India Cannot Walk A Diplomatic Tightrope Any Longer

India's insistence on keeping every diplomatic door open is based on a flawed conception of geopolitical reality, particularly as it seeks to reap the benefits of being a strategic partner for the United States in its great power rivalry with China.

India Cannot Walk A Diplomatic Tightrope Any Longer

In my previous article, I argued that India is walking a precarious diplomatic tightrope, attempting to balance its relations between Iran and Israel, Russia and Ukraine, and the US-NATO alliance. Traditionally, India has maintained a policy of being amicable with all nations - Pakistan being a notable exception - a strategy developed during the Cold War through its involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement.

While India refrained from aligning with either the Western or Soviet blocs, Pakistan formalised its association with the Western bloc by signing the CEATO and SENTO agreements. I also contended that India faces a situation where it must pick sides; it can no longer remain neutral. This earlier assertion of mine is corroborated by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s statement during Modi’s visit to Kyiv: “I very much need your country on our side, not balancing between the US and Russia”, as reported by The Indian Express.

I have repeatedly posed the question on my show over the past few weeks: is it feasible for India to persist with its market-driven diplomacy, as posited by Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar? This question is particularly pertinent, given Prime Minister Modi's recent visit to Ukraine, where Jaishankar attempted to clarify India's stance on purchasing Russian oil during a press talk. On many occasions during this visit, Jaishankar seemed to be offering explanations regarding PM Modi’s prior visit to Russia, particularly his warm hug with President Putin.

In short, PM Modi’s visit to Ukraine, where he envisioned himself as a peacemaker on the world stage, proved to be completely unwarranted—a diplomatic disaster and a source of national embarrassment.

What prompted Modi to undertake this visit? What led Indian policymakers to believe they could mediate in the war? It became glaringly apparent that Modi's venture was reckless, earning him nothing but humiliation. While Modi was in Ukraine, Russia—India's long-standing ally—launched a massive offensive in eastern Ukraine—ostensibly a clear expression of how Putin felt about Modi’s presence in Kyiv. President Zelenskyy, on the other hand, criticised Modi, pointing out that India's purchase of Russian oil has bolstered the Russian economy, indirectly fuelling the war against his country. This compelled Jaishankar to justify India's trade relations with Russia and that India’s oil purchase from Russia is not politically motivated, it is rather market driven —an explanation that appeared rather peculiar.

Name-calling seems to be an Indian thing. The minute someone says anything that doesn’t suit them, it happens.

The Indian media has been in a frenzy since Modi’s return. The former Indian Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, described President Zelenskyy’s comment about India as “most improper, cheap, immature politics, talking down to Modi, and dictating policy to India.” On Karan Thapar’s show The Wire, Sibal further labelled it as “inept diplomacy, immature diplomacy, and entitlement politics, as if the world owes him everything.”

Name-calling seems to be an Indian thing. The minute someone says anything that doesn’t suit them, it happens. I have personally experienced this while conducting shows about India. Notable political scientist and author of Jinnah: His Successes, Failures and Role in History, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed, has been on the receiving end of similar name-calling. He was held in high esteem by the Indian commentariat as long as he presented his unbiased critical views about Quaid-e-Azam and Pakistani history. The minute he expressed critical views about Modi, he was labelled a 'jihadi.' That clearly demonstrates the extent of tolerance among Indians. They are given to self-praise and expect everyone to join the chorus.

Back to the key question: what made Modi think he could mediate peace between Russia and Ukraine? And, what compelled him to visit Ukraine immediately after his trip to India’s long-standing ally, Russia? Did the Indian policymakers not inform Modi that Ukraine supplied weapons to Pakistan during the Kargil War? Were they silent about Ukraine’s support of Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir?

Ignorance of these facts might be forgivable. However, deciding to travel to Kyiv with this knowledge in hand makes the story even more intriguing, raising a looming question: What made him go despite all this? Or rather, who persuaded him to go? Yes, that last question! And to find the answer, consider the following scenario.

During a panel discussion at the Munich Security Conference on February 17, 2024, where the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock were present, Jaishankar was asked whether he entertained multiple options in his foreign relations. “Yes,” he said. “Is that a problem? Why should it be a problem? If I’m smart enough to have multiple options, you should admire me.” Blinken and Baerbock obviously didn’t seem to enjoy this jibe. Jaishankar might have forgotten that India owes a great deal to the US for the success of its IT sector, which employs a significant portion of its young population.

India is now a strategic partner for the US against China – and not a neutral state. Therefore, it can no longer maintain friendly relations with those who are waging war against US interests, particularly in Europe.

Additionally, India is a strategic partner of the US in the region—against China. Again, India has a substantial trading relationship with China, amounting to over US$140 billion in FY 2023. Indian imports from China stood at US$98.50 billion, while exports were less than US$16 billion. India’s exports to Russia amounted to US$4.06 billion during 2023, with imports standing at US$67.07 billion. India’s imports from the United States totalled US$42.12 billion, and exports were US$75.81 billion during 2023. 

Clearly, it is only with the US that India has a favourable balance of trade. Moreover, the majority of FDI in India is from US companies—alongside China, of course. So, one cannot address the US Secretary of State in such a manner as Jaishankar did at the Munich Conference when the Indian Air Force requires a significant upgrade, and much of the Indian economy depends on American investment and support. Imagine the level of unemployment that the withdrawal of US companies from India could cause; no political government could survive that for even a minute!

Jaishankar’s outrageous performance at such forums, along with his insistence on pursuing a declared policy of playing all sides, proved to be ill-advised during his Ukraine visit. He, along with his team of policymakers, seemed to be living in the Cold War era, not realising that the world has changed—at least for India. India is now a strategic partner for the US against China – and not a neutral state. Therefore, it can no longer maintain friendly relations with those who are waging war against US interests, particularly in Europe. Zelenskyy made it abundantly clear to Modi through his so called ‘rude’ remarks and attitude.

As to the question of what prompted Modi to visit Kyiv after his warm embrace with Putin, that remains anyone’s guess.

The author holds a PhD from the University of Glasgow, UK. He hosts a political talk show on TV and appears as a political commentator in TV shows.