2024, the year of elections
2024 is an election year for more than half of the world population. India’s general elections, the world’s largest exercise of democratic franchise saw Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lose the majority in an election where the Hindu nationalist right-wing party was expected to make gains from its already impressive 2019 electoral position. Modi will now be forced to rule the world’s most populous country with a coterie of coalition partners. General elections were held in Mexico this June, in which the former Mexico City mayor, Claudia Sheinbaum, emerged as the winner. She is all set to take office as Mexico’s first female president in October this year. In South Africa, parliamentary elections were held in May, in which the dominant party, the African National Congress (ANC), failed to win the majority for the first time ever since South Africa’s first ‘free’, fair and multi-ethnic elections held in 1994 in which the legendary Nelson Mandela, became the first black president of the country post-apartheid. In Europe, elections for the European Parliament were held early June in which the far-right European parties such as the AfD, made considerable electoral gains.
Moreover, France and the UK are going for ‘snap’ polls in the coming weeks. In North America, presidential debates are around and the presidential election will be held in November this year. In Asia, many countries will be conducting elections at various level. Indeed, general elections have already taken place in Bangladesh and Indonesia early this year. Iranians would be polling for their new president on June 28 following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash last month. Similarly, presidential elections are expected to be held by October this year.
As the above indicates, many elections have either been held or scheduled in 2024. It also points to the fact that the majority of the world population believes in the power of elections, even as they were held in ‘flawed’ democracies, hybrid systems and authoritarian or autocratic contexts.
My predictions about the 2024 elections in Pakistan
Pakistan had its general election held in February this year. The elections got delayed due to peculiar political issues because as per the Constitution, they were supposed to be held in 2023, no more than 60 days after the National Assembly completed its 5-year tenure. The PTI (Imran Khan’s party), the PML-N (the Sharifs’ party) and the PPP (Bhutto-Zardari’s party) seemed major contenders along with a plethora of ethno-nationalist and religious political parties. While disagreeing with many political pundits and ‘electoral’ experts ─ who claimed a two-thirds majority for the PML-N ─ I predicted the outcome of the 2024 election in these pages a day before the election as follows:
“Given the electoral mobility of the (urban) middle classes, coupled with the youth’s love for Khan, in such tight constituencies, the pro-PTI independents can turn the tables. Non-PTI independents also can win in constituencies with close competition. Thus, the independent candidates are, by and large, likely to grab between 30-40 National Assembly seats in the entire country. The share of pro-PTI independents could be between 25-30…[out] of the 18 districts of Central Punjab - Lahore, Gujranwala, Faisalabad and Sahiwal division - the PML-N is likely to grab 60 plus seats of the total 71 seats. In addition, the PML-N will secure a few seats in South Punjab. Perhaps, none in Sindh.”
First, none of the political parties could attain a simple majority, let alone the PML-N. Secondly, the PML-N won 75 seats (only 5 seats short of 80 as per my calculation).
Making further predictions about the electoral outcomes for provinces and the federal capital, I wrote “[the] N-League can also win four to five seats in KP. The party could possibly win a couple of seats in Balochistan on its own too. In Islamabad, the PML-N candidates seem in good shape compared to the ‘new faces’ introduced by the PTI in terms of independent candidates. The PML-N is likely to win at least two seats in Islamabad, too. Hence, the PML-N is likely to win between 80-90 seats for the National Assembly. With reserved seats, its total haul could be around 120 seats, thus, short of the 169 needed to form a government.”
Regarding the electoral perform of the PPP, and the ethno-nationalist and religious parties, I predicted “[the] PPP is very likely to win around 40 seats from Sindh, five to eight from Punjab and a couple from KP and Balochistan. Overall, the PPP is likely win to around 50-55 seats in total… the PML-Q (Shujaat group) is likely to win three to four seats. The MQM is likely to win four to six seats…[And] the JI [Jamaat-e-Islami] is likely to win three to four seats overall, and the JUI-F [Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazal] can win between 12-15 seats…Pervez Khattak’s PTI-P is also not likely to shock Imran Khan’s PTI…[Moreover] the ANP is likely to win around five to eight seats due to its sustained campaign, despite threats. Similarly, the ethnonationalist parties are likely to win a couple of seats from Balochistan. BAP may not win as it did the last time…As far the TLP is concerned, its vote bank is likely to go up…however, it is likely to act as a spoiler. Finally, Tareen’s IPP is likely to win three to four seats on its own.”
Finally, I predicted that “based on my calculations, the PML-N is likely to emerge as a leading party, but falling short of the 169 seats needed to be a ruling party. To this end, the PML-N will need coalition partners, and the Sharifs will be quite comfortable with the JUI-F, MQM, GDA, PML-Q (Shujaat) and, above all, Tareen’s IPP. Hence, Pakistan is very likely to be governed by another coalition government at the federal level. The pro-PTI independent may not join any of the mainstream parties under normal circumstances. However, if coerced or persuaded, some will join other parties like the IPP.”
