Having relinquished the role of “General Tariq” to Brigadier Sher Khan, in April 1948, Akbar Khan was assigned the command of the Kohat Brigade, now re-designated as 101 Infantry Brigade. Major General Nazir’s path crossed with Akbar as the brigade was under his formation – the 9th (Frontier) Division – since January. Two months later Akbar was back in Kashmir where his brigade was temporarily placed under command of 7 Division and assigned the Uri Sector. When the Indians launched their attack astride the River Jhelum, 101 Brigade was hard pressed and Akbar rushed to the Chakoti Sector from his brigade HQs at Murree. With him was Faiz Ahmed Faiz, the editor of the Pakistan Times.
In 1942. Faiz Ahmed Faiz had been commissioned into the British India Army as a lieutenant and posted to Delhi as a public relations officer. He was recruited by my uncle Majid Malik who subsequently replaced Desmond Young (the author of Rommel the Desert Fox) as Director Public Relations of the Indian Army. Within two years he was a lieutenant colonel serving at Rawalpindi as Assistant Director of Public Relations, HQ North-Western Army. After the war he was awarded an MBE and chose to retire after Independence when his old friend Mian Iftikharuddin invited him to become the chief editor of a new newspaper called the Pakistan Times. It was probably Mian Sahib who asked Akbar to take Faiz along – and the time that the two spent on the frontline together would have established a bond.
A heavy machinegun crew of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir during the 1947-49 war
During the two months that the battle raged, the greatest success by Akbar’s brigade was blunting the Indian offensive along the Jhelum Valley. For a brief period, one of Akbar’s battalion commanders was Muhammad Abdul Latif Khan who was commanding 5/12th Frontier Force Regiment (Guides Infantry) and later became a party to the conspiracy. He was from Bhopal and commissioned from IMA in 1936 (IC-105) into 5/10th Baluch Regiment (now 12 Baloch). He saw extensive action in Burma during the Second World War and was with 8/10th Baloch in the Arakan and with 16/10th Baloch during the battle of Imphal-Kohima.
Akbar was building up on the discontent that prevailed within the army. Some of it was directed rightly or wrongly towards the presence of British officers, particularly at the senior level who did not allow the full potential of the Pakistan Army to be used during the Kashmir War. However, it was also directed at the civil government and administration
During the counter-offensive by the Fourteenth Army he was back with 5/10th and his battalion played a leading role in securing the bridgehead across the Chindwin by 19 Indian Division. While holding a feature called Pearl Hill, “Major MOHD ABDUL LATIF KHAN, under very difficult conditions, by his coolness, example, and understanding of his men, was able to encourage them and enabled them to hold on to their position under heavy fire, and in spite of their losses, beat off the enemy with heavy losses to the Japs.”
Gen Douglas Gracey, who was C-in-C of the Pakistan Army while the Rawalpindi Conspiracy was being hatched
For this action and his performance in subsequent major encounters, he was awarded a Military Cross. Latif was a highly professional officer and after Independence he had the honor to be selected as the first battalion commander at the Pakistan Military Academy under Brigadier Ingall. When placed in command of the Guides Infantry, he was introduced to the battalion by the Gen Gracey, the C-in-C as the best battalion commander in the Pakistan Army.
Two of Akbar’s officers on the brigade staff were also caught in the web – Major Ishaq Muhammad the brigade major and Captain Namazi his Grade III staff officer.
The Flag Staff House at Kohat which was the residence of Maj Gen Akbar Khan when he was commanding the 101 Infantry Brigade in 1948-49
As the Brigade Major, Ishaq was initially covering the Baramula sector and subsequently the Kotli Sector. He had been commissioned in 1942 into 7/16th Punjab Regiment, a new battalion raised in Sialkot a year earlier. During the Second Arakan Campaign his battalion was operating in the Kaladan Valley in March 1944. Though a temporary captain with only two years of service, Ishaq had been specially selected to command a company of Dogras as its general state was unsatisfactory. Between 7-11 March 1944, his company beat off three determined Japanese attacks killing 40. According to his citation, “He has shown outstanding leadership, highest sense of devotion to duty, which he instilled in his Company in a short time.” His personal bravery and self-sacrifice, remarked upon by all his VCO’s was of the highest order. “Ishaq Sahib was everywhere – we told him not to expose himself unnecessarily as we could hang on alright but he was always around not worrying about his personal safety.” He was recommended for a DSO but awarded a MC.
