The advocacy of peace diplomacy as a central theme of Pakistan’s foreign policy appears at first glance to be a useless exercise. Our dominant political culture since independence has been immersed in the idiom of war, militarism and belligerence. So the idea of peace diplomacy normally would be seen as idealist trash. Here I seek to argue that changing circumstances are pushing Pakistan in the direction where this idealism will be the only pragmatic solution to our foreign policy problems.
But first a little lesson in regional history. The leader of the Indian Independence Movement, Jawaharlal Nehru was very hard on the generals of the Indian Army after he became the first Prime Minister of India. He made India’s civilian intelligence apparatus chase and monitor the Army Generals, as part of a series of protective measures - what experts of Indian civil-military relations describe as “coup proofing.” So much so that Nehru didn’t even allow private and social meetings between more than two Army generals, lest they start plotting against him.
As everyone knows, coup proofing measures instituted by Nehru proved to be quite successful in warding off a military takeover in India. The result was a meek and low-spirited cadre of Army Generals. In the wake of Indian independence, Nehru was a thorough idealist as far as foreign policy issues and strategic thinking about India’s role in the region and world politics was concerned. He wanted India to be friends with China. Indian military historians point out that Nehru was an emotionally dejected man when Chinese land forces attacked India and routed the Indian Army at the international border in the 1962 War.
He stylized himself as a leader of an anti-colonial struggle, and according to Indian historians, had a very romantic attitude towards other third world countries, including China. Some Western historians and strategic writers even suggest that war with China had emotionally broken Nehru and he died soon afterwards, as he could not survive the emotional shock of Chinese belligerence against India. There was another response to the Sino-Indian war of 1962 that was visible in Nehru’s personality: he ceased to be an outright idealist in foreign policy management.
To many, his decision to beg the Americans – and he was virtually on his knees - for an emergency shipment of military hardware immediately needed on the front, was surprising to say the least. After all, this was a self-styled anti-colonial hero begging for help from the Americans - the new imperial power after the second World War, which was in the process of replacing British political and military power in the region.
Nehru’s idealism could have cost him part of India’s territory if the Chinese military had not unilaterally withdrawn from Indian territory, captured in the wake of the rout of the Indian Army in 1962. At a subjective level, from all this, we can draw the conclusion that military and strategic realities between nation-states are more important than philosophical idealism that Nehru, according to Indian historians, pursued in the initial years after independence. China posed a military threat to India in the 1960s, something Nehru was being told by multiple sources. Yet he ignored this reality, and stuck with his idealism of anti-colonial and pan-Asian brotherhood. India then paid the price.
This is not to say that we should become idealists like Nehru and ignore military threats that exist in our region or conversely, turn towards belligerent militarism when the chips are down. While true that Nehru was a dejected man after the 1962 war, he didn’t bid farewell to his idealism completely. Indian foreign policy continued to depict anti-colonial and pan-Asian themes after the 1962 defeat, and even after Nehru’s death. They continued to remain wary of great power interference in their region, while securing the best military hardware deals from both the Soviet Union and United States. In his tenure, Nehru was convinced that India needed to have a strong military.
Nobody is arguing that we should unlearn the realist lesson that Pakistan exists in a tough neighborhood and that we absolutely need to have a strong military. Following in Nehru's footsteps, successive Indian leaders did not allow the ascendance of the Indian military in national political life and in the formation of foreign policy and strategic thinking. Strengthening the institution of the military as military force is one thing, and making militarism a way of life at the social and political level is completely another. Till the mid-1990s, Indian foreign policy continued to revolve around the Nehruvian theme of non-alignment while it continued a balancing act between the two superpowers during the Cold War.
With the start of the new century and end of the Cold War, the Nehruvian theme started to lose its shine, but still, the Indian strategic elite continued to abhor entanglement in great power politics. Non-alignment thus transformed into “strategic autonomy.” Interestingly, the Indian strategic elite refused to completely part ways with Nehruvian themes in the evolving landscape of global politics. This became amply clear when the Indian government demonstrated reluctance to become a party to the Quad’s military component - the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, involving the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. They overcame this reluctance only after prolonged military tension with China in 2022.
