The Pakistani government has recently announced another operation ‘Azm-e-Istehkam’ (Resolve for Stability) to eradicate extremism and terrorism from the country, though there seems to be little clarity on whether this would be a full-scale military operation or a series of intelligence-based targeted operations against suspected militants. The public at large, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), the most affected province from terrorism, is wary of such operations as in the past, military operations have played havoc with peoples’ lives by depriving them of their homes, livelihood and by bringing widespread destruction to their areas. The government’s failure to provide them with appropriate compensation further added to their miseries.
Instead of relying solely on kinetic or military approaches outrightly, a counterterrorism strategy to eliminate or eradicate terrorism must be based on an informed approach on how terrorism and terrorist groups end. Terrorism scholars, after decades of research on terrorism, have identified several ways that usually lead to end of terrorist groups. These ways are not exclusive, they mostly work in combination. The aim of this article is to present a review of different ways of how terrorist groups end and how these revelations can help us in assessing in what ways the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan might come to an end.
The TTP emerged as a militant group in 2007 in Pakistan’s erstwhile tribal territories to fight the Pakistani security forces and to provide support to the Afghan Taliban who were engaged in fighting US forces in Afghanistan. In the following years, a weak counterinsurgency strategy by the Pakistani government allowed the TTP to establish its control in different parts of FATA, even challenging the writ of the Pakistani state in Swat, an area not that far from the country’s capital, Islamabad. The TTP further resorted to terrorism that killed thousands of innocent Pakistani citizens and the country’s security forces. The most deadly and horrific terrorist attack by TTP included an attack on an army-run school in Peshawar in December 2014 that killed almost 150 people, most of them children.
The TTP’s main stated objective are to impose Afghan Taliban-styled Shariah in Pakistan and to restore the tribal status of FATA.
Perceiving TTP as an existential threat, the Pakistani state launched several military operations including Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 which destroyed the group’s military and financial infrastructure in FATA and forced the group leadership to seek refuge in neighboring Afghanistan. The uprooting of TTP from FATA was followed by a significant reduction of terrorism in the country.
However, terrorist violence has surged again during the last three years after the Afghan Taliban regained the control of Kabul in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Securing ideological and material support from the Afghan Taliban, the TTP, under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, unleashed a new wave of terrorism across Pakistan, targeting mainly police and military forces that signaled a clear departure from the previous strategy of targeting mainly civilians.
The TTP’s main stated objective are to impose Afghan Taliban-styled Shariah in Pakistan and to restore the tribal status of FATA. The Afghan Taliban brokered negotiations between the Pakistani state and TTP failed to yield peace, let alone providing an opportunity to regroup and plan terrorist attacks in Pakistan. How TTP ends poses as a perplexing question that needs an informed and systematic answer.
The first way terrorism comes to an end is through success, although it is rare and the least common way. The chances of success for the TTP in achieving its objectives, which are both ideological and territorial, limited mainly to the former FATA region, are extremely grim. The military strength of the group appears very weak when confronted with its enemy, the Pakistani state, which is far superior in terms of military strength and financial resources.
The Pakistani state has successfully conducted military operations in FATA (now the Merged Districts) which not only destroyed the organizational infrastructure of the terrorist group, but also uprooted the TTP leadership from their strongholds, forcing them to flee and find refuge across the border in Afghanistan.
Most importantly, these TTP objectives do not resonate with the population they claim to represent. Moreover, the TTP’s indiscriminate terrorism strategy targeting civilians has turned the Pakistani people against the group and people living in KPK and FATA held the TTP partly responsible for their miseries due to the military operations in FATA.
A second way a terrorist group can end is by transforming into something else: a criminal network or an insurgency. There is an element of criminality among TTP militants who have been reported to collect money by intimidation or threatening locals residing in and around KPK. However, the TTP’s ability to transform into an insurgency is far from a possibility. Most of the group leadership which is hiding in Afghanistan is simply not capable of mobilizing people who have already demonstrated their disdain for the organization as they hold TTP partly responsible for bringing chaos and destruction in their areas.
A third way terrorist groups end is through state military repression. The Pakistani state has successfully conducted military operations in FATA (now the Merged Districts), which not only destroyed the organizational infrastructure of the terrorist group, but also uprooted the TTP leadership from their strongholds, forcing them to flee and find refuge across the border in Afghanistan. However, these military operations incurred a heavy cost on the FATA people who were not only forced to leave their areas and live in ill-managed refugees’ camps, but also suffered from massive destruction of their houses and livelihood which probably would take many years to rebuild depending on the government’s seriousness, resolve and availability of financial resources.
