Both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan have put forward, though separately, a model of dealing with the institution of the Pakistani military, which is not at all viable in the current political environment. One after the other, the two former Prime Ministers have taken on the military leadership after they were ousted from power within a short span of four years. Both of them went out of the way to accommodate the military top brass on policy matters while they were in power and turned against them when they were ousted from office, though for different reasons and in different circumstances.
We are living in times when the military leadership has clearly shown that they not only have political ambitions, they also have geopolitical ambitions in the region. We have a military which is strongly in thrall to its public image—an institutional trait that puts it on the course to indulge in managing the mechanics of politics in the country. Consider this: the political role of the military is an intensely debated political issue in our society.
Discourse and commentaries related to this debate on the military's political role greatly impinge on the image of Pakistani military. The avalanche of criticism that the Pakistani media and political commentaries lodged at the door steps of military top brass irked them greatly and compelled them to dub even serious contributions in this debate as handiwork aimed at creating a wedge between the people of Pakistan and “their Armed Forces.” This is where the whole exercise of image building of the military assumes a political tone.
The two honorable former prime ministers who are engaged a power struggle at the moment appear to be intellectually barren when it comes to developing a framework on how to accommodate the institution of the military—which is not only politically assertive but geopolitically ambitious and which seems to be at odd with emerging intellectual and political trends in the society—within a fragile political system that they would be presiding over and managing if either one of them would win the next parliamentary elections expected to be held in October this year. Direction confrontation with the military, which was the overt policy of both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan when they were ousted from power one after the other, may help you win votes among the populace that holds every power wielding official responsible for his economic hardship in the times of economic meltdown.
But this is hardly a viable option to take in case you are bestowed with the responsibilities to run the affairs of the state. If the new prime minister—whoever wins the next parliamentary elections—again goes into either the accommodationist or confrontationist mode with the military, it will hardly solve the problem. In the post Musharraf period, not a single civil government has escaped the heavy hand of military establishment either in the matters of governance or in the possible longevity of its tenure.
Nawaz Sharif has a habit of not dealing directly with the military top brass. He employs his trusted lieutenants for dealing with the military top brass. Remember Shahbaz Sharif and Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan used to interact with army chiefs whenever Nawaz Sharif was in power. No institutional arrangements were in place to deal with the military at an institutional level or in any systematic way. Imran Khan also had personal one on one relations with the military top brass during his tenure in office. To suggest that both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan did not have a clear understanding of the inner functioning of the institution of the military and its political, geopolitical requirements and its needs as far as its image is concerned doesn’t mean that these requirements, needs and mechanics of the inner functioning of the military didn’t impinge on the country's politics and military’s relations with these two respective prime ministers. There has been no attempt in either of the major parties to understand these dynamics of the military as an institution and its political weight in the system.
The PML-N’s central leaders strongly believe that one of the reasons the military decided to oust Nawaz Sharif from power in 2017 was his policy of harboring close personal relations with the Indian Prime Minister and his desire to normalize relations with India. But has there been any attempt in the PML-N to comprehend why General Bajwa started offering talks to India in his public speeches immediately after the ouster of Nawaz Sharif? None.
The military is a complex institution and its responses to political developments within the country and its reactions to geopolitical developments in the region are also complex. Whether Nawaz Sharif and Imran as Prime Minister comprehend these responses and the political goods that the military leadership seeks to extract from the political system or not, these responses will nevertheless impinge both on matters of governance and longevity of the tenure of the civil government. Ironically, both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan have not demonstrated any intellectual capacity to understand the complex dynamics of political and geopolitical ambitions of the Pakistani military as an institution and neither do their party structures possess any academic or intellectual competence to guide them in this regard. Their total reliance on retired army generals to deal with strategic and military affairs in their political operations is a poor response to the complexities at hand.
The latest speech by the new Army Chief General Asim Munir at the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, is an example of how complex the military's response is to the situation at hand. Firstly, the speech clearly demonstrates that the new army chief, just like all his predecessors, sees the military as an autonomous institution within the political structures of the country. Its political ambitions are visible in General Asim’s assertions that dub critical voices, which in his opinion, are trying to create a wedge between army and people of Pakistan. Both his wish to condemn these voices and his desire to be on the right side of public opinion in the country will put him on the course of political activism just like his predecessors. The mention of Kashmir and Afghanistan in his speech clearly indicates that geopolitical ambitions still persist within the military as an institution. This also indicates that the central element of the so-called Bajwa Doctrine to project Pakistan as a hub of regional connectivity will have to take a back seat. During Bajwa’s tenure, there were clear signs that the desire to see Pakistan as a regional connectivity hub had taken root within the intellectual landscape of the military. The idea seems to have fallen out of vogue.
The future Prime Minister of Pakistan cannot afford to ignore these realities when dealing with the military as an institution. The Pakistani military is in love with its image and any future Prime Minister ignores this institutional trait at his own peril. Our political leaders need to understand that the military is not simply an institution which provides ladders to them to raise their political stature. It is an institution which dominates the power structure of the state, and it also insists on defining the political and strategic agenda of the state because the military’s leaders have political as well as geopolitical ambitions. The problem with the Pakistan political class is that it has not even started to think strategically. In the post-9/11 strategic environment, our political class has completely relinquished their right to assert themselves in strategic and military affairs.
We are living in times when the military leadership has clearly shown that they not only have political ambitions, they also have geopolitical ambitions in the region. We have a military which is strongly in thrall to its public image—an institutional trait that puts it on the course to indulge in managing the mechanics of politics in the country. Consider this: the political role of the military is an intensely debated political issue in our society.
The two honorable former prime ministers who are engaged a power struggle at the moment appear to be intellectually barren when it comes to developing a framework on how to accommodate the institution of the military.
Discourse and commentaries related to this debate on the military's political role greatly impinge on the image of Pakistani military. The avalanche of criticism that the Pakistani media and political commentaries lodged at the door steps of military top brass irked them greatly and compelled them to dub even serious contributions in this debate as handiwork aimed at creating a wedge between the people of Pakistan and “their Armed Forces.” This is where the whole exercise of image building of the military assumes a political tone.
The two honorable former prime ministers who are engaged a power struggle at the moment appear to be intellectually barren when it comes to developing a framework on how to accommodate the institution of the military—which is not only politically assertive but geopolitically ambitious and which seems to be at odd with emerging intellectual and political trends in the society—within a fragile political system that they would be presiding over and managing if either one of them would win the next parliamentary elections expected to be held in October this year. Direction confrontation with the military, which was the overt policy of both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan when they were ousted from power one after the other, may help you win votes among the populace that holds every power wielding official responsible for his economic hardship in the times of economic meltdown.
But this is hardly a viable option to take in case you are bestowed with the responsibilities to run the affairs of the state. If the new prime minister—whoever wins the next parliamentary elections—again goes into either the accommodationist or confrontationist mode with the military, it will hardly solve the problem. In the post Musharraf period, not a single civil government has escaped the heavy hand of military establishment either in the matters of governance or in the possible longevity of its tenure.
The PML-N’s central leaders strongly believe that one of the reasons the military decided to oust Nawaz Sharif from power in 2017 was his policy of harboring close personal relations with the Indian Prime Minister and his desire to normalize relations with India. But has there been any attempt in the PML-N to comprehend why General Bajwa started offering talks to India in his public speeches immediately after the ouster of Nawaz Sharif? None.
Nawaz Sharif has a habit of not dealing directly with the military top brass. He employs his trusted lieutenants for dealing with the military top brass. Remember Shahbaz Sharif and Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan used to interact with army chiefs whenever Nawaz Sharif was in power. No institutional arrangements were in place to deal with the military at an institutional level or in any systematic way. Imran Khan also had personal one on one relations with the military top brass during his tenure in office. To suggest that both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan did not have a clear understanding of the inner functioning of the institution of the military and its political, geopolitical requirements and its needs as far as its image is concerned doesn’t mean that these requirements, needs and mechanics of the inner functioning of the military didn’t impinge on the country's politics and military’s relations with these two respective prime ministers. There has been no attempt in either of the major parties to understand these dynamics of the military as an institution and its political weight in the system.
The PML-N’s central leaders strongly believe that one of the reasons the military decided to oust Nawaz Sharif from power in 2017 was his policy of harboring close personal relations with the Indian Prime Minister and his desire to normalize relations with India. But has there been any attempt in the PML-N to comprehend why General Bajwa started offering talks to India in his public speeches immediately after the ouster of Nawaz Sharif? None.
The military is a complex institution and its responses to political developments within the country and its reactions to geopolitical developments in the region are also complex. Whether Nawaz Sharif and Imran as Prime Minister comprehend these responses and the political goods that the military leadership seeks to extract from the political system or not, these responses will nevertheless impinge both on matters of governance and longevity of the tenure of the civil government. Ironically, both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan have not demonstrated any intellectual capacity to understand the complex dynamics of political and geopolitical ambitions of the Pakistani military as an institution and neither do their party structures possess any academic or intellectual competence to guide them in this regard. Their total reliance on retired army generals to deal with strategic and military affairs in their political operations is a poor response to the complexities at hand.
During Bajwa’s tenure, there were clear signs that the desire to see Pakistan as a regional connectivity hub had taken root within the intellectual landscape of the military. The idea seems to have fallen out of vogue.
The latest speech by the new Army Chief General Asim Munir at the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, is an example of how complex the military's response is to the situation at hand. Firstly, the speech clearly demonstrates that the new army chief, just like all his predecessors, sees the military as an autonomous institution within the political structures of the country. Its political ambitions are visible in General Asim’s assertions that dub critical voices, which in his opinion, are trying to create a wedge between army and people of Pakistan. Both his wish to condemn these voices and his desire to be on the right side of public opinion in the country will put him on the course of political activism just like his predecessors. The mention of Kashmir and Afghanistan in his speech clearly indicates that geopolitical ambitions still persist within the military as an institution. This also indicates that the central element of the so-called Bajwa Doctrine to project Pakistan as a hub of regional connectivity will have to take a back seat. During Bajwa’s tenure, there were clear signs that the desire to see Pakistan as a regional connectivity hub had taken root within the intellectual landscape of the military. The idea seems to have fallen out of vogue.
The future Prime Minister of Pakistan cannot afford to ignore these realities when dealing with the military as an institution. The Pakistani military is in love with its image and any future Prime Minister ignores this institutional trait at his own peril. Our political leaders need to understand that the military is not simply an institution which provides ladders to them to raise their political stature. It is an institution which dominates the power structure of the state, and it also insists on defining the political and strategic agenda of the state because the military’s leaders have political as well as geopolitical ambitions. The problem with the Pakistan political class is that it has not even started to think strategically. In the post-9/11 strategic environment, our political class has completely relinquished their right to assert themselves in strategic and military affairs.