Former Lieutenant-General Tariq Khan has recently penned a short piece on counterinsurgency, which needs serious reading and discussion. A word about Khan before I get to the points he has raised.
During the days of the so-called 'War on Terror,' Khan first commanded a division based in Dera Ismail Khan with its area of operations in South Waziristan and later took over as Inspector-General Frontier Corps. In both command capacities, he arguably garnered the most hands-on experience of any general officer in planning and executing small-, medium- and large-scale operations. His analysis, therefore, is guided by practical experience.
Later, as lieutenant-general he commanded 1 Corps, which is one of the two strike corps of Pakistan Army.
Let me now proceed to the central points of his analysis under four heads: analysing the threat, strategic response, tactical response, and administrative response.
[NB: the summary of Khan's points is in italics; my assessment is in plain text.]
THE THREAT
The militant does not seek space primarily, though his tactics are designed to gradually expand his presence by reducing the state's/government's writ. He does this by seeking and attacking political and military targets. Once he manages to dilute the state's writ, he secures space which he can govern by raising revenue and dispensing justice. This cycle is repeated to enlarge the physical space. The state loses credibility, and the people in those spaces come to rely on the militant because of the state's absence or near-absence. The militant's approach is incremental and he targets government officials, security forces and, in some cases, mounts spectacular attacks to cause civilian casualties. Simultaneously, he attempts to dominate the lines of communication by using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushing security forces' convoys and raiding bases and posts in the area.
Allowing the militant to ingress incrementally and ultimately capture physical spaces then requires major operations that are necessarily disruptive of sociopolitical and economic life in those areas. A proactive strategy, on the other hand, takes the 'war' to the adversary and, in the initial phases, relies on the scalpel
This is a good overall assessment of the threat. We experienced it in the erstwhile Provincially and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, many of which were lost to elements of Al Qaeda and an alphabet soup of Pakistani and Central Asian groups.
Every one of the points above can be further broken down for the purposes of strategic and tactical planning. At the core of the militant's strategy is to neutralise the state's asymmetric advantage and create his own. He takes advantage of a number of factors to make this strategy work — poor governance, distances, terrain, underdevelopment, kinship bonds, religious/sectarian or ethnic affinities, porous borders, sanctuaries in foreign but contiguous territories, enabling environment (sympathetic foreign government(s), funding, availability of weapons, covert ingress and egress points etc)
Khan is right in arguing that space is not the primary operational objective. But it is a desired development if the state and the people can be physically and psychologically impacted through a strategy of incremental, event-based violence. In a way it is akin to what in nuclear strategy is referred to as 'salami slicing'.
Another important implication of Khan's argument is the militant's reliance on a reactive strategy by the state/government. The militant acts; the government reacts. Result: events outpace military employments and deployments and the militant retains the initiative.
Corollary: unless the state can wrest the initiative from the militant, it will be forced to react — i.e., defend when an attack comes and wait for the next attack to come. According to Khan, "we have no specific strategy for the phenomenon; nor have we hypothesised the threat."
The problem with a reactive strategy or not hypothesising the threat should be obvious, not least because we have been through that experience at a very high cost. Allowing the militant to ingress incrementally and ultimately capture physical spaces then requires major operations that are necessarily disruptive of sociopolitical and economic life in those areas. A proactive strategy, on the other hand, takes the 'war' to the adversary and, in the initial phases, relies on the scalpel — targeted, intel-based operations. If we let that stage pass then the state has to use the sledgehammer. That, among one's own people, is never an advantageous position.
This is where Khan speaks of the three-tier response.
STRATEGIC RESPONSE
Most importantly, the state policy should be proactive and it must control physical spaces. These spaces should be identified and secured. Law enforcement and local intel must be integrated with the people of the area. Denying space to the militant is very important while hypothesising the threat is crucial for appreciating the militants' orientation. This would help prioritise targets, the protection they need and the response that can be made available. The assessment must also include multiple threat scenarios in order for resources to be judiciously allocated. The execution should be decentralised but the command centralised.
