The first time I heard about the Wakhan strip was from my geography teacher in school who explained to us certain geographical lacunas that the receding British colonialists left in the region on purpose. Late Sir Gohar enlightened us about the Durand Line and the Wakhan track, as the sleeping serpent that he rightly perceived then would wake up with consequences.
The Two Potential Conflict Triggers on the tip of Flashpoints— the Durand Line remains the bone of contention and never tastes better in the Afghanistan-Pakistan bilateral relations ever since the British left the region. The 2,640-kilometer Durand Line was inked under an agreement in 1893 between the British Raj and the Amir of Afghanistan and has been serving as an international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1947.
The almost 350-kilometer Wakhan corridor is at the crossroads of Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and Tajikistan. It separates Pakistan from Tajikistan and connects Afghanistan with China. Generally peaceful, the dirt strip hibernated for a good seven decades. The Wakhan had been an unofficial passage used by smugglers and militaries alike for their own purposes until China realised the importance of developing an alternative route into the region. The multiple vulnerabilities to its showcase China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project taking a snowball effect, especially in insurgency-plagued Balochistan. Wakhan is acquiring strategic value for China’s flagship Belt and Route Initiative (BRI) in the backdrop of an increasingly independent yet dubious role of the Taliban government in Kabul, India’s coercing desire to acquire a physical trade route into Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s own triangular issues with India, Afghanistan and the Sino-American influence on its policy and decision-making processes.
The Shifting Policy Scenario— a visible move in Chinese policy suggests a shift where it seems not likely to get directly involved with the Taliban government for geopolitical maneuvering. It’s vital for Pakistan’s strategic interest to contain the Indian ambition of a direct transit trade route to Afghanistan while Tajikistan would want to ensure its own border security. Interestingly, from 2010 onwards when the United States started telegraphing intent to withdraw from Afghanistan theater, China had started dealing directly with terrorists and other actors in the region for transparency bypassing the customary regional mediators. However, now it seems reluctant about any direct involvement. Perhaps China wants to continue its non-military involvement policy in world affairs and restrict itself to bolstering its economic supremacy agenda only.
As the speculations are steaming in the media about a possible China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan alliance on making Wakhan a viable alternative route for BRI
China which brokered rapprochement between rivaling Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, mainly to ensure the uninterrupted oil supply for power generation and its industries, has now started working on alternatives. The Chinese government has approved building a mega dam in Tibet with the expected generation of 300 billion kilowatt-hours of power annually, Xinhua, the official Chinese news wire reported last month. Along with other hydropower generation projects like the Three Gorges Dam, China wants to reduce dependency on imported oil. It has started working independently of the third-party mediation on terrorism-related issues but wants to look insignificant yet in corpulence of the Wakhan route initiative.
Myth or Reality— As the speculations are steaming in the media about a possible China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan alliance on making Wakhan a viable alternative route for BRI, Dr. Munir Ahmed Saeed, an academic at the University of Canberra argues: “I think a 50/50 share (in Wakhan strip) would prevent a sharp reaction from the Taliban but it would require tacit approval from China.”
Local analysts believe that’s what probably China is craving, in order to keep away from the blitzkrieg of any potential truculent actor that would want to contain Chinese advancement in the region.
Pakistan being at the United Nations Security Council “it could be a good opportunity.” Saeed suggested. But many would argue that such a move would justify India’s occupation of Kashmir, the Aussie academic argued suggesting: “but Pakistan needs to move unhindered by Kashmir conundrums.”
The hyped Wakhan adventure might weaken Pakistan’s position on the Durand Line, local analysts fear. In the case of Jammu Kashmir valley where instead of condemnation, the abolition of Article 370 facilitated the subsequent formal annexation of Jammu in mainstream India and it widely received international investment in Kashmir.
“Such a move would impact the legality of the Duran Line and Pakistan’s stance on it as an internationally recognised border between the two countries,” Saeed underlined. However, Pakistan may argue that Afghanistan never recognised the Durand Line, “so it can push the boundaries further” and make a new partnership with Tajikistan to blunt Afghanistan’s response.
“This is the best political environment to annex Wakhan” and to establish a buffer zone inside the Afghan territory as Turkey has done in Syria recommended a foreign diplomat on the condition of anonymity.
It might sound doable to some, particularly in the shadow of several recent precedents to legitimise such action such as the Israeli occupation of Gaza and its decision to distance itself from a two-step solution. The Russian annexation of Crimea and its occupation of eastern Ukraine as well as President Trump’s fresh threat to occupy the Panama Canal for its economic security, so much so, even thoughts on Greenland highlighting the elite drinks hangouts!
The presence of Pakistan’s negative balance of trade with China and thriving Indo-China economic ties where it has emerged as India’s largest trading partner in 2023-24, further dwarfs the proportion of China’s negative balance of trade with Pakistan
An Opportunity or a Risk— Anyway, “the world is too preoccupied with the Middle East and Ukraine conflicts, and Trump to worry about Afghanistan,” the diplomat asserted.
Whereas Dr. Munir Saeed emphasised: “The non-recognition of the Taliban government by the world offers a rare opportunity.”
However, the question is, can Pakistan afford to risk such a strategic move? Particularly, in the backdrop of not-so-successful previous attempts that sought strategic depth in Afghanistan. Both Tajikistan and Pakistan might not be in the correct weight class to adventure around such a strategic move of mega proportions sodden with both international repercussions and consequences in the volatile international arena.
China certainly has the capacity and the capability to handle, in case, a brewing conflict at Wakhan starts spewing but how far China can go in defending its two regions, in the presence of de facto recognition of the Taliban government in some capitals such as Russia, China, and UAE, carries significant weight in the embryonic situation.
What worries me is the odd moment, if at a later yet possibly imminent rung, China asks Pakistan to allow India to use the Wakhan corridor to physically access Afghanistan! Wouldn’t it create fissures in an already deteriorated relationship with the Taliban? Afghanistan, quite loudly has been trying to outflow the international agenda of the Islamic emirate into Pakistan, allegedly allowing a host of rogue non-state actors operating from its soil in violation of earlier assurances.
The Tight Rope Walk— The presence of Pakistan’s negative balance of trade with China and thriving Indo-China economic ties where it has emerged as India’s largest trading partner in 2023-24, further dwarfs the proportion of China’s negative balance of trade with Pakistan. According to Deutsche Welle, Pakistan is overburdened by Chinese loans of $26.6b in 2022, more than any country in the world with challenging interest rates to repay. It also exceeds the payment capacity of the government whereas Pakistan’s total external debts and liabilities reportedly soar to $130.179b by May last year. It includes loans from the Paris Club, multilateral donors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China, and others while the US remains the vital money-bags provider!
Whether the Wakhan corridor or any such development, it might place Pakistan at loggerheads between the “devil and the deep sea” kind of situation, as the country’s choice options shrink further in its power balancing act on the tight rope with both ends burning.