As Pakistan awaits the impending arrival of Trump, and what might follow in its wake, it is important that policymakers get ready to absorb any shocks of his radical agenda and remain alert to avail of any opportunities. An important pre-requisite to this preparedness is a correct grasp of where the US-Pakistan relations are coming from, and where they stand as of now.
Here a proper study of US policies in South Asia is important. It may sound novel, if not radical, but I feel that correct reading of the US-India relationship is fundamental to the understanding of Washington’s South Asia policy, and that is critical to the understanding of the US-Pakistan relations. This is as valid now as it has been historically.
There are five ways in which US-India relations are currently seen in Pakistan. And I find them all misleading and problematic. They do not clarify our understanding. It is often said in Pakistan that the US is giving ‘preferential’ treatment to India. Another way the relationship is being characterised is this. It is said that it is India, not Pakistan that is America’s partner now. And yet another way the US-India relations are being described is: that the US has ‘moved over ‘ to India from Pakistan. Fourthly, it is often suggested both by the political leadership and the strategic community that the US should keep a balance in its relations with India and Pakistan. Lastly, questions are being asked about whether we have lost our strategic value.
The common theme in these different ways of describing the US-India relations is that Pakistan is always mentioned in each of them. Another odd thing about these perceptions is that they see the American engagement with the region in terms of either or, as if the US interests in South Asia could have been advanced either by Pakistan or India.
Two Different Relationships
When we say the US is giving “preferential” treatment to India the implication is that Washington has a single interest in South Asia for which both India and Pakistan are equally qualified but the US has “preferred” India. It is like saying that in the past the US used to have that sole interest advanced by Pakistan but now it has “moved over” to India to play the same role. That is what is implied by the comments that previously Pakistan was a “partner” but now it is India.
The fact is in deciding about the type and the quality of its relations with India or for that matter with Pakistan Washington has never been confronted with a binary choice. Neither of the two relations, that is with India or Pakistan, has been limited or enhanced by the other. The imbalance in Washington’s relations with India and Pakistan is not the result of any discrimination by the US, nor is it a reflection of some unfair treatment or abandonment of Pakistan. Both relations are standing on their own, serving different purposes, and following different trajectories. And one does not derive from the other.
America’s principal interest in South Asia during the Cold War was the containment of the Soviet Union, and in the post-Cold War South Asia the containment of China
Up until now, the US did not have a South Asia policy. So it is a mistake for us to think of Pakistan’s centrality to Washington’s past South Asia policy. The simple fact is there WAS no South Asia policy in the past. The US tried to enlist both India and Pakistan as allies in the early years of the Cold War but India declined. And it went a different way whereas Pakistan chose to be a US ally.
America’s principal interest in South Asia during the Cold War was the containment of the Soviet Union, and in the post-Cold War South Asia the containment of China. And there have been secondary interests in both periods. During the Cold War Pakistan could do for the U S what India did not want to. And in the post-Cold War South Asia, only India could do for the US what it wanted her to do.
Hyphenated Or De Hyphenated
We should not mention the two relations in the same breath. I know the US relations with India and Pakistan have long been described as “hyphenated” by much of the American strategic community and it is now said that they have been “de-hyphenated”. The fact is these labels do not fully embrace the complexity of the US, India, and Pakistan triangle. When America’s critical interests were involved with Pakistan, such as during the Afghan Jihad of the 80s, the US did not care too much about the Indian reaction. And when these interests were involved with India like in the Sino-Indian war in 1962 Washington did not care much about Pakistani reaction. So where was the hyphen then?
Now more than ever before, the relations with India have their own dynamics and strategic rationale and the relations with Pakistan have their own imperatives. Both are de-hyphenated, whatever the case before. Pakistanis are trying to hyphenate them. This would not work. One can perhaps consider the two relations “bracketed”, for want of a better word, but certainly not hyphenated.
Pakistan has no permanent importance for Washington, nor any lasting place in its foreign policy. Pakistan’s importance has varied according to fluctuating American interests in the region, putting it sometimes alongside Washington, and sometimes against it.
Forget about the “halcyon” days.
The reality is that US-Pakistan relations have come a long way from where they were during the early period of the Cold War. We keep hoping for the so-called ‘reset’ in the relations to be where it used to be. But this is not going to happen. Instead, we will do ourselves a favour by resetting our own perceptions of the relationship. In doing so we should not consider the “halcyon” days of the alliance during the early years of the Cold War as the baseline. That world does not exist anymore; nor is Pakistan the same.
It was Pakistan’s role in America’s wars in the past that had enabled it to have a high-profile aid relationship with the US
The simple fact is the relationship has lacked strategic continuity and consensus support both in Pakistan and the US. And now so much in the world and indeed in Pakistan and the US has changed. That is why the popular question in Pakistan as to what happened to its status as America’s “most allied ally” cannot be answered and should never be asked. It would be more realistic to look at the period since the end of the Cold War. Only the ups and downs of the relations during this period are relevant to define the future.
It was Pakistan’s role in America’s wars in the past that had enabled it to have a high-profile aid relationship with the US. But Pakistan should never become America’s war partner again. America has a proven record of failures in wars that were started by it. They were marked by electoral politics, elite interests, incompetence, strategic overextension, and ignorance about other societies. Washington’s war aims will always be different from Pakistan’s. As in the past, the costs will outweigh the benefits.
Here comes Trump
For Pakistan, friendly ties with the US are necessary but partnership in war is optional. Fortunately, Trump has no interest in wars. So we may not have to make that choice. So whether by necessity or by lack of choice the absence of a high level of engagement with the US that was war-related will be for the good as it had brought much harm to Pakistan. How about normal economic and commercial relationships and cooperation in security challenges like counter-terrorism? There is no indication from Trump‘s previous tenure that he would be against it.
As for Trump’s reaction to the Pakistan-China relationship. Frankly, it is not really posing any serious threat to the US Indo-Pacific strategy which Trump will definitely continue. So it should not cause any serious concern in Washington. In any case, it is doubtful if Trump would follow Biden’s obsession for America to remain number one. In America the politics and policy of issues like globalisation, China, big power relationships, alliances, and America’s “forever wars” are being reshaped by Trump’s worldview, changing the way America perceives and is perceived by the world. That had already forced the Biden administration to find workable compromises between the “global policeman era” of the past and a future “era of restraint”, and between globalisation and protectionism, and conflict and cooperation with China.
The fact is geopolitics is opening to a wider contest. As the US and China compete to reorder the world according to their respective visions, many countries are aligning with both to maximise their global engagement and optimise their interests, so as to be comfortable with any future international order.
Pakistan too needs to diversify and make use of the emerging geopolitics. Without compromising its strategic relationship with China it needs to have a working relationship with the US, its leading export destination, a major foreign investor, a lifeline to its IMF-dependent economy, and a key stakeholder in South Asian stability. But Pakistan should stop hoping that the “happy days” of the US-Pakistan relations will be here again. Deep down that was not a good bargain, for either side. And we would be better off without it.