The strategic response, as argued by Khan, is in line with the overall appreciation of the threat. If the militant's primary objective is to undermine the state's writ, and if the first-order effect of that strategy results in physical, psychological and socioeconomic dominance of spaces, then it stands to reason that the militant should be denied spaces. Extrapolating from this, it would be logical to argue for a proactive approach that does not allow the situation to reach a point where the militant can partially or fully achieve these two objectives.
It is enough to understand the objective behind the strategy: the militant should not have the initiative. This does not mean that he will be completely divested of mounting a surprise. That is never possible. Nothing is ever foolproof
But strategic guidelines are not much use without clear tactical plans and their execution. What does a proactive approach look like?
TACTICAL RESPONSE
While many fundamentals remain the same, the application of tactical responses in terms of priorities would likely differ depending on a number of factors. However, if we are to keep the two objectives discussed above as constant, some basic approaches can be listed. Here, instead of summarising Khan's points, I will reproduce them in toto with some editing:
- Law enforcement elements must establish patrol plans that illuminate the region.
- The night must belong to the LEAs.
- Spontaneous roadblocks, checks, raids are important. They may not always give results but the few that do, create a huge deterrence.
- As an operational routine, ambushes should be put up on numerous sites selected separately for each day.
- Militant groups can never be dismantled by large-scale operations and must be subjected to continual raids, patrols, ambushes and harassment. The militant must never be allowed a period of peace and stability in which to rest and recuperate.
- Mix of weapons and type of effect must be worked out for each target. Smoke is an essential, lifesaving asset.
- Drones must be deployed for better intelligence as well as armed engagement where feasible. Intel-sensors should be used extensively to over-watch movement and locate concentrations of people/militants. Wide deployment of "Shikari detachments" [communication interception teams] is very important for electronic surveillance and to surf frequencies and pick up VHF conversations.
The plan based on the hypothesis should be: a:
- Prevent it from happening.
- How to respond if it does happen.
- Preventing the escape of the militants when it does happen.
- Sealing the target area and isolating it.
- Protecting the civilians in the area.
b: Troop movement must always be covered by VHF communication, protective standing patrols, night vision, artillery and aerial support where possible. Movements at times may have to be in distanced packages with one group securing the road and the other moving – a kind of fire and move. This may be needed to induct troops into areas not secured as yet.
Some of these points are technical and meant primarily for professional LEA commanders. But for the informed generalist, it is enough to understand the objective behind the strategy: the militant should not have the initiative. This does not mean that he will be completely divested of mounting a surprise. That is never possible. Nothing is ever foolproof. The basic idea is to make mounting a surprise for him as difficult as possible.
To put it another way, he should feel hunted instead of being the hunter.
There are other points in Khan's assessment above, especially related to deployments (static), patrolling (mobile) and ground and aerial support that need to be elaborated further, for instance, in the case of COIN in Balochistan, given the province's terrain, vast distances and local populations that might be hostile to COIN forces.
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE
This is one of the most important non-kinetic aspects of any CT/COIN strategy. Unfortunately, it is often ignored or allotted a backseat. Let me summarise Khan's basic points:
The government needs to empower the DC/PA and ensure his office remains functional. FM stations should be established with a dial-in system for callers. Complaint cells should be established and operated efficiently. Development plans must involve local leaders and populations and funds used transparently.
The civilian-administrative side of the strategy is crucial because the civilian set-up for governance and local police forces should be the first line of defence. Too often, the state has ignored this, and the army has had to do the heavy lifting. The army itself is also to be blamed for keeping other LEAs deficient in terms of incentives and resources, both human and materiel. That must change.
In the case of Balochistan, as I have noted in this space previously, a political settlement must be the primary objective with CT/COIN as its subset. That said, sound CT/COIN planning and execution always require public buy-in. That is a function of people's trust in the government. That trust itself is a function of people's sense of belonging.
Lt-Gen Khan's article is a good basis for taking the discussion further on the technical side of CT/COIN. The other leg is a government's political legitimacy. The two must work in tandem.