What explains the wrong predictions?
In the hindsight, the following predictions came out to be empirically true as per the initial (excluding independents joining other parties and by-elections) data released by the Election Commission on its website.
I, and perhaps many other political observers, fumbled at measuring the youth’s overwhelming support for the PTI-backed independent candidates. I admit that I took it lightly that too many votes would come out particularly in rural areas in support of their favorite independent candidates.
First, none of the political parties could attain a simple majority, let alone the PML-N. Secondly, the PML-N won 75 seats (only 5 seats short of 80 as per my calculation). Thirdly, the PML-N won a few seats in KP and Balochistan for the National Assembly. Fourthly, the PPP won 54 seats (within my prediction range of 50-55 seats). Fifthly, the PML-Q, IPP, JI, BAP and PkMAP won a couple of seats as predicted. Pervez Khatak’s faction of PTI was routed, too, as predicted. Sixthly, the PML-N won in the federal capital as predicted. Seventhly, the TLP also failed to win any seat for the National Assembly as predicted. Lastly, another coalition government, comprising the PML-N and the PPP, has been formed at the centre as predicted.
However, some of my predictions went terribly wrong. Here is the list. Firstly, the independent candidates won 101 seats, compared to the 30-40 seats that were predicted. In fact, the PTI backed independent candidates scored 93 National Assembly seats. Secondly, the MQM won 17 seats (10 more seats). Thirdly, the PML-N could not win massively in Central Punjab. Fourthly, the JUI-F could hardly win 4 seats.
While wondering about the factors and ponding over the variables that were not taken into account while make electoral predictions, I would posit the following factors were missed due perhaps to over-reliance on conventional voting pattern and electoral behavior in, for example, Central Punjab and parts of KP and Balochistan.
First, I, and perhaps many other political observers, fumbled at measuring the youth’s overwhelming support for the PTI-backed independent candidates. I admit that I took it lightly that too many votes would come out particularly in rural areas in support of their favorite independent candidates.
Secondly, I underestimated, to an extent, the utility, or perhaps power, of the digital media whereby the youth, particularly the PTI affiliated, used the social media optimally. Thirdly, we need to revisit the way we understand the electoral affiliations of the urban (and even rural) middle classes. They are not solely moved by material factors such as low taxation for merchants. Indeed, a major chunk of this section of the population is ideologically motivated to overwhelming support the PTI.
This is also confirmed by my personal conversation with representatives from these classes from both the urban and rural setting. Lastly, I accorded bit more operational value to the ‘religious’ factor when it comes to constituency politics in rural KP and Balochistan where Fazlur Rehman’s JUI-F had won around a dozen seats in the past elections that it contested. This surprisingly did not happen in this election. One explanation could be the ideological factor that favored the PTI in KP that won massively even for the provincial assembly seats.
Legitimacy issues
Like any previous election held in Pakistan, the 2024 elections, too, have received its due share of criticism. The PTI-backed independents, who joined the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) post-election, have alleged the Election Commission rigged the election in favor of the PML-N and the PPP with the support of the military establishment. They publicly showed evidence of the infamous Form-47 that had been fabricated in numerous constituencies where, they believe, the PTI-backed independent candidates have won as per Form 45.
The ruling elite of our country ought to understand the youth population's dynamics. They make more than 60 % of our population; the majority is semi-educated and poorly skilled. They face joblessness amid high inflation and high tax rates. What if they take to streets for their constitutional rights?
On its part, the PML-N leadership posits that had they been favored by the military establishment through the Election Commission, they should have won more than two-thirds of seats to form a majority government. Maulana Fazlur Rehman and other religious political parties have also questioned the legitimacy of the entire electoral exercise. In addition, the entho-nationalist political parties also seem dissatisfied with the electoral results.
The way forward
For (future) elections to be regarded as free, fair and transparent, the following measures need to followed. First, we need to disband the office of an interim Prime Minister. It no longer exists in other South Asian countries such as Bangladesh and India. The election commission needs to follow the rules in letter and spirit. It must conduct the election freely, fairly by, for example, announcing the results within the stipulated timeframe along with uploading Form 45 and 47 in real time. PILDAT has made similar recommendations. In addition, foreign media from the US, UK and EU should not only be invited, but also provided access to independently observe and report about the electoral conduct.
Importantly, the ruling elite of our country ought to understand the youth population's dynamics. They make more than 60 % of our population; the majority is semi-educated and poorly skilled. They face joblessness amid high inflation and high tax rates. What if they take to streets for their constitutional rights? Didn’t we see this in GB and AJK just recently? Even globally, the youth is at the forefront of various rights movements. Pro-Palestine rallies in the US and Europe are a case in point. In Kenya, the youth is part of the rioters, violently agitating against high taxes, inflation and unemployment.
Thus, it is time our political and policy elites re-rank their choices in favor of the large interest of the society. Otherwise, the youth bulge may take any shape in the foreseeable future.