How The 1965 War Continues To Cast A Long Shadow On Pakistan's Politics

The military today has lost the stature that it had during and after 1965

How The 1965 War Continues To Cast A Long Shadow On Pakistan's Politics

Fought 59 years ago, this war implanted the army in the strategic culture of Pakistan as the saviour of the nation. From that point on, it would be the final arbiter in politics.

On September 6, the Indian army attacked Lahore. The Pakistani army saved Lahore from falling. President Ayub called India the aggressor. That is still the official narrative.

The truth is that the war was started by Pakistan, as Air Marshal Asghar and others have written. Trouble had been brewing on the home front for Ayub since he defeated Fatima Jinnah in the election of January 1965.

Ms. Jinnah’s loss was not well received by the public. While Ayub suppressed the protests by force, he was aware that the temperament of the public had turned on him. He had to regain his stature by finding a diversion.  

On the advice of his foreign minister, ZA Bhutto, he approved an invasion of Indian-held Kashmir, hoping to annex it. In April 1965, Pakistan carried out a manoeuvre in the Rann of Kutch to test the Indian army. The Indians were caught off guard. Ayub, now armed with a false sense of confidence, stated that one Muslim soldier was worth ten Hindu soldiers. In August, the Pakistani army launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir.

After some initial successes, the operation ground to a halt. Pakistan had intended to cut off India’s supply line to Srinagar, hoping to bring about a surrender.

However, India launched a counterattack on Lahore. When it failed to take Lahore, it launched an assault directed at Sialkot and Pakistan launched an armoured assault to cut off the Grand Trunk Road between Amritsar and Delhi. Both attacks failed. On September 22, a ceasefire was signed.

During the conflict, East Pakistan felt isolated. Even before the war, it had consistently felt neglected, both economically and politically. This was acknowledged in the Fourth Five Plan.

Political chaos had broken out in Pakistan once the Tashkent Agreement was signed in 1966. Bhutto broke away from Ayub, created his own party. Ayub began to celebrate his Decade of Development. When a Round Table Conference failed to resolve the differences, Ayub’s hand-picked army chief, Yahya, overthrew him.

He vowed to restore democracy in Pakistan but, after holding what are still regarded as the freest elections in the country in 1970, the general refused to honour their results. Mujib had won an absolute majority in parliament and the general, at the urging of Bhutto and others in West Pakistan, simply annulled the elections.

On 25 March 1971, Operation Searchlight was launched in East Pakistan. Mujib was arrested, his party banned, and his supporters rounded up for treason. The army’s action imposed an uneasy calm. West Bengal was overflowing with refugees and India was threatening to push them back.

The size of the army grew between 1965 and 1971, and even further between 1971 and 1999, even though Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them

Ironically, it was Yahya who lit the fuse when he ordered the PAF to hit several Indian airfields in the West. He had thought India would divert its forces from the East to the West. Instead, India decided to invade East Pakistan while also attacking Pakistani forces in the West. In less than two weeks, Pakistan surrendered the East to India and Bangladesh was born.

Paranoia set in. The army anointed Bhutto as the President. He got Pakistan going on developing an atomic bomb to prevent another Indian attack.  Inadvertently, he just strengthened the army’s hand.

His rule was marked by political vindictiveness and nationalisation of major assets. His hand-picked army chief, Zia, not only removed him from office in 1977 but hanged him two years later.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made Zia the darling of the West, further consolidating army rule. In 1988, a plane crash killed Zia and several senior generals. Civilian rule was restored but the army continued to call the shots.

In May 1998, when India exploded five nuclear devices near the border with Pakistan, a decision was made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, presumably on the army’s directive, to explode six nuclear devices in Balochistan, quite far from the border with India.

In the spring of 1999, the army led by Musharraf decided to rekindle the Kashmir issue by sending troops into Kargil. Musharraf had reckoned that India would not attack Pakistan because both countries had nuclear explosions. However, the invasion failed not only militarily but also politically. To cover his embarrassment, Musharraf decided to put the blame on Sharif and overthrew him in the fourth coup in Pakistani history.  He anointed himself as the Chief Executive and later declared himself to be the President.

Between 1947 and 1965, the strength of the army had grown considerably. It had grown further between 1965 and 1971. And it grew even further between 1971 and 1999, even though Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

By 2008, Musharraf’s had lost credibility, even domestically and internationally. When the US urged him to step down, he did. While there has been no coup since then, the army continues to dominate the political landscape.

Stephen Cohen regarded the army as the biggest political party in Pakistan. It allowed Imran Khan to form a coalition government in 2018. Within months, he extended the tenure of the army chief, Bajwa, honouring a long tradition.  

Imran Khan often boasted that the army and the civilian government were on the same page. But when he got too big for his boots, the generals showed him the door.

Despite being the most popular politician in the country, he is in jail. He is hoping to claw his way back into office by saying that he has no conflict with the army, only with the army chief. Whether that comes to pass is anyone’s guess.

As for the army, it has lost the stature it had in 1965. Today, its strength stands at 660,000 versus 1,475,000 of India. To fight a defensive war, it only needs to be a third as large as India’s. The size could be lowered by 200,000, freeing up scarce resources for human development.

Only then will the long shadow of 1965 be lifted.

Dr. Faruqui is a history buff and the author of Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, Routledge Revivals, 2020. He tweets at @ahmadfaruqui