Two days before the French election last Sunday, I spent 2.5 hours watching and listening to a video of the debate between far-right Marine Le Pen and centrist Emmanuel Macron because I wanted to see how Macron handled himself when the chips were really down. Normally, a debate that long would be hard to sit through here, but this rowdy affair proved to be much more diverting than the milquetoast events we call Presidential debates in the US. To paraphrase something I once heard Edward R. Murrow say, insults flew like shrapnel across the table. Ms. Le Pen, a nasty piece of work to begin with, was at her vicious best in attack, but Macron batted back each insult and lie like Serena Williams bats back intemperate shots, with power and accuracy. Clearly he was up to the task, and French polls declared Macron the winner of the debate. The French voters followed up by electing him overwhelmingly on Sunday (66% to 34%) as the next President of the French Republic.
Does the decisive Macron victory over Le Pen mean that the Nationalist/Populist/Nativist tide that had been sweeping through the West is now reversed? I doubt it. Before that could be claimed, the Liberal-Centrist forces have to win convincingly in Germany, which seems likely, but also in Italy, which is more problematic. More importantly, it will also depend on whether Macron can transform this landslide victory into an effective start on transforming France, his central promise, I think, during the election campaign, and on leading the effort to reform the European Union and especially the Eurozone, which I believe is central to the dislocation and paralysis into which Europe has slipped in the last decade.
Macron labels himself a Centrist, and in one sense he is. His politics tries to meld the social consciousness of the Center-Left with the free market philosophy of the Center-Right. Most of the previous Presidents of France would fit this description, some more intent on social programs beloved of the Left, and some more intent on economic modernization favored by the right, and it is not easy to discern where Macron fits on this scale. He was economics minister in the Socialist government of François Hollande, but only lasted two years, and it was in that position that he evidently decided that France needed a new politics, a new party and a new (and much younger) President. But what he exudes is a dynamism rarely seen in French politics, except at the fringes (viz. Marie Le Pen and her FN party) these days, and he has formed a movement-cum-party in which the average age is said to be around 30. He clearly represents a new and very different generation of the French population, and his Centrist philosophy draws heavily on the mindset of this young generation.
In a sense, Macron has seen that the weakness of many of the mainstream parties in Western countries lies in the unwillingness of their old, tired leaders (same old faces for 20 years) to allow a flow through of younger leaders to the top. I see this, particularly in the US, as one reason that politicians voicing Nationalist/Populist/Nativist messages have broken through. No, Donald Trump is not young, but he is (still) a new voice with a seductive message to those already alienated or discouraged. In contrast, Trump’s opposition, Hillary Clinton, is not only eligible for senior status, but had been in American politics for 25 years, and carried great political baggage because of that. And though it appears that Trump and the Republicans will be especially vulnerable in the 2018 congressional elections, as well as the 2020 Presidential elections (assuming Trump makes it that far, which is not certain), the Democratic leaders, as of now—Pelosi, Schumer, Biden, Warren, Sanders—have all been around forever, or so it seems.
Winning the election was the easy part of Macron’s challenge. Marine Le Pen and her party have a toxic history in France, going back to its founder’s support for the fascist Vichy regime and its collaboration with the Nazis, and are in reality a fringe party even if they did make it to the final round. But they did get a third of the vote, and are not going away any time soon. The implosion of the mainstream parties was responsible for the FN’s success. And, of course, it was also responsible for the success of Macron.
Next up is the parliamentary election in June. He must transform his movement, En Marche (translated usually in English as “On the Move,” but this has a more dynamic connotation in the sense he uses it), into a political party in less than 60 days and find 577 candidates to run for Parliament. This movement started from scratch less than a year ago. He has promised to find candidates from all walks of life, not just retread politicians who have migrated to his banner. But most experts, even some who are his close advisors, rate this as next to impossible. It is likely he will have to govern with a coalition of parties from the center, both left and right. This is going to make it difficult for him to get his dream transformation underway as each of the parties in any coalition will have a different take on his transformational policies. What is more, coalition partners will demand places in government and given the entrenched views of most of France’s political parties, this is hardly a recipe for transformation.
Macron did not make it clear in the debate that the transformation of France is inextricably linked to the transformation of the EU and especially of the Eurozone. Given Le Pen’s stand, I can understand his reticence to debate this issue with her. But, in my view, the question of France’s transformation is linked closely with a root and branch reform of the Eurozone itself. In fact, the Eurozone cannot succeed as it is now, and it will change either as a result of reform or of economic forces. It is bound to fail, in one way or the other.
And if the Eurozone fails, the EU itself will be seriously weakened, and become less of a cohesive force for a liberal Europe. The growth of nationalism/populism/nativism in member countries and in Europe as a whole will spread. The single market that now binds the entire EU together will shrivel and atrophy. But there is need for a leader in Europe for Eurozone reform. Germany, which has benefitted from the Eurozone crisis, seems in no mood to lead a reform that would make it viable over the long term. That leader must be the only other large and powerful nation on the continent, France, which must view the Eurozone’s transformation as integral to its own transformation. The Eurozone crisis is the result of a euphoric rush to a single currency in an incomplete regional integration project. Until a common fiscal policy mechanism and a common financial regulatory authority is developed, crises will continue and some member countries will be progressively immiserized. But it would be a terrible blow to European unity and to a liberal world to throw the baby out with the bathwater. We count on France, and on Macron, to see this through.
