As the war in Gaza approaches its one-year mark, the decimation of Hamas sought by Israel remains elusive. With all its war preparedness and technological superiority backed by the military might of the United States and Europe, Israel has failed to achieve the goal of total victory envisioned by its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Desperate attempts by the USA, Egypt, Qatar, and other countries for a ceasefire in exchange for Israeli hostages continue to stall and, aside from statements from the leaders, there does not seem to be any end in sight. It seems that politics has overshadowed this already complex issue involving occupation, the fight for freedom, terrorism, religion, personal agendas, and much more. Below is an attempt to unfold this juggernaut by comparing the competing viewpoints of different sides involved and some additional dimensions, to then be able to understand what may come next in this continuing fiasco of human suffering.
From Israel’s perspective, it has destroyed or seized crucial supply routes from Egypt to Gaza, including the crucial Philadelphia Corridor which is a 300 feet wide and eight-mile-long strip from Israel's border to the Mediterranean. This corridor has Gaza to its Northeast and Egypt to the Southwest and was a key supply route for weapons and food transportation for Hamas. Israel claims that about 14,000 combatants in Gaza have been killed or captured and half the leadership of Qassam Brigade, the military wing of Hamas, including Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa have been eliminated. IDF asserts it can now move freely throughout Gaza and that Hamas is so damaged that its officials have told international negotiators it is willing to give up civilian control of Gaza to an independent group after a cease-fire is in place.
Israel feels if it evacuates Gaza now, Hamas will be strong again within a year. Another 2-3 months of high-intensity fighting in central and southern Gaza are needed before Israel can transition to conducting intelligence-based raids and strikes for around a year to take out remaining Hamas fighters and weapons infrastructure, before allowing another party to take over the administration of Gaza. The United States assesses that Hamas is no longer capable of planning or executing an attack on the scale of Oct 7, and its ability to launch smaller terrorist attacks on Israel is in doubt. But the US officials believe that Hamas will continue to reconstitute and pop up after the Israeli forces say they have cleared an area without follow-on plans for security and governance in Gaza.
Israel does realise that the biggest remaining goal of the return of around 115 living or dead hostages can only be secured through negotiations.
Hamas’s strategy from the beginning has been “survival is victory”. It has urged its fighters to hide in its vast tunnel network under Gaza or among civilians. While Israel has tried to damage the underground tunnels in Gaza, it has failed to destroy them. Some of the larger tunnel complexes, which Hamas has used as command posts, have been rendered inoperable, but the network has proved much larger than Israel anticipated, and it remains an effective way for Hamas to hide its leaders and move around fighters. While Hamas holds Israeli hostages in this tunnel network it claims Israel’s army and reserve forces are exhausted and want an end to this war. Hamas believes that every day of war brings more civilian casualties causing more displeasure and rage in the world against Israel while highlighting and winning support for the Palestinian cause.
Meanwhile, the US has made security and economic coalitions to contain Russia in Europe, and China in the Pacific, and to isolate Iran in the Middle East. These coalitions spread from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the Asia Pacific to India in the Persian Gulf, up to NATO in Europe. A key component to connect these alliances from Asia Pacific to the Middle East to Europe is a proposed defense alliance with Saudi Arabia.
Netanyahu knows that the younger base of Democrats in the USA is against the actions taken by Israel in Gaza. Hence, a win for Democrats in the November elections in the US runs opposite to Netanyahu’s interests
To get the US Congress to pass a defense alliance with Saudi Arabia, the olive branch would be normalising relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Concurrently, for Saudis to agree to normalising relations with Israel, they would need a ceasefire in Gaza and a path to a two-state solution leading to a Palestinian state at some point in the future. A cease-fire deal with Hamas in Gaza with the release of Israeli hostages will compel Hezbollah to cease fire as well. At that point, Israel can agree to open talks with the Palestinian Authority, which will pave the way to normalising relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – the greatest diplomatic achievement by the USA as well as Israel. This will create conditions for Egypt, UAE, and Morocco to send peacekeeping troops to Gaza, along with the Palestinian Authority representing the Palestinians rather than Hamas. Such a coalition will act as an Arab force to counter the Iranian alliances with Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, and Iraqi Militias.
While the above is in play, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who was indicted in 2019 on charges of fraud, bribery, and breach of trust, wants to stay in power to stay out of prison, if convicted. His government holds power through a delicate coalition with extreme right-wing Jewish supremacists. A two-state solution runs in contravention of the vision of the right-wing coalition partners. While wanting permanent Israeli control over the West Bank, they have threatened to topple Netanyahu’s government if there was any deal with Saudis or a ceasefire in Gaza.
Netanyahu has consistently discredited the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank for its incompetence and corruption, even though it recognised Israel and embraced the Oslo Peace Accords. A competition with Hamas in Gaza was promoted to keep the Palestinian people divided. Qatar was allowed to send $1 billion to Hamas for humanitarian aid, fuel, and government salaries.
Netanyahu knows that the younger base of Democrats in the USA is against the actions taken by Israel in Gaza. Hence, a win for Democrats in the November elections in the US runs opposite to Netanyahu’s interests. If Netanyahu does not agree to a cease-fire and a hostage deal, this would force Kamala Harris to come under pressure to either criticise Netanyahu and lose Jewish support in the presidential race or else stay quiet and lose Arab support. And if she finds it difficult to do either, it would make her look weak in the eyes of American voters.
On the other hand, Trump wants Netanyahu to finish the job in Gaza. A Trump victory in November aligns with Netanyahu’s objectives. If Trump wins, Netanyahu can then announce a ceasefire and return of hostages along with a Saudi deal and declare total victory for Israel, which can pave the way for his re-election and formation of government without the support of a coalition.
In an additional dimension of this drawing board lies another cherry that Netanyahu would like to pick. An alliance with Saudi Arabia and some other countries in the Middle East would be a solid diplomatic achievement from the Israeli perspective, and it would create an Israeli Arab partnership against Iran’s expansionist overtures and support for hostile proxies in the region. However, this alliance will not neutralise the biggest military threat that Israel considers in its wider scheme of affairs, Pakistan.
Pakistan, with one of the most powerful militaries and the only nuclear-armed state in the Islamic world, is vital for Israel to make the Israel-Saudi alliance more meaningful. With its ailing economy dependent upon constant support from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Western multilateral lenders, Pakistan could possibly be lured into joining the coalition provided there is a path to Palestinian statehood and also if the country gets relief in its burgeoning foreign debt. If this offer was on the table, Pakistan would find itself between a rock and a hard place since its people may not be ready to accept and recognise Israel. Generations of Pakistanis have grown up looking upon Israel as an occupying force that has illegally usurped land from Palestinians.
Will Pakistan join the Israel-Saudi alliance and recognise the state of Israel, an act that was unthinkable for Pakistanis for the past almost 8 decades? Will Israel consider a deal with Saudi Arabia to be complete without Pakistan? The solution to the war in Gaza and the larger problem of Israel and Palestine is more complex than just what happens in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. The vast array of competing interest’s way beyond the Middle East will have to stretch and balance before we see any hope of lasting peace in the region and the world.