Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are calling for international attention to the ongoing threat of terrorism. Pakistan blames the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for attacks within its borders, while Afghanistan claims to have defeated the Islamic State (Daesh), but sees a need for regional cooperation to prevent its resurgence. These concerns warrant an inquiry into the underlying factors prompting such actions. While the intricacies of Afghanistan's stance lie beyond the current research scope, focus will be placed on understanding the reasons compelling Pakistan to make these assertions.
Pakistan has faced a surge in terrorism after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Militant groups like TTP and IS, with nearly 13,000 fighters, target both civilians and security forces. Fatalities due to terrorism spiked from 616 in 2022 to 1513 in 2023, making Pakistan the world's most terror-hit nation in 2023 as per the 11th Global Terrorism Index.
The upsurge in violence continued unabatingly in the first quarter of 2024 as well, with a recorded figure of 432 fatalities stemming from 245 incidents of violence within three months alone. If this trend continues unchecked, the total number of lives lost by the end of this year is poised to surpass the figures of 2023. A brief historical overview of violence-related incidents in the country reveals ongoing factors threatening its security.
From 2013 to 2020, security personnel accounted for an average of 18% of total fatalities per year. During 2021-2023, this figure jumped to 32%, nearly doubling the previous percentage.
From 2021 to the first quarter of 2024, Pakistan witnessed 3,796 fatalities from violence, with 65% being security officials and civilians. Militant groups claimed responsibility for targeting 450 security officials and 289 civilians during this period. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for 245 security personnel and 47 civilian deaths, while the Islamic State (Daish) primarily targeted civilians, resulting in 176 fatalities. Baloch insurgent groups claimed responsibility for 175 fatalities, including 121 security personnel and 45 civilians. A large number of attacks were not claimed by any group.
The sharp rise in terror attacks against security forces from 2021 to the first quarter of 2024 starkly contrasts with previous trends. From 2013 to 2020, security personnel accounted for an average of 18% of total fatalities per year. During 2021-2023, this figure jumped to 32%, nearly doubling the previous percentage. This escalation poses a serious threat to the country's security situation, especially as militants target key installations and engage in acts that violate the sanctity of religious places and affect Pakistan’s foreign relationships with neighboring countries.Top of Form
On September 29th, 2023, a devastating explosion ripped through an Eid Milad procession in Mastung, leaving 60 dead and 93 injured. While the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) promptly distanced itself from the attack, a journalist from Al Jazeera noted the presence of Islamic State (ISIL or ISIS) elements in the area. Jihadist militants and insurgent groups persisted in continuing their lethal attacks in the first quarter of 2024 as well.
Tensions between Pakistan and Iran peaked on January 16th, 2024, as Iran conducted airstrikes targeting Jaish-ul-Adl in Panjgur, Balochistan. Pakistan condemned the airspace violation, citing civilian casualties. Retaliating, Pakistan struck terrorist hideouts in Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province on January 18. Subsequently, Jaish-ul-Adl then claimed responsibility for targeting Hossein-Ali Javedanfar, a former deputy of the Revolutionary Guards, and his two bodyguards in Saravan. These events strained Pakistan-Iran relations, prompting both countries to engage in dialogue. A high-level meeting ensued, aiming to resolve cross-border violence and prevent future incidents.
On March 16th, 2024, a militant attack on an army camp in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, resulted in the deaths of seven Pakistani soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel and a captain. The attack, claimed by Hafiz Gul Bahadur's group Jaish Al-Fursan, prompted a Pakistani counterstrike targeting Gul Bahadur's hideout in Afghanistan. This retaliation further strained Pakistan's already tense relationship with Afghanistan.
The TTP has consistently emphasized its goal of enforcing Sharia law in Pakistan. With the Taliban in control in Kabul, they now have access to a state apparatus to further this agenda. Pakistan's previous "strategic depth" policy, relying on a friendly Taliban regime, may clash with the shared objective of Sharia implementation by the TTP and Afghan Taliban.
Another high-profile terrorist attack occurred in Shangla on March 26th, 2024 that killed five Chinese nationals and their Pakistani driver. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, raising concerns about the attackers' motives and potential foreign involvement. The incident sparked outrage in China, prompting them to send a team to participate in the investigation.
A report issued by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) on February 2nd, 2024 claimed participation of at least 385 fighters, including 12 suicide bombers (fidayeen) in attacking the Mach Jail and Kolpur complex. This breakdown, which includes various BLA units like the Majeed Brigade and Special Tactical Operations Squad, suggests a coordinated and well-organized attack aimed at challenging Pakistani authority in the region. The mobilization and transportation of such a large force, nearly 400 fighters, raises serious concerns, even if the exact number is debatable.
The rise of new security threats marks a transition from the US-led "War on Terror" to a broader “war against the global threat of terrorism.” Pakistan's UN representative, Munir Akram, cautioned that without action, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), supported by Al Qaeda and certain states, may pose a global terrorism threat. This revelation, coming three years after the Taliban's takeover in Kabul, reflects a pattern of increasing terrorism incidents. It appears to be an acknowledgment of potential failure to address terrorism during the US-NATO campaign and highlights the consequences of the strategic depth doctrine. This doctrine overlooked the ramifications of supporting a group with objectives contrary to Pakistan's interests.
Pakistan, like the US, faces a crucial period of introspection. While American policymakers scrutinize their errors in Afghanistan, Pakistan must rigorously assess its own approach in the "War on Terror."
The TTP has consistently emphasized its goal of enforcing Sharia law in Pakistan. With the Taliban in control in Kabul, they now have access to a state apparatus to further this agenda. Pakistan's previous "strategic depth" policy, relying on a friendly Taliban regime, may clash with the shared objective of Sharia implementation by the TTP and Afghan Taliban. Finding common ground between these divergent perspectives seems improbable, given the incompatibility between the foundations of the Afghan Taliban, TTP, and Pakistan.
Pakistan, like the US, faces a crucial period of introspection. While American policymakers scrutinize their errors in Afghanistan, Pakistan must rigorously assess its own approach in the "War on Terror." This strategy not only consumed the $30 billion received in US aid but also relied on additional revenue streams such as customs duties on NATO-US logistics support. Despite these substantial investments and logistical assistance to the erstwhile Afghan Taliban in their resistance against foreign occupation, it now belongs to the annals of history.
Under the new circumstances, Pakistan must formulate a fresh strategy devoid of ties to past policies. All militant groups and their ideological proponents must be brought to justice. A new narrative, detached from religious extremism, is imperative to counter the narratives of the Afghan Taliban, the TTP, Daesh, and their sympathizers. Tolerating any form of extremism will only breed further extremism, jeopardizing global support. Continued appeasement of extremism is untenable.