The harrowing details of another terrible day in Balochistan are known by now so I will eschew them. I want instead to focus on the timing and purpose of the attacks, the government’s response to them and how that response is likely to feed the cycle of violence and make the problem even more intractable.
August 26 is the death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. The day was chosen deliberately to challenge the federation. Separate groups of Balochistan Liberation Army terrorists mounted multiple attacks across Balochistan: Musakhel (northeast Balochistan), National Highway - 70 that runs from Qila Saifullah through Loralai and DG Khan to Multan, Khad Koocha (south of Mastung), Kalat (south of Khad Koocha), Bela district (south), Coastal Highway, southernmost tip of the province.
A cursory look at the map would tell the reader the distances involved as well as the ethnography of these areas. These are both Pashtun-Baloch and Baloch areas. The purpose: BLA can strike at will in different areas of Balochistan.
Balochistan is not just about counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. It requires a holistic approach that can ultimately lead to a political resolution of the problem.
The government’s response to these attacks, the most daring since the fifth round of Baloch insurgency started in 2003 and picked up after 2006, has been predictable. Anger coupled with the usual shibboleths about befitting response and rooting out terrorism — as if we should have waited for these attacks to go after the BLA.
This is knee-jerk bollocks and will only worsen the situation. That’s precisely what I fear given the impotent anger. By this I do not mean that there should be no action against the BLA (or other terrorist groups). There should and must be. But Balochistan is not just about counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. It requires a holistic approach that can ultimately lead to a political resolution of the problem.
That problem, basically, is about the rights of the Baloch and their sense of belonging to the federation. For the most part the Baloch are angry and a sense of belonging cannot be bludgeoned into anyone.
It is crucial to unpack the problem and to develop strategies — in the plural — to deal with its various aspects. Developing such an approach after decades of hubristic mismanagement will not be easy. There is no silver bullet. Nor is Balochistan a tabula rasa. The past is deeply etched on the slate and it cannot just be rubbed away. Putting together this Humpty Dumpty will require equanimity and patience, starting with understanding what has gone wrong and why.
First, the federation has to clearly figure out the direction of causality. Is Balochistan a political problem or a counterterrorism problem? What has begotten what. From where I stand, it is primarily a political problem. That being the case, the province must first get a genuine political process. That won’t eradicate terrorism but it will help in sifting the grain from the chaff.
The imperative of the process of sifting should be obvious to everyone. Years ago, on the sidelines of a conference at Khuzdar University, I interviewed a very dear friend and elder, the late Mir Hasil Bizenjo. Among other things, Hasil bhai said to me that the Baloch leaders demanding rights for the Baloch within the federation were getting sidelined.
That problem, basically, is about the rights of the Baloch and their sense of belonging to the federation. For the most part the Baloch are angry and a sense of belonging cannot be bludgeoned into anyone.
This is how he put it (words to that effect): “We are losing traction. The separatists target us while the federation is not prepared to take us seriously. Many in my party have been killed by the groups. If we cannot be effective for the Baloch, there will be no one left to find a non-violent solution.”
In my travels to Balochistan, I heard many Baloch voice this sentiment. And yet, the federation remains totally tone-deaf to this basic necessity.
Second and allied with the first point, the federation has decided since 2003 to deal with Balochistan as a CT problem. This approach, coupled with the lack of genuine political representation, has given primacy to the security forces and multiple intelligence agencies. The security forces, by the very nature of their job, are the state’s sledgehammer. That brings in a cognitive bias in favour of using force, what can be described as the Law of the Instrument: “If the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat every problem as a nail.”
Three, Balochistan has a clear problem of terrorism. That won’t just go away and has to be dealt with. It is also now sponsored by external state actors like India. The important question is, how. If the idea is occupation and destruction then unapologetic ruthlessness may work, as it did for Hafiz al-Assad in Hama. But if the problem is political and terrorism a byproduct of warped political choices and socioeconomic inequalities then CT has to rely on superior intelligence, highly disciplined field forces and discrimination. The forces operating in the field also have to be accountable to the political dispensation.