Though the Indian Spring offensive of 1948 stalled on a number of axis, they continued to improve the communication infrastructure, build up the logistics and induct additional forces into Kashmir. They were therefore able to steadily recover lost ground particularly towards Dras-Kargil and by autumn were close to launching a major offensive in the southern part of the sector and take the war into Pakistan if necessary. Prime Minister Liaquat informed the UN that unless the Indians halted their preparations, the Pakistan Army would launch a counteroffensive that could lead to a general war. The Indians too did not want the conflict to escalate and agreed to a ceasefire which was formally declared on 1 January 1949. As some of the formations/units of the Pakistan Army pulled back, Akbar’s brigade returned to Kohat.
In the UK, he had a number of meetings with a well-known American Communist that was reported back to Pakistan. This was a new dimension to the conspiracy which was being debated even before Akbar left for the UK. Akbar eulogized communist ideology while others in the steadily expanding group were in favor of an Islamic orientation
Initially, Akbar’s grievance was not about the ceasefire. It was that the government had not accepted his plan of an “armed revolt inside Kashmir” by arming the population of the valley. Three months later, the Prime Minister had a two-hour discussion with him on the future course of action and assured Akbar that weapons were being procured. Nothing came of it – and that added to Akbar’s feeling that that he had been marginalized. For nearly the whole of 1949, he remained with 101 Brigade in Kohat. He and his wife entertained lavishly and kept an open house in which conversation flowed from world politics at one end of the spectrum to Kashmir at the other with the underlying theme being the ineptness of the government, corruption, inefficiency etc. and the need for radical change. Akbar’s contemporaries as well as junior officers were welcome and cultivated – and it enabled him to assess their inclination and suitability to the cause.
Faiz Ahmed Faiz (fourth from the right), Chief Editor at The Pakistan Times, with Mian Iftikharuddin, the owner of the newspaper, and editorial staff
Akbar was building up on the discontent that prevailed within the army. Some of it was directed rightly or wrongly towards the presence of British officers, particularly at the senior level who did not allow the full potential of the Pakistan Army to be used during the Kashmir War. However, it was also directed at the civil government and administration and the manner in which the army was being treated – and a perceived need for a military dictatorship. All this was mentioned in a source report that I found in the archives of my father who in 1949 was establishing the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at Karachi. The report also stated that “it is widely known in Pindi, even to civilian circles, of creation of rival groups among high ranking Pakistani officers which is seriously affecting the rank and file.”
On the basis of such like reports, Shahid Hamid suggested to General Gracey – during one of the visits by the Chief to the directorate – that the ISI should be permitted to have some agents reporting on the activities of the officers in the Army. To this Gracey replied he did not want a “Gestapo” organization in the forces. I find this attitude of General Gracey difficult to appreciate considering the circumstances and the fact that he was well aware that Akbar and other officers were very vocal and critical about the role of GHQ in the conflict. During the first half of 1949, Akbar enlarged the group of conspirators and there were a number of clandestine meeting in which he managed to persuade, cajole, seduce and `half-convince’ the officers to string along with him.
From the middle of 1949 onwards, a number of meetings were held some on the roadside but the most significant was at the Kund Rest House on the River Kabul. In a nutshell the plan was to arrest of the prime minister, governors, chief ministers and the entire army hierarchy in Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Lahore. Air Commodore Janjua would carry out similar arrests in Karachi. The scale was too large and too ambitious (for the resources in terms of troops that could be mustered) but then so was Akbar and more so his wife. Thereafter a military council would be established under Akbar and Major General Nazir would be appointed as the new C-in-C. Elections would be held within six months and the power would be handed back to a civil government. There are other versions of the same meeting regarding the course of action(s) that also included recommencing the Kashmir War. However, whatever the final plan, it was not implemented for two reasons. Firstly, there were strong indications of reluctance of some of the key players and secondly, the army detailed Akbar to attend the Joint Services Staff Course (JSSC) in UK in the beginning of 1950.
Apparently the purpose of sending the officer to UK was to diffuse the coup and secondly for Akbar to be more favorably inclined towards the British. However, while he was in UK he had a number of meetings with a well-known American Communist that was reported back to Pakistan. This was a new dimension to the conspiracy which was being debated even before Akbar left for UK. Akbar eulogized the communist ideology while others in the steadily expanding group were in favor of an Islamic orientation. In Pakistan, the leftists were under tremendous pressure with warrants and arrests for members of the Communist Party (CP). Through her links with political families, Nasim Akbar had connections with committed sympathizers of the party such as Faiz Ahmed Faiz.
These political connections brought together the CP leadership and the Chief of General Staff after his return from UK. Akbar was aware that the coup would subsequently need political support as well as a broader base which the CP and its affiliated trade unions, kissan committees, etc., could provide. Editorial support would be forthcoming from The Pakistan Times, a leading newspaper, whose editor was Faiz Sahib. In return the CP would be allowed to function as a legitimate political party and take part in the elections which General Akbar promised to hold a few months after consolidating his power. It was a bad error of judgement for Faiz Sahib and many in the military to become a party to the conspiracy.
