The myth of Israel’s invincibility, owing to its missile defense system known as the Iron Dome and American President Joe Biden’s 'ironclad' pledge to support Israel was put to the test when Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, and when Iran retaliated against the Jewish state’s strike on its consulate in Damascus by firing drones, ballistic and cruise missiles on April 14. Both the Iron Dome and the ‘iron clad’ support, however, failed to guarantee Israel’s security and save it from external attacks, preventing albeit large-scale physical and material damage.
Israel’s massive retaliation in the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7 attacks has led to 33,500 Palestinian deaths, thousands injured and millions displaced, but Iran’s retaliation against Israel’s April 1 attack on its Damascus consulate, which killed 6 people including two generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), led to meager damage to the Jewish state.
Iran’s deterrence against Israel proved to be a myth, which was repulsed by the Iron Dome and assistance from its allies United States and France, which ensured the Iranian attack was unable to cause any significant material and physical damage.
Iran had warned Israel of retaliation to avenge the April 1 destruction of its consulate in Damascus, but the manner in which Tehran conducted its drone and missile attacks against the Jewish state was tantamount to a strategic failure. Barring air raid sirens and the fear which gripped Israel when Iranian missiles reached its airspace along with missiles from Yemen, Lebanon and Syria, more than 99% of the drones and missiles were destroyed by Israel’s Iron Dome.’
Was it wise on the part of Iran to fire hundreds of missiles and drones against Israel, passing through the airspace of Iraq, Jordan and Syria - taking several hours to reach their destination or should it have launched an attack based on precision targeting, going after military officials of the Jewish state? In order to mitigate the ramifications of its attack against Israel and prevent massive retaliation, Iran came up with a statement that it has achieved its objectives, and Israel need not retaliate. Likewise, it also asked the US to keep away from the Israel-Iran conflict and warned countries from where its missiles and drones had hit Israel not to prevent its attack. Reportedly however, Jordan assisted Israel by downing Iranian missiles.
In order to mitigate the ramifications of its attack against Israel and prevent massive retaliation, Iran came up with a statement that it has achieved its objectives, and Israel need not retaliate.
On January 3, 2020, the US killed Iranian General Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Al-Quds Brigade, when he was travelling to meet the Iraqi Prime Minister. Iran vowed to avenge the death of its commander, but did nothing of substance. Rhetorical statements were issued by Tehran condemning that attack and warning the US that it will retaliate. But there was no retaliation directly targeting American forces in the Gulf or elsewhere. This time, following the Israeli attack on its consulate in Damascus, it was too much for Iran to swallow the humiliation.
Why did Iran take two weeks to retaliate against Israel, and why did it fail to cause enormous physical and material damage to the Jewish state? What will be the Israeli way of retaliation against Iran and if a retaliatory strike takes place, how will Tehran react? Furthermore, why has the G7 condemned the Iranian attack on Israel, and why has it failed to condemn Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus? These are the questions which are being raised in the context of recent Iran-Israel standoff.
In retrospect, since the Iranian Revolution of February 1979, the regime not only broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, but also with Israel. The age-old policy, which was pursued under the Shah of Iran for maintaining cordial relations with Israel was reversed, and the revolutionary regime in Tehran began to support the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which emerged as a source of conflict between Iran and Israel.
The escalation of the Iran-Israel conflict will not only have international ramifications, but it will block trade routes in the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, and Bab-al Mandeb from the Red Sea.
Furthermore, Iran’s support to Hezbollah in Lebanon and its strategic ties with Syria also widened the gulf between Iran and Israel. On the top of this, Iran’s nuclear program became another source of antagonism between the Jewish state and Tehran. With the passage of time, hostility between Iran and Israel widened to an extent that Israel also opposed the normalization of relations between Washington and Tehran during the tenure of President Barack Obama.
The prevailing conflict between Iran and Israel needs to be analyzed from three perspectives. First, this spat will be a test case for Israel on how to respond to Iran’s attack, because the war cabinet under Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that it will retaliate. Whereas, US President Joe Biden has advised Israel to show restraint and claim a high moral ground, instead of embarking on an adventure by attacking Iran. Hawks in Israel will try their level best to rally American and Western support for its predictable retaliation against Iran, but it is yet to be seen whether that reaction will be in the form of direct military attacks on Iran, or by targeting its strategic interests in the region.
Iran tried to calm the situation down diplomatically by arguing that it has avenged the Israeli attack on its consulate in Damascus, and it will consider the matter a closed chapter. Perhaps, unlike Iran, which took two weeks to retaliate against Israel, the Jewish state will not take that long.
Second, the escalation of the Iran-Israel conflict will not only have international ramifications, but it will block trade routes in the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, and Bab-al Mandeb from the Red Sea. Iran and Yemen are in a position to block both choke points, thus jeopardizing 60% of global oil and gas supplies. Not only will the supply of oil and gas be disrupted, but any possible Israeli-Iranian war will destabilize the whole of the Middle East and other parts of the world.
Those who wield power at the international level realize how deadly it will be in case war breaks out between Iran and Israel. Particularly, China and some other countries will do their utmost to prevent the escalation of the Iran-Israel conflict. Predictably, Russia will side with Iran, along with Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.
This current attack has proven Iran’s capability to target Israel and exposed the myth of the Jewish state’s invincibility.
Will the US, NATO and G7 take the risk of granting all out support to Israel for its attack on Iran is a question that needs to be contemplated. Meanwhile, US National Security spokesman John Kirby said in Washington that “we are not looking for a wider war with Iran. Mr. Netanyahu was well aware of Mr. Biden’s feelings after the two leaders spoke on Saturday while Iran’s unprecedented attack was still unfolding.” It seems that Israel, the US and its allies have released their anger at the UN Security Council’s meetings, by condemning Iran, as they know very well that an escalation of conflict will have lethal ramifications for regional and global peace.
Finally, at the end of the day, both the Iron Dome and the US’ ironclad support seem to have prevailed, as Iran’s so-called massive retaliation failed to cause any significant damage to Israeli military installations. If the Iranian objective by launching such attacks was to deter Israel and avenge the April 1 attack, then in that case, Tehran’s purpose has been fulfilled. Any post-April 14 Iranian attacks on Israel will however be crucial, because hawks in Netanyahu’s war cabinet will try to keep tensions high and target Iran not only inside Iranian territory, but also elsewhere.
This current attack has proven Iran’s capability to target Israel and exposed the myth of the Jewish state’s invincibility. What matters now is the extent to which the war in Gaza will take a new turn and to what extent the chances of a wider Middle Eastern conflict will deepen in the days to come.