It can and will be frustrating, for sure. Security forces don’t like getting their personnel killed. The desire for revenge runs high after such attacks. But that is precisely the point at which leaders must summon patience and discrimination.
Four, allied with three above, is the absolute and non-negotiable requirement of distinguishing between those in the population peacefully demanding their rights and those who are using the gun. When violence is raging and emotions are running high, the chances of conflating peaceful protest with terrorism also run very high. That constitutes one of the most egregious blunders a CT/COIN force or a government can commit.
Balochistan has a clear problem of terrorism. That won’t just go away and has to be dealt with. It is also now sponsored by external state actors like India. The important question is, how. If the idea is occupation and destruction then unapologetic ruthlessness may work, as it did for Hafiz al-Assad in Hama.
The winning idea is not so much to make extremists moderate but to ensure that the moderates remain moderates and become a counterweight to the extremists. Treating peaceful protestors hamfistedly and conflating them with those with the gun only serves to push the non-violent towards violence. That is 101.
In fact, terrorist groups often resort to increased violence to beget a ruthless and indiscriminate response from the governments against ethnic populations to which the terrorist groups belong. The reprisals help the groups recruit from those populations. It creates a vicious cycle of violence.
A pertinent example would be the Baloch Yakjehti Committee led by Dr. Mahrang Baloch. The BYC is a peaceful movement demanding rights, an end to enforced disappearances and equitable distribution of resources, perfectly legitimate and constitutional demands. The federation has already mishandled the movement. If current anger leads to persecution of BYC activists and I fear it could, the federation would play right into the hands of the BLA.
Dr. Baloch has caught the imagination of the Baloch youth. She is a natural ally of the federation, not its enemy. The BLA attacks have put her in a terrible bind. Lots of people will judge her for how she responds to these attacks. That will be a mistake. The space she occupies is unenviable: on the one hand she has to remain relevant to the Baloch; on the other hand, as a rights activist, she would be asked to condemn the heinous ethnonationalist murders of the non-Baloch. She will be walking on burning coals.
Finally, how to handle the BLA. I have so far argued for a discriminatory CT policy. Let me now add the element of ruthlessness to it. And by ruthlessness, I mean the ruthless pursuit, through high-grade intelligence, of BLA sanctuaries, training camps, supply routes, ingress and egress routes, covert safe houses within their areas of operations and other related information that will help the forces to take out their leaders and cadres.
This, as should be evident, is the other prong of the holistic approach. Just like it’s crucial for Balochistan to get authentic political representation — not the current spurious one — and for the federation to work towards addressing the demands of the Baloch, so it is important to go after the terrorist groups with ruthless determination.
The government is dealing with a wicked problem. Tired cliches and anger won’t do the job. There is need to chalk out a comprehensive approach which can incrementally improve the situation.
The BLA chief commander Basheer Zeb put out a long statement in Brahui in February 2022. He makes clear in that statement that his cadres are now better trained and equipped and the BLA attacks are becoming more daring. The BLA has also said that the August 26 attacks were the first phase and will be followed by even more daring raids. Zeb needs to be taken out.
Equally, however, the same statement is replete with references to why the Baloch have had to pick up the gun. That part of the statement is as important as his promise of more violence.
These attacks can’t hold territory. The guiding principle of such a strategy is to prolong the war, wear down government forces, manage violence for the purposes of recruitment, create pockets where the government’s writ is either absent or grows steadily weaker, induce fear, keep the situation unstable to hinder development and sabotage reconciliation processes.
Corollary: the government is dealing with a wicked problem. Tired cliches and anger won’t do the job. There is need to chalk out a comprehensive approach which can incrementally improve the situation. There’s no magic wand and certainly no immediate solution.