second part in a series of articles on PTV. Read Part 1 here.