How is all of this relevant to Pakistan’s foreign policy predicament? Our situation demands that we formulate foreign policy based on perceptions of reality and idealism. We do face military threats. The Indian military is flirting with the idea of limited war and ballistic missile defense, which could make part of our nuclear deterrent obsolete. Our western border is unstable, and we are facing two insurgencies in our territory, one in the north west and the other in the south west. Our militarism, all pervasive as it may be in our social and political life, has limited value for those who matter in international politics. It was valuable for the Americans and the westerners till the time they were interested in Afghanistan and what was happening there. It is true they still have their eyes on Afghanistan. But the West’s strategic focus has shifted to the great power rivalry with China.
Our militarism may still be relevant to our situation in order to confront the military threats we are facing. But this militarism will not take us far in making Pakistan a viable, successful state. All-pervasive militarism is part of the problem, not the solution as far as our economic issues and our chronic political instability are concerned. If our foreign policy continues to be a reflection of the military reality we are facing within the country and in the region broadly, our image and reputation in the world will continue to be that of a politically unstable and economically viable state. We need to introduce a little bit of idealism into our foreign policy and into our social and political life.
Military tensions around the world are rising: the China and United States military rivalry is heating up, China and India have simmering military tensions, and Western Europe is growing ever more wary of Russian aggression. If circumstances drag us into any of these conflicts, we will ruin our prospects for any sustainable economic recovery in the future and political stability.
If we maintain our neutrality, this neutrality will have to be provided a philosophical base. We have to shift our understanding of world politics from that of a realist to a liberal worldview. Realism as a world view corresponds clearly with militarism. War and military readiness are central to the realists’ understanding of global politics. Liberalism as a worldview depicts a world connected through economic interdependence, and is based on the idea of solving problems with other countries through cooperative mechanisms. In the case of Pakistan, the irredentist claims and dreams of military solutions to political problems have to take the proverbial and literal back seat.
Pakistan’s political leaders have likely faced the kind of emotional shock that Nehru faced in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war many times over during the past 25 years. They didn’t change course as militarism continued to define our relations with our neighbors and within society. We can learn lessons from Nehru’s predicament in the wake of the 1962 war and the way he handled his problems. Changing course and infusing idealism into our foreign policy is one way that Pakistan’s foreign policy can become well-suited to ensuring our viability as an economically prosperous and stable state.
But first a little lesson in regional history. The leader of the Indian Independence Movement, Jawaharlal Nehru was very hard on the generals of the Indian Army after he became the first Prime Minister of India. He made India’s civilian intelligence apparatus chase and monitor the Army Generals, as part of a series of protective measures - what experts of Indian civil-military relations describe as “coup proofing.” So much so that Nehru didn’t even allow private and social meetings between more than two Army generals, lest they start plotting against him.
As everyone knows, coup proofing measures instituted by Nehru proved to be quite successful in warding off a military takeover in India. The result was a meek and low-spirited cadre of Army Generals. In the wake of Indian independence, Nehru was a thorough idealist as far as foreign policy issues and strategic thinking about India’s role in the region and world politics was concerned. He wanted India to be friends with China. Indian military historians point out that Nehru was an emotionally dejected man when Chinese land forces attacked India and routed the Indian Army at the international border in the 1962 War.
Jawaharlal Nehru was very hard on the generals of the Indian Army after he became the first Prime Minister of India. He made India’s civilian intelligence apparatus chase and monitor the Army Generals, as part of a series of protective measures - what experts of Indian civil-military relations describe as “coup proofing.”
He stylized himself as a leader of an anti-colonial struggle, and according to Indian historians, had a very romantic attitude towards other third world countries, including China. Some Western historians and strategic writers even suggest that war with China had emotionally broken Nehru and he died soon afterwards, as he could not survive the emotional shock of Chinese belligerence against India. There was another response to the Sino-Indian war of 1962 that was visible in Nehru’s personality: he ceased to be an outright idealist in foreign policy management.
To many, his decision to beg the Americans – and he was virtually on his knees - for an emergency shipment of military hardware immediately needed on the front, was surprising to say the least. After all, this was a self-styled anti-colonial hero begging for help from the Americans - the new imperial power after the second World War, which was in the process of replacing British political and military power in the region.
Nehru’s idealism could have cost him part of India’s territory if the Chinese military had not unilaterally withdrawn from Indian territory, captured in the wake of the rout of the Indian Army in 1962. At a subjective level, from all this, we can draw the conclusion that military and strategic realities between nation-states are more important than philosophical idealism that Nehru, according to Indian historians, pursued in the initial years after independence. China posed a military threat to India in the 1960s, something Nehru was being told by multiple sources. Yet he ignored this reality, and stuck with his idealism of anti-colonial and pan-Asian brotherhood. India then paid the price.
