Imran Khan is now engaging in the same opportunistic sloganeering, along the old theme of, “I am criticizing the individuals (read Army Chief) and not the institution of the military.” This was also the theme Nawaz Sharif resorted to when he was ousted from power in 2017 through a judicial order. Throughout his public contact campaign, Nawaz Sharif kept on criticizing military leaders, including the then Army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa and his DG ISI, and praising the institution of the military, all the while reminding the people that he had done great things for the military and national defense while he was in power.
Imran Khan is indulging in a similar, extremely opportunistic style of politics: target the leaders, but praise the institution. Punjab centric political leaders, including Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, adopt this narrative when they are backed up into a corner by the coercive machinery of the state which the top brass of the military controls. Contrast this with the opportunistic way in which they praise the military leaders while in power. Imran Khan used to dub General Bajwa the most democratic minded military chief in the history of Pakistan when he was serving as Prime Minister. The same Imran Khan described General Bajwa as the biggest traitor when he started to feel the pressure from the state machinery in the form of charges in trial courts. Similarly, General Asim Munir is acceptable to Nawaz Sharif while his party sits atop the perch in Islamabad. The same Nawaz Sharif used to spit venom against military leaders when he had been ousted from power.
Why do Punjab-centric leaders seek to remain on the right-side military as an institution, all the while criticizing its leaders? The Pakistani military forces as an institution are the outgrowth of Punjabi society from the northern and central parts of the country’s most populous province. The officer corps of the Pakistani army are almost exclusively drawn from the cities in northern and central Punjab. The Punjabi middle classes are deeply attached to the military as an institution. Remember that this is a middle class whose support made Nawaz Sharif a national leader in 1993, when a military backed President ousted him from power and when the religious right parted ways with him. This middle class remained committed to Nawaz Sharif till the 2013 parliamentary elections, but dramatically shifted its loyalty towards Imran Khan after coming under tremendous economic pressure due to worsening economic conditions.
It would not be wrong to suggest that the PML-N, the PTI and the Army as an institution are political triplets. Hence, it will be difficult to separate them at the source of their political support without causing damage to their standing in the eyes of middle class dominated public opinion in Punjab.
The Punjabi middle classes are addicted to state sanctioned subsidies—subsidies which provide the bases of their comfortable lifestyles. The military itself draws loyalty and political support from these social classes. One indicator of this political axiom is that the Pakistani military’s media wing’s publicity campaigns are always targeting the tastes of these classes. The protagonist in ISPR produced dramas is either the scion of a middle-class family or drawn from the downtrodden segments in society, who is trying his best to achieve middle class status by scaling the ladder of success in his military career. So, it would not be wrong to suggest that the PML-N, the PTI and the Army as an institution are political triplets. Hence, it will be difficult to separate them at the source of their political support without causing damage to their standing in the eyes of middle class dominated public opinion in Punjab.
The political idiom and deeply ingrained political narrative in Punjabi society is deeply supportive of what the Army jawans and mid-ranking officers do. This is a middle class which is deeply anti-India, has adopted a deep-seated religious worldview during the last 4 decades, and is dependent on a highly subsidized lifestyle. Anti-India feelings are waning though, as indicated by the popularity of Indian pop culture as reflected in Hindi feature movies and their celebrity actors. Waning anti-India sentiment does not mean that they have stopped perceiving army men in khaki uniform and a gun pointed towards the enemy as their heroes. The Taliban is the new enemy. The military’s massive media publicity campaign plays no small part in this.
Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan’s massive anti-military leaders’ campaign since 2017 has dented the support for the military in the Punjabi middle classes. But the basic narrative that people fighting external and internal enemies are our heroes still holds, and this narrative is supported by a blinkered view of Islamic history and the siege mentality which took root at the time of the birth of Pakistan.
In the ongoing power struggle in Pakistan, the military leadership is continuously taking sides. First, they prop up this side, then they support the other side.
The primary target of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan’s campaigns were the Army Chiefs—General Qamar Javed Bajwa and then General Asim Munir. The office of the Army chief during the six years of General Bajwa’s tenure was increasingly seen as part of the ruling clique. Reports in the media indicated that the Army chief was more powerful than Prime Minister Imran Khan. In fact, memes in social media often described General Bajwa as Imran Khan’s political father.
Therefore, both Punjab-centric leaders, Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif, have fully realized how public opinion will perceive their statements in their prime constituency—central and northern Punjab. Separating the Army Chief, who is perceived as part of the ruling clique from the main body of officers and jawans, who are fighting the enemy and laying down their lives, is easy and convenient; the Army Chief is an easy target in the light of the long and persistent tradition of anti-Army chief tirades from political leaders.
But attacking the institution itself will backfire in central and northern Punjab, primarily because the support for the military profession is deep-seated in these areas. Every other family has a relative or an immediate member serving in the forces. I think General Bajwa is perceived in the same way General Musharraf was perceived by public opinion — the latter became a hated figure because people used to contrast their hardship with the power of the Army chief. After General Musharraf was ousted from power, his successor General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani scored exceptionally well in public opinion polls the moment Pakistani troops defeated Taliban in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009.
Another reason Punjab centric leaders like Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif adopted a highly opportunistic approach towards dealing with the military is the fact that they see the military as a ladder which will help them reach the corridors of power. Both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan are products of military-led intelligence agencies, who propped them up to be national political leaders. With the military's support, both became prime ministers for the first time. Both then targeted the military as part of their public contact campaign.
As a manager of power, deciding who gets how much and when, military leaders think it fair to malign one or the other political party. This is what they are doing right now. So, at present, a basic conflict exists between their role as a defender of national security and their role as the distributors of resources in society.
The ongoing power struggle in Pakistani society revolves around both national level institutions which according to the universally agreed upon principles of political management, should be impartial and neutral in political conflicts. But if a country's military, which should have a monopoly over violence and which should be strictly neutral in a political conflict, becomes entangled in power struggles, the likely outcome could be civil war, especially if violence is already endemic.
In the ongoing power struggle in Pakistan, the military leadership is continuously taking sides. First, they prop up this side, then they support the other side. Although there has been conclusive evidence to indicate that the rank and file of the military has been affected by this power struggle, the rumor mill in the federal capital and social media is not without isolated information about cracks developing in military discipline, especially in the time around the ouster of Imran Khan from power. But there are visible signs that the military’s responsibility as a defender against internal and external threats has come into direct conflict with their role as an institution engaged in the management of power within the political system.
As the defender of national security, the military has a deep-seated interest in developing consensus within society on issues of national security, especially for attacking militants in the Pak-Afghan border areas. But as a manager of power, deciding who gets how much and when, military leaders think it fair to malign one or the other political party. This is what they are doing right now. So, at present, a basic conflict exists between their role as a defender of national security and their role as the distributors of resources in society. Their role as the exclusive arbiter of power among different segments of society does not endear them to the public or to the political elite, and if this power struggle leads to political struggle in the streets of Pakistan, accompanied by violence -- we might be looking at more events like May 9.