Dear Mr Prime Minister,
I am taking the presumption of penning this letter in regard to the recent upsurge in violence in Balochistan. I realise that given the multiple crises your government is facing, not least the vexing question of its own legitimacy, your plate is full and, at best, you must rely on bullet points and one-page summaries. I will, therefore, try to keep this as brief as possible, though it might still end up being two pages too long for your time.
Let me reiterate the point that I am only referring to the violence in Balochistan, not Khyber Pakhtunkhwa because the two cases are different. The result in both cases may be dead bodies, but the motives, motivations and objectives of violent groups are different.
This distinction should also be our starting point.
Since the violence in Balochistan is primarily political, spring as it does from historical Baloch memory and deprivation of rights, Baloch separatist violence cannot be treated like the terrorism perpetrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Mr Prime Minister, Hans Morgenthau was a German-American political scientist and a classical realist who famously opposed America's misadventure in Vietnam both on realist and moral grounds. During his teaching years at the University of Chicago, he once told his students that "appeasement is a legitimate strategy in dealing with autonomist movements; give them their own self-government within the established state, but the worst possible strategy when dealing with those who are bent on taking it over."
The parallel, according to Morgenthau, was with territorial aggressors: if their ambition is limited, then a border adjustment is possible (medieval European wars are a good example of that). But they may also have an insatiable appetite, in which case appeasement is a disaster (the appeasement of Hitler is a case in point).
The extreme Baloch sentiment — expressed by groups that have resorted to violence as opposed to the Baloch majority that remains peaceful — desires to secede. The self-styled Pakistani Taliban want to translate the ideological space they have created for themselves into physical and politico-administrative spaces. The TTP wants to conquer, not secede.
That, Mr Prime Minister, is the most important difference and must guide the formulation of any policy at the strategic level. The Baloch can be talked to for an adjustment, to use Morgenthau's argument. The TTP cannot be appeased.
Now, a few words about don'ts.
When an attack happens, especially a big one like on August 26, do not say we will uproot terrorism. You cannot because, so far, the state hasn't even determined the correct causal pathway. Also, an irregular war is generally a low-intensity conflict at multiple levels, not just the contest of arms. In the case of Balochistan, it is about history, presumed and real, the trajectory of politics and its crests and troughs, the socioeconomic grievances, and the contesting narratives. It is not a tame problem. It cannot be solved with executive fiats and simplistic assertions.
Societies are not military barracks. The Baloch are not the enemy who need to be sorted out; they are Pakistanis who need to be understood
Do not say it's because of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), because it is and it isn't. Let me explain: the Baloch sense of being wronged goes back to the creation of Pakistan and the problem with the princely State of Kalat. This is not the place to go into the details of that, but it is important to understand that this history is one of broken promises and state repression. The story of Nawroz Khan and his fighters is one of those stories, etched in the collective consciousness of the Baloch.
While I am on CPEC, Mr Prime Minister, play it down, not up. I am quite certain that hostile elements and agencies want to sabotage it. But they can do it only because the state has developed an autoimmune disorder in Balochistan. The hostile agencies are not responsible for ghettoising the people of Gwadar, the state is. People are protesting — peacefully. What does the state do? It shows executive hubris like it did with Maulvi Hidayat-ur-Rehman of Jama'at-e Islami. The Haq Dau Tehreek (Rights Movement) is just an example of how the state deals with Balochistan.
Do not say the troubles in Balochistan are because of foreign subversion. They are, and they aren't. They aren't because what's happening is rooted in history. Once a state pushes a people to the margins, they decide, at some point, that they owe nothing to the state. To use Albert Hirschman's framework, when the voice is ignored, loyalty is a casualty, and exit the only option. These groups have exited the system and they now have the gun. They seek external help. That help will be readily available. Let me put it another way, Mr Prime Minister: having renounced the state because the state was and is found wanting in its constitutional and legal obligations, their actions cannot be analysed within the framework of the state. That, Mr Prime Minister, is not just an important point but a very basic one. We saw this in East Pakistan. We should have internalised this lesson, but clearly we haven't.
Do not conflate armed groups with peaceful protests for rights. Armed attacks are meant to draw a response. Armed groups hope the state's response will be ham-handed. That helps their narrative. The state has to decide whether it will respond prudently or act like a bull in a china shop.
Do not send "experts" on television channels to mouth tired, stale establishment talking points. If the establishment could muster even a bit of empathy and compassion, Balochistan would be in a different place.
Do not say we will sort them out. That's how this vicious cycle began: we can sort them out. Societies are not military barracks. The Baloch are not the enemy who need to be sorted out; they are Pakistanis who need to be understood.
There are no winners when a state responds to a people's aspirations by killing them, only losers. At best, it can notch tactical successes. Too often in history, we have seen strategic failures despite tactical successes
On the point of empathy, allow me, Mr Prime Minister, to recommend to you a great documentary on Robert Strange McNamara by Errol Morris: The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert Strange McNamara. It's first lesson is drawn from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and McNamara calls it empathising with the enemy. If it's important to empathise with the enemy, how much more important it is to empathise with one's own people. Surely, exponentially more.
Do not say we have managed to kill so many terrorists and the operation will continue until we have killed them all. Killing doesn't stop movements. If it could, Hamas would be done by now in Gaza and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Killing doesn't kill ideas. There are no winners when a state responds to a people's aspirations by killing them, only losers. At best, it can notch tactical successes. Too often in history, we have seen strategic failures despite tactical successes.
This is not to say that the state should not deal with those who have picked up the gun. Unfortunately, the problem has been allowed to fester for so long that discriminate exercise of violence at this stage has become a necessity. Equally, as noted Mr Prime Minister, Balochistan is a political, not a counterterrorism problem. That direction of causality is important for generating a holistic response.
In other words, Mr Prime Minister, while it's vital in the near-term to deal with the groups that have picked up the gun, the political strategy has to be long-term and must aim at improving the situation where it becomes difficult for the violent groups to win recruits to the separatist cause.
Greek mythology is often both interesting and instructive, Mr Prime Minister. When Antaeus, son of the sea god Poseidon and the Earth goddess Gaia, challenged Heracles to a wrestling match, Heracles noted that every time he threw Antaeus to the ground, Antaeus rose stronger than before. Realising that Antaeus' source of strength was Gaia, Heracles then grabbed Antaeus, held him aloft and crushed him to death. Mr Prime Minister, it's called the strategy of dislocation — dislocate the armed groups from the context which gives them strength. Change the ecosystem.
Counterterrorism, in a political strategy, would be the subset; it cannot be allowed to drive the strategy. The question of how counterterrorism should be done is a separate, albeit very important issue. Which is why, sir, you need to sit your interior minister down and tell him that he must not replicate his sterling performance as the head of the Pakistan Cricket Board in Balochistan. He would also probably need to be educated on policing in Balochistan, about Areas' A' and 'B' before he thinks the problem can be solved by a station house officer.
Two final points, Mr Prime Minister, and I realise this has already become too long: a political strategy as distinct from just pumping in and wasting development funds, would require genuine political representation, not establishment lackeys with establishment talking points. I realise how difficult it is, given that you are already grappling with your own legitimacy. Allied with this should be an understanding that despite the province's backwardness, we now have thousands of educated young Baloch men and women who cannot be marginalised. The historical consciousness is now wedded to their immediate aspirations. If the state fails to tap into that pool, they, too, would go the ethnonationalist way.
That would just bring the wheel full circle. How long and repeatedly can the state keep sorting them out and failing?