Just three days before Pakistan gained independence, the founder of the new nation uttered these immortal words:
“You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”
Ayesha Jalal traced Jinnah’s role in her 1994 book, The Sole Spokesman. In Jinnah’s mind, there was no room for religious discrimination, even less for military intervention. He had envisaged Pakistan as a secular democracy in the British tradition. Ironically, four years prior, Professor Jalal had authored, The State of Martial Rule which showed how Pakistan had deviated so significantly from Jinnah’s vision.
In October 1958, a decade after Jinnah’s death, General Ayub, the army commander in chief, overturned Jinnah’s vision by declaring martial law. In the decades that followed, it would experience several more coups. Tragically, the Supreme Court would validate each martial law soon after it was imposed and condemn it after it was withdrawn.
The late Stephen Cohen, a luminary among American scholars on South Asian politics, went so far as to say that the army was the largest political party in Pakistan. Since the end of General Pervez Musharraf’s era in 2008, the army has not explicitly ruled the country through martial law. But it has remained the dominant institution. It decides who will run the country and how that person will run it. This needs to change for the restoration of Jinnah’s vision.
In 2018, the army decided to elevate a cricket legend and philanthropist with no real political experience to the high office of prime minister. On multiple occasions, Imran Khan would proudly proclaim that the army and the civilian government were on the “same page.”
At some point, Imran Khan became too big for his boots and began to interfere in the internal workings of the army. Of all people, he should have known that was a redline. The army found a way to force him out by “facilitating” a vote of no confidence in parliament.
The army, too, should have known that they were going to enhance Imran’s popularity by ousting him. Had Imran been allowed to complete his term in office, he would probably have lost the election since his performance had been dismal.
Against these political shenanigans, it’s worth noting that the army has been expanding its size for decades. During the 1965 war, it was much smaller than it was during the 1971 war. Even though that war led to the secession of East Pakistan, the size of the army continued to grow.
Today, the army is roughly half as large as India’s. Many experts have argued that for defensive purposes, an army that is the third of the Indian army would suffice, especially since Pakistan has nuclear weapons. If Pakistan would reduce the size of the army, it would free up resources for economic, human, and social development, which is sorely needed.
Jinnah’s death within a year of independence set the stage for leaders of far inferior caliber to begin scrambling for power
Another noteworthy development is that many army chiefs have had their terms extended. Even Imran Khan did not hesitate to extend General Bajwa’s tenure. In a short memo, he simply justified the extension based on vaguely articulated concerns about national security. This behavior is far more frequent than seen in other armies. It needs to change. Jinnah would never have tolerated it.
On the economic front, Pakistan’s international debt continues to grow. Exports are trumped by imports. Tax revenues are trumped by government spending. The country continues to borrow money to finance its lavish expenditures, especially on the military, and to service debt. The lenders range from the IMF to China to the Gulf Arab states. Such an economic model is not sustainable.
Sadly, Pakistan’s troubles began soon after its inception, as explained by Pervez Hoodhboy. Jinnah’s death within a year of independence set the stage for leaders of far inferior caliber to begin scrambling for power. Provincial and ethnic tensions surfaced. Economic growth faltered. That allowed the army to seize power. For the first few years, military rule was welcomed by the public, but the army overstayed its welcome. Corruption and incompetence, which had characterised civilian rule in the first decade, soon became the hallmark of military rule.
Matters came to a head when the nation splintered into two in 1971 when General Yahya was at the helm. But that did not diminish the power of the military. It seized power twice, in 1977 under General Zia and in 1999 under General Musharraf.
Some analysts contend that Pakistan’s survival proves its resilience. Others hold a contrary opinion. The likely future of Pakistan remains anyone’s guess. Three scenarios come to mind. First, a bright future, brought on by a remarkable turnaround in the country’s fortunes. This was spelled out recently in a report by Goldman Sachs. Second, the nation could be stuck in the doldrums, and witness more of the same. Or, third, it could be a dim future, characterised by an economic slump and a breakdown of the political order.
Unless the people of Pakistan can change its strategic culture, it’s difficult to envisage a restoration of Jinnah’s vision. They need to emulate the people of South Korea who prevented the president from imposing martial law. This is a testament to the strong institutions that exist in that country. Like Pakistan, it too was once a nation characterised by martial rule.
Closer to home, they need to emulate the people of Bangladesh, the former East Pakistan, who prevented dictatorial rule from being established in that country. The army did not intervene as the prime minister, who had gone rogue, fled to India, and an illustrious citizen, who had won the Nobel Prize, was inducted as the prime minister.