Nevertheless, the group's ability to find safe havens in Afghanistan after the Afghan Taliban victory in Afghanistan in August 2021 helped them to survive and plan terrorist attacks in Pakistan, mainly targeting this time the military and police forces.
A fourth way that terrorist groups end is through the decapitation of leadership, either through arrest or the killing of leaders. Various leaders, from Baitullah Mehsud to Hakimullah Mehsud and Fazalullah, were killed mainly by American drone strikes, but the organization proved resilient in providing a new leader to the group.
The strength of the organization was considerably weakened with the loss of almost every leader even to the extent of disintegration of the group, especially after the death of Hakimullah, but the group ultimately restored itself and continued to survive against the leadership crisis. The current leader Noor Wali Mehsud reinvigorated the TTP by reuniting the former splinter groups into its fold and by exercising control over the group members which has significantly increased the group strength and outreach.
The group's ability to find safe havens in Afghanistan after the Afghan Taliban victory in Afghanistan in August 2021 helped them to survive and plan terrorist attacks in Pakistan, mainly targeting this time the military and police forces.
Negotiations represent a fifth way through which terrorism may end. At various occasions, the Pakistani state adopted the strategy of negotiations to end terrorism in the country, but this strategy failed miserably, instead, it provided opportunities to the group to consolidate itself which made the group stronger. After the Afghan Taliban capture of Kabul in August 2021, the Pakistani state engaged TTP in negotiations with the help of the Afghan Taliban, but these negotiations could not make any substantial progress. The TTP even rejected an offer of amnesty made by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, and vowed to continue its armed struggle until the Sharia law replaces democracy as a governance system in Pakistan.
The sixth way is the most common way through which terrorist groups end; they either face internal implosions or lose popular support. Internal collapse may result due to various factors, including generational shifts, and disintegration due to ideological or operational differences. Losing popular support is also cited an important factor that account for the demise of a terrorist group. Terrorist groups tend to make mistakes in selecting targets that result in the loss of support among important constituencies.
The internal collapse of TTP does not seem like it will happen anytime soon. The current leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud has consolidated the group by bringing most of anti-state militant groups under its banner and there are no reported ideological or operational differences within the group. Regarding popular support, the TTP does not garner any public support among the people of KPK or FATA.
Islamabad also needs to concentrate on diplomacy with the Afghan Taliban to deprive the TTP of the necessary support it has secured to survive as a terrorist group. Another military operation will not only displace people from their homes, but also create frustration and anger among the affected population.
As discussed earlier, locals loath the TTP because of its indiscriminate targeting of civilians that caused thousands of deaths. Furthermore, the media reported that TTP militants’ presence in parts of FATA and Swat stirred a deep sense of revulsion among locals, who staged protests and urged the government to take stern action against the militants.
The Pakistani state’s counterterrorism strategy instead of launching another military operation must focus on intelligence-based operations targeting the militants and the core leadership to destroy the organizational structure of the group. There are some instances where the Pakistani state has managed to kill some important figures in the groups.
In addition, Islamabad also needs to concentrate on diplomacy with the Afghan Taliban to deprive the TTP of the necessary support it has secured to survive as a terrorist group. Another military operation will not only displace people from their homes, but also create frustration and anger among the affected population. Handling the displaced people would create additional burden on the already struggling economy of Pakistan.
As part of its diplomatic efforts, the Pakistani state can use its leverage with the pro-Pakistan faction of the Afghan Taliban, such as the Haqqani group to engage the Afghan Taliban for effective actions against the TTP. In addition, Pakistan can depend on China’s influence over the Afghan Taliban to convince them to stop supporting the TTP.
On the domestic front, accepting and providing legitimacy to PTM by the Pakistani state can offer people an alternative to the militants’ narrative that presents Pakistan as unjust and oppressive state. In the form of PTM, people have a platform to vent their grievances against the state which are legitimate in most cases and would potentially discourage the use of violence as a means to challenge status quo or bring a political change. An informed counterterrorism strategy could help the Pakistani state to end this menace to rid the country of terrorism.