What Russian History Can Tell Us About Ukraine's Future

What Russian History Can Tell Us About Ukraine's Future
To understand Russian President Vladimir  Putin, the broadcast meeting of his National Security Council, days before he ordered an invasion into Ukraine, is essential viewing. In a discussion about a plan of action, Putin gives Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, a dressing down on live television. A nervous Sergei is finally asked to sit down after agreeing with Putin’s proposal. The video is shocking and provides insight into his personality.

In the last couple of years, Putin has isolated himself: he makes his own decisions, so much so that even those close to him are often unsure as to his next move. He governs Russia under a one-man, one-rule system. His personal ideas become state policies.

Among many untruths during Putin’s televised speech on February 21, nothing short of an angry rant, the Russian president blamed founder of Soviet Russia Lenin for chopping off Ukraine from Russia. Putin was presumably referring to the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1919, a move necessary at the time due to rising nationalism amongst union republics. Putin also blamed Nikita Kruschev for handing Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, another essential move at the time for administrative purposes. Finally, he denied Ukraine’s right to statehood, saying Ukraine only exists because of Russia. Putin delivered the message that a great Russia once existed, and he will restore it.

 
Russian forces have now made it to Kyiv. Ukrainian forces are putting up fierce resistance along the Donbas border. Residential buildings in Kharkiv and Kyiv have been hit by shelling. Airfields and airports are under attack. Hundreds of civilians have died in the conflict.

 

These ideas and untruths have guided Putin’s stance on invading Ukraine. Putin is a paranoid man. He thinks the US is using Ukraine as a launchpad to attack Russia. He also thinks Ukraine is on a path to acquiring nuclear weapons. There were certain concessions he demanded which went largely unaddressed by the US and NATO. For that reason, the West is complicit in the current crisis. However, the way in which Putin chose to address these concerns are counter-productive at best and catastrophic at worst.

Any leverage Putin had from amassing 190,000 troops on Ukraine’s border is now gone. The West will be even more determined to make Ukraine a NATO member. By invading, Putin has united the Western alliance against him, created an anti-Russian resistance amongst the Ukrainian public and invited global condemnation.

On a strategic level, Putin’s move into Ukraine made no sense. Instead, it looked like an opportunistic power grab. Putin saw the West weak and divided, and understood that the US and NATO had limited options, considering they had stated they would not send troops to fight Russian forces. Sensing the time was right, Putin invaded.

Russian forces have now made it to Kyiv. Ukrainian forces are putting up fierce resistance along the Donbas border. Residential buildings in Kharkiv and Kyiv have been hit by shelling. Airfields and airports are under attack. Hundreds of civilians have died in the conflict. According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, he is Putin’s primary target.

What is Putin’s endgame here? Is it occupation, regime change or something else? History provides some answers. Many parallels can be drawn from Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its military support in Syria in 2015.

By the early 2000s, Georgia was drifting Westward, even joining the US-led coalition in the Iraq War. They were also on the verge of joining NATO. At the same time, there was a separatist movement brewing in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, which the pro-Western government blamed on Russia. In 2008, Georgia cracked down on these two regions. Russia responded by invading Ukraine, halting its advance 30 miles from Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. A ceasefire was called, and Russia formally recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. The Georgian invasion is very similar to the current invasion in Ukraine. At this stage, the outcome in Georgia could be the best-case scenario for Ukraine.

In 2015, Russia intervened militarily in Aleppo to support President Bashar al-Assad, saving Syrian government forces from collapse. Under the pretext of stopping the Islamic State, Russia established itself as the ultimate power broker in the region. Today, Russia has complete freedom to move personnel and cargo in and out of Syria. They have stationed advanced military equipment and special forces there. Thousands of Russians work for Syrian companies. If the same happens in Ukraine, the country would lose sovereignty and become dependent on Russia for protection.
 

By invading, Putin has united the Western alliance against him, created an anti-Russian resistance amongst the Ukrainian public and invited global condemnation.

 

These are two of many possibilities that may unfold in Ukraine. It is hard to predict which path Putin will choose and many seasoned analysts have already been proven wrong. We are no longer operating in the realm of rationality. Who knows how far Putin is willing to go? However, it seems that he is vying for a regime change. Putin thinks Zelensky is a US puppet and wants to overthrow him. This would be a vital step in Putin’s goal to reclaim Ukraine.