Nobody is arguing that we should unlearn the realist lesson that Pakistan exists in a tough neighborhood and that we absolutely need to have a strong military.
This is not to say that we should become idealists like Nehru and ignore military threats that exist in our region or conversely, turn towards belligerent militarism when the chips are down. While true that Nehru was a dejected man after the 1962 war, he didn’t bid farewell to his idealism completely. Indian foreign policy continued to depict anti-colonial and pan-Asian themes after the 1962 defeat, and even after Nehru’s death. They continued to remain wary of great power interference in their region, while securing the best military hardware deals from both the Soviet Union and United States. In his tenure, Nehru was convinced that India needed to have a strong military.
Nobody is arguing that we should unlearn the realist lesson that Pakistan exists in a tough neighborhood and that we absolutely need to have a strong military. Following in Nehru's footsteps, successive Indian leaders did not allow the ascendance of the Indian military in national political life and in the formation of foreign policy and strategic thinking. Strengthening the institution of the military as military force is one thing, and making militarism a way of life at the social and political level is completely another. Till the mid-1990s, Indian foreign policy continued to revolve around the Nehruvian theme of non-alignment while it continued a balancing act between the two superpowers during the Cold War.
With the start of the new century and end of the Cold War, the Nehruvian theme started to lose its shine, but still, the Indian strategic elite continued to abhor entanglement in great power politics. Non-alignment thus transformed into “strategic autonomy.” Interestingly, the Indian strategic elite refused to completely part ways with Nehruvian themes in the evolving landscape of global politics. This became amply clear when the Indian government demonstrated reluctance to become a party to the Quad’s military component - the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, involving the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. They overcame this reluctance only after prolonged military tension with China in 2022.
How is all of this relevant to Pakistan’s foreign policy predicament? Our situation demands that we formulate foreign policy based on perceptions of reality and idealism. We do face military threats. The Indian military is flirting with the idea of limited war and ballistic missile defense, which could make part of our nuclear deterrent obsolete. Our western border is unstable, and we are facing two insurgencies in our territory, one in the north west and the other in the south west. Our militarism, all pervasive as it may be in our social and political life, has limited value for those who matter in international politics. It was valuable for the Americans and the westerners till the time they were interested in Afghanistan and what was happening there. It is true they still have their eyes on Afghanistan. But the West’s strategic focus has shifted to the great power rivalry with China.
We need to introduce a little bit of idealism into our foreign policy and into our social and political life.
Our militarism may still be relevant to our situation in order to confront the military threats we are facing. But this militarism will not take us far in making Pakistan a viable, successful state. All-pervasive militarism is part of the problem, not the solution as far as our economic issues and our chronic political instability are concerned. If our foreign policy continues to be a reflection of the military reality we are facing within the country and in the region broadly, our image and reputation in the world will continue to be that of a politically unstable and economically viable state. We need to introduce a little bit of idealism into our foreign policy and into our social and political life.
Military tensions around the world are rising: the China and United States military rivalry is heating up, China and India have simmering military tensions, and Western Europe is growing ever more wary of Russian aggression. If circumstances drag us into any of these conflicts, we will ruin our prospects for any sustainable economic recovery in the future and political stability.
If we maintain our neutrality, this neutrality will have to be provided a philosophical base. We have to shift our understanding of world politics from that of a realist to a liberal worldview. Realism as a world view corresponds clearly with militarism. War and military readiness are central to the realists’ understanding of global politics. Liberalism as a worldview depicts a world connected through economic interdependence, and is based on the idea of solving problems with other countries through cooperative mechanisms. In the case of Pakistan, the irredentist claims and dreams of military solutions to political problems have to take the proverbial and literal back seat.
Pakistan’s political leaders have likely faced the kind of emotional shock that Nehru faced in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war many times over during the past 25 years. They didn’t change course as militarism continued to define our relations with our neighbors and within society. We can learn lessons from Nehru’s predicament in the wake of the 1962 war and the way he handled his problems. Changing course and infusing idealism into our foreign policy is one way that Pakistan’s foreign policy can become well-suited to ensuring our viability as an economically prosperous and stable state.