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, and a former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh
Does the decisive Macron victory over Le Pen mean that the Nationalist/Populist/Nativist tide that had been sweeping through the West is now reversed? I doubt it. Before that could be claimed, the Liberal-Centrist forces have to win convincingly in Germany, which seems likely, but also in Italy, which is more problematic. More importantly, it will also depend on whether Macron can transform this landslide victory into an effective start on transforming France, his central promise, I think, during the election campaign, and on leading the effort to reform the European Union and especially the Eurozone, which I believe is central to the dislocation and paralysis into which Europe has slipped in the last decade.
The transformation of France is inextricably linked to the transformation of the EU. In fact, the Eurozone cannot succeed as it is now, and it will change either as a result of reform or of economic forces. It is
bound to fail, in one way
or the other
Macron labels himself a Centrist, and in one sense he is. His politics tries to meld the social consciousness of the Center-Left with the free market philosophy of the Center-Right. Most of the previous Presidents of France would fit this description, some more intent on social programs beloved of the Left, and some more intent on economic modernization favored by the right, and it is not easy to discern where Macron fits on this scale. He was economics minister in the Socialist government of François Hollande, but only lasted two years, and it was in that position that he evidently decided that France needed a new politics, a new party and a new (and much younger) President. But what he exudes is a dynamism rarely seen in French politics, except at the fringes (viz. Marie Le Pen and her FN party) these days, and he has formed a movement-cum-party in which the average age is said to be around 30. He clearly represents a new and very different generation of the French population, and his Centrist philosophy draws heavily on the mindset of this young generation.
In a sense, Macron has seen that the weakness of many of the mainstream parties in Western countries lies in the unwillingness of their old, tired leaders (same old faces for 20 years) to allow a flow through of younger leaders to the top. I see this, particularly in the US, as one reason that politicians voicing Nationalist/Populist/Nativist messages have broken through. No, Donald Trump is not young, but he is (still) a new voice with a seductive message to those already alienated or discouraged. In contrast, Trump’s opposition, Hillary Clinton, is not only eligible for senior status, but had been in American politics for 25 years, and carried great political baggage because of that. And though it appears that Trump and the Republicans will be especially vulnerable in the 2018 congressional elections, as well as the 2020 Presidential elections (assuming Trump makes it that far, which is not certain), the Democratic leaders, as of now—Pelosi, Schumer, Biden, Warren, Sanders—have all been around forever, or so it seems.
Winning the election was the easy part of Macron’s challenge. Marine Le Pen and her party have a toxic history in France, going back to its founder’s support for the fascist Vichy regime and its collaboration with the Nazis, and are in reality a fringe party even if they did make it to the final round. But they did get a third of the vote, and are not going away any time soon. The implosion of the mainstream parties was responsible for the FN’s success. And, of course, it was also responsible for the success of Macron.
If the Eurozone fails, the EU itself will be seriously weakened, and become less of a cohesive force for
a liberal Europe. The growth of nationalism/ populism/nativism in member countries and in Europe as a whole will spread
Next up is the parliamentary election in June. He must transform his movement, En Marche (translated usually in English as “On the Move,” but this has a more dynamic connotation in the sense he uses it), into a political party in less than 60 days and find 577 candidates to run for Parliament. This movement started from scratch less than a year ago. He has promised to find candidates from all walks of life, not just retread politicians who have migrated to his banner. But most experts, even some who are his close advisors, rate this as next to impossible. It is likely he will have to govern with a coalition of parties from the center, both left and right. This is going to make it difficult for him to get his dream transformation underway as each of the parties in any coalition will have a different take on his transformational policies. What is more, coalition partners will demand places in government and given the entrenched views of most of France’s political parties, this is hardly a recipe for transformation.
Macron did not make it clear in the debate that the transformation of France is inextricably linked to the transformation of the EU and especially of the Eurozone. Given Le Pen’s stand, I can understand his reticence to debate this issue with her. But, in my view, the question of France’s transformation is linked closely with a root and branch reform of the Eurozone itself. In fact, the Eurozone cannot succeed as it is now, and it will change either as a result of reform or of economic forces. It is bound to fail, in one way or the other.
And if the Eurozone fails, the EU itself will be seriously weakened, and become less of a cohesive force for a liberal Europe. The growth of nationalism/populism/nativism in member countries and in Europe as a whole will spread. The single market that now binds the entire EU together will shrivel and atrophy. But there is need for a leader in Europe for Eurozone reform. Germany, which has benefitted from the Eurozone crisis, seems in no mood to lead a reform that would make it viable over the long term. That leader must be the only other large and powerful nation on the continent, France, which must view the Eurozone’s transformation as integral to its own transformation. The Eurozone crisis is the result of a euphoric rush to a single currency in an incomplete regional integration project. Until a common fiscal policy mechanism and a common financial regulatory authority is developed, crises will continue and some member countries will be progressively immiserized. But it would be a terrible blow to European unity and to a liberal world to throw the baby out with the bathwater. We count on France, and on Macron, to see this through.
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, and a former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh