BJP leader Dr Subramaniam Swamy threatened that India will militarily defeat Pakistan within two years. In another statement, the newly promoted Indian Army Chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag warned Pakistan against any ‘aggression.’ These provocative statements were not welcomed at any level in Pakistan, since a very cordial visit by the Pakistani Prime Minister on the oath taking ceremony of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi helped get both the governments get off to a decent start.
Such statements are not new, and are common among the political elite for diplomatic strong-arming. India does however give an impression that it still retains ambitions to fight a war with Pakistan in response to a terrorist attack allegedly by Pakistan-based groups on Indian soil. In fact, these ambitions have further gained prominence after the nuclearization of South Asia.
The conventional asymmetry between the two strategic competitors has grown over the years. The spillover effect of this rising conventional asymmetry has meant lowered nuclear thresholds of Pakistan. Moreover, the contemplation of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) – now Proactive Strategy or Operation – into the Indian military doctrine has forced Pakistan to induct Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) into its nuclear arsenal as a response to it and deter India from waging a risky war that can lead to a devastating nuclear exchange putting one fifth of humanity at risk.
But it is important to ask whether, in a nuclearized environment, we can fight a war. Can we even fight a limited war under nuclear overhang? Is it possible for Pakistan and India to settle down their territorial disputes through fighting a war and winning it in a nuclearized environment? These are some pinching questions that need answers.
Fears are associated with fighting a limited war that it will escalate to an all-out war, which will eventually lead toward a nuclear exchange. The ‘No First Use’ option in the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine is seemingly under revision in the BJP regime.
Right now, Indian strategists are rigorously working on creating more ambiguity around their nuclear doctrine. They are also studying creating some sort of limited space between undeclared Pakistani red-lines and its conventional forces so that they can wage a limited war on Pakistan. It is evident from the study on the progress of the decade-old Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine that India wants to bluff Pakistan. The Indian civil leadership has frequently distanced itself from CSD in order to maintain plausible deniability and test and explore Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds.
Indian progress in its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), especially its recent missile inceptor test, has put Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence under stress. However, the Indian civil-military leadership must understand the red lines for Pakistan. For Pakistan, it will be difficult to subdue or counter the Indian army through conventional means. And at some point in time, in a contingency situation, where Indian army gains ground or occupies some territory in Pakistan, what options does Pakistan have to force them out of its territory?
Since Pakistan has tested a nuclear device, and its deterrent capability is acknowledged worldwide, we find that despite India’s conventional advantage over Pakistan it has been unable to cross the border or wage a war.
There is a need for mutual restraint and sober statements that do not heighten the fears of war in such testing times. Pakistan and India must move to resolve bilateral disputes and break the impasse of the last 67 years, and reach common grounds to ensure peace and stability.
Ahmad Khan is a PhD scholar at the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies at NDU, Islamabad. Ali Ashan is a postgraduate student in the International Relations department of the same universuty
Such statements are not new, and are common among the political elite for diplomatic strong-arming. India does however give an impression that it still retains ambitions to fight a war with Pakistan in response to a terrorist attack allegedly by Pakistan-based groups on Indian soil. In fact, these ambitions have further gained prominence after the nuclearization of South Asia.
The conventional asymmetry between the two strategic competitors has grown over the years. The spillover effect of this rising conventional asymmetry has meant lowered nuclear thresholds of Pakistan. Moreover, the contemplation of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) – now Proactive Strategy or Operation – into the Indian military doctrine has forced Pakistan to induct Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) into its nuclear arsenal as a response to it and deter India from waging a risky war that can lead to a devastating nuclear exchange putting one fifth of humanity at risk.
But it is important to ask whether, in a nuclearized environment, we can fight a war. Can we even fight a limited war under nuclear overhang? Is it possible for Pakistan and India to settle down their territorial disputes through fighting a war and winning it in a nuclearized environment? These are some pinching questions that need answers.
Fears are associated with fighting a limited war that it will escalate to an all-out war, which will eventually lead toward a nuclear exchange. The ‘No First Use’ option in the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine is seemingly under revision in the BJP regime.
Right now, Indian strategists are rigorously working on creating more ambiguity around their nuclear doctrine. They are also studying creating some sort of limited space between undeclared Pakistani red-lines and its conventional forces so that they can wage a limited war on Pakistan. It is evident from the study on the progress of the decade-old Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine that India wants to bluff Pakistan. The Indian civil leadership has frequently distanced itself from CSD in order to maintain plausible deniability and test and explore Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds.
Indian progress in its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), especially its recent missile inceptor test, has put Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence under stress. However, the Indian civil-military leadership must understand the red lines for Pakistan. For Pakistan, it will be difficult to subdue or counter the Indian army through conventional means. And at some point in time, in a contingency situation, where Indian army gains ground or occupies some territory in Pakistan, what options does Pakistan have to force them out of its territory?
Since Pakistan has tested a nuclear device, and its deterrent capability is acknowledged worldwide, we find that despite India’s conventional advantage over Pakistan it has been unable to cross the border or wage a war.
There is a need for mutual restraint and sober statements that do not heighten the fears of war in such testing times. Pakistan and India must move to resolve bilateral disputes and break the impasse of the last 67 years, and reach common grounds to ensure peace and stability.
Ahmad Khan is a PhD scholar at the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies at NDU, Islamabad. Ali Ashan is a postgraduate student in the International Relations department of the same universuty