Much focus has been placed on sanctions as a deterrent to Russian aggression. While economic sanctions are weapons in today’s world, sanctions are a double-edged sword. Gone are the days of Cold War containment policies which aimed to isolate the Soviet Union from the world. Today Russia is heavily integrated in the world economy. Excluding Russia from the global financial system would come back to haunt Europe, as the continent is dependent on Russian gas.  If Russia does not receive payments, they will not supply gas, which is why sanctions on big Russian banks, and talks of excluding them from SWIFT, might be an uneasy issue for some European leaders.

So, what else can be done? Putin notoriously derives his power from oligarchs, who he treats as his personal piggy bank. Oligarchs famously keep their money outside of Russia. According to some estimates, the sum of laundered money may be worth as much as 85 per cent of the Russian GDP. An effective way to hit Putin would be to freeze foreign assets belonging to oligarchs. It would be a challenge to find these accounts, but if they do, it would create a lot of unrest among people close to him. Loyalties change when personal wealth decreases.

We are already seeing signs of Russian isolation on the sports fields. The Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) announced cancellation of the Russian Gran Prix. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) announced relocation of the Champions League final from St. Petersburg to Paris. Poland is refusing to play Russia in a World Cup qualifier and heavy pressure is being placed to exclude Russia from World Cup 2022. It is unclear how much this will impact Putin’s decision making. He excels at playing victim among world leaders who are out to get him.

 
Thousands of people across Russia have risked arrest to protest the invasion. Celebrities are speaking out. Putin’s spokesperson’s own daughter posted on social media against the war. These are major steps in a country that heavily cracks down on dissent and must not be underplayed.

 

The US and Europe need to do more to come to Ukraine’s aid. Messages of solidarity will not protect Ukrainians on the front lines, but anti-tank weaponry and anti-aircraft missiles will. Germany sending 5,000 helmets in response to Ukraine’s request for 100,000 helmets did not bode well for Europe’s commitment. However, one crucial factor that Putin failed to acknowledge at the time of invasion, and continues to downplay now, is Ukrainian resistance.

Videos are pouring in from Ukraine of regular citizens answering the call from their President to take up arms. So far, 100,000 have joined defence units. In a poll, 58 per cent have said they are ready to resist in some form, while 43 per cent said they are ready to fight. The Ukrainian public might be the most crucial deterrent in this war.

Putin has also received a very underwhelming response at home. Thousands of people across Russia have risked arrest to protest the invasion. Celebrities are speaking out. Putin’s spokesperson’s own daughter posted on social media against the war. These are major steps in a country that heavily cracks down on dissent and must not be underplayed. According to a recent poll, most Russians did not support the decision to recognize the two new independent states in Ukraine, let alone an actual invasion.

The lack of support from China must also be a surprise for Putin. While not condemning Russia outright, China’s foreign ministry said they would never seek spheres of influence or engage in military bloc confrontations – an underhanded way of saying they oppose this invasion. Their response is understandable. China’s stability depends on maintaining strong economic relations with both Ukraine and the EU. Talks are already underway among world leaders to adopt long term measures to isolate Russia, including diversifying away from Russian gas. Why would China undermine its trading partners in support of a country that is being isolated?

In the world of power dynamics, aggression must be met with a decisive counteraction. The invasion in Georgia, led to the invasion in Crimea, which led to Ukraine. If the world is serious about stopping Putin, more needs be done.  The broad range of sanctions, resistance, military supplies, boycotts, and isolation aim to show Putin his actions will not succeed. Just how much these measures will serve as a deterrent remains to be seen. But the future of Ukraine depends on it.

Coming back to Putin’s speech and his remarks about Lenin: political views aside, Lenin actually prevented the breakup of the Russian empire by creating within non-Russian colonies a willingness, through concessions, to remain part of a larger whole kept together by force. Essentially, Lenin gained power by losing power. Putin now blames Lenin for giving up Ukraine. However, Putin may want to take a page out of Lenin’s playbook, otherwise, history teaches us that this will not end well for him.

The writer is a lawyer. He tweets at @azwarshakeel12