I have a fear, and this fear is not the fear of the unknown. It is fear of the known. I know that the Pakistani state is standing on a very narrow social base—it can rely on the absolute loyalty of a few ethnic groups that now form part of Pakistan. Presently there are two insurgencies underway in the country, one of which is inspired by a separatist ideology. We inherited the British steel frame to keep the country together which is composed of disparate ethnic groups and distinct geographical units. Social and political cohesion among the different nationalities that form part of Pakistan is very weak—the social, political, and ideological glues that keep disparate ethnic and geographical units that form Pakistan and now keep Pakistan together are extremely weak. Instead of the British steel frame, we inherited, and thanks to the Cold War, we succeeded in constructing a military steel frame that now keeps disparate geographical units of our country together. This steel frame, just like the British steel frame, is a myth. In other words, the glue that keeps the centrifugal forces in our country at bay is a myth—a myth of omnipotence and omnipresence of the military.
The insurgency in the Southwest is testing the strength of this myth. The challenge that the Punjab-centric popular political forces like PTI and PMLN have posed to the veracity of this myth could undermine it completely. My fear is that the myth of the military's steel frame could just evaporate into thin air if PTI’s driven anti-military campaign and its genuine capacity to wean Punjabi middle classes away from military-dominant political culture persist for another few years. The anti-military campaigns that the two major Punjab-centric parties, PTI and PMLN have successively run since 2014 have already chipped away the shine and veneer of smartness, omnipresence, and omnipotence from the myth that surrounds the military-dominant political culture that defines our social and political life. Punjab-centric political parties seem to have a realisation about their strategic value—with their middle-class following, which forms the backbone of Pakistani nationalism, they know they can test the patience of Pakistan military leaders who otherwise don’t show much tolerance for dissent, political agitation and violence on the periphery like Balochistan and Pak-Afghan border areas.
In the world of political commentators and political analysts, the subject of civil-military relations seldom involves issues related to how political unrest in our society since 2014 has impacted the internal discipline of the Pakistani military. This is primarily because the military as an institution is a closed society, and we do not get to know what exactly is happening inside the rank and file of the Pakistani military. It would be naivety of the highest order if we think that the unrest since 2014 has passed unnoticed by the rank and file of the Pakistani military. Since 2014 the office of COAS and its role in political developments in the country have remained the subject of political comments, analysis, jokes, memes, and sloganeering. Political leaders have engaged in anti-COAS tirades (mostly against the person who is occupying the office), occasionally, he has been threatened with dire consequences for the perceived siding with one or the other or the other political forces. He has been publicly insulted and occasionally dubbed even as anti-national.
PTI and its leadership are mocking themselves by taking a position that they would only negotiate with the military leaders to calm down the political situation
Now in the latest development, there are memes related to his character assassination, which are occasionally deeply insulting. This is all not happening in space—it is happening in the social, political, and cyber space to which the rank and file of the military have access. With the help of a little imagination, we can say that the days of neat and clean discipline in any regimented military formation cannot survive in such an environment. We can be sure that the military officers who first conceived the idea of soft intervention in 2014—when Imran Khan with the assistance of some spymasters launched his first Long March—could not have perceived the consequences this would lead to. When this will all spill over into the open is difficult to predict. But remember coercion and discipline have their limits. Nevertheless, we can be sure that the military’s internal discipline and the role it plays in a country's politics are beyond doubt one of the elements of military dominance myth.
In such a situation why is it unrealistic to expect and demand the military to withdraw from politics? I will give three answers which are as follows:
a) Pakistani political parties and forces, especially the mainstream political forces are too overawed by the omnipotence and omnipresence of the Pakistani military and its intelligence services. For instance, look at how PTI, the underdog, is behaving. PTI and its leadership are mocking themselves by taking a position that they would only negotiate with the military leaders to calm down the political situation. It is as if only the military can rectify the political situation. This attitude is not restricted to one political party. The ruling PMLN is no less overawed—after DG ISPR termed PTI’s November protest as a conspiracy, even those leaders of PMLN who are negotiating with PTI started playing a secondary role to the military spokesman. As if saying anything to appease the PTI would destroy their goodwill with the military. None of the major political parties is a go-getter. They lack initiative and are always ready to play a secondary role in the military.
b) Our whole civilian state structure is devoid of any capacity to manage internal security and law and order on its own. The military not only controls the decision-making process related to internal security and handling of internal security matters, but it is also the only government agency capable of undertaking such a task. It is another matter that the military's capacity in this regard is limited as well. Repeatedly we have come face to face with the situation where the military’s lack of expertise in dealing with the law-and-order situation was exposed before the whole nation. And yet no efforts to build civilian structures for policing and counter-terrorism capacity building have been undertaken over the years. In all the 70 years of our existence management of violence has been a sole prerogative of the military leaders. Any attempt to create a parallel structure was perceived as anti-national. In the post-9/11 security situation, the military's dominance of security matters became a gospel truth. Resource allocation, application of force, and high decision-making about security matters are completely in the hands of military leaders, leaving little in the hands of the civilian government. Of course, civilians could continue to bicker about who should remain behind bars and for how long. The politics for which political leaders have control is nothing beyond inter-party and intra-party conflicts. In such a situation expecting the military to go back to barracks is highly unrealistic.
Pakistani political class if they want to dominate the politics of the country, if they want civilian supremacy of politics, they must present the society with an alternate myth—a myth as an alternative to the military dominance myth that at present serves as the most powerful glue against centrifugal forces
c) Military's international legitimacy: Some political analysts claim that the military dominates a country's politics because of its international legitimacy—no foreign dignitary visits Pakistan without having a one-on-one meeting with the Chief of the Army Staff. In the post-Musharraf period, there was a time when the incumbent COAS used to serve as a diplomat-in-chief of the country. Until recently General Bajwa used to pick up the phone and talk to US State Department’s senior officials to talk to them about the prospects of Pakistan getting a loan from the IMF and the World Bank. Saudi King, Iranian supreme leader, Turkish President, British Foreign Minister, Russian Defense Minister, and the list goes on and on, will not miss an opportunity to meet Pakistani COAS. The reason is Pakistan’s internal security situation plus the situation in Afghanistan, is the most critical issue the world leaders want to discuss with Pakistani leadership. And among Pakistani leaders who is the point man to discuss security matters—the incumbent COAS. Since 2014 I have not seen a single political leader even articulating or formulating a position on foreign policy issues that confront the Pakistani nation. I do not want to sound as if I want to initiate a competition between civil and military leaders on foreign policy questions in Pakistan. All I want to suggest is that without controlling foreign policy the political leaders cannot talk about civilian supremacy in politics. They cannot talk about or demand the military to withdraw from politics because foreign policy is the crux of politics.
Pakistani political class if they want to dominate the politics of the country, if they want civilian supremacy of politics, they must present the society with an alternate myth—a myth as an alternative to the military dominance myth that at present serves as the most powerful glue against centrifugal forces. PTI, its charisma PMLN, and its pragmatism are poor glues for keeping the state together. Here I want to make a point of personal clarification: I am not for the military’s dominance of politics; this webpage has enough evidence to prove my testimony. My argument is that the quality of politics and political discourse that we have in our society is ill-suited for the politics of civilian supremacy.
The lack of civilian supremacy in our society is a function of the absence of capacity in civilian institutions. In our political context governance means managing internal security. Whoever controls that part of governance will dominate politics as the military is doing right now. In our peculiar political context managing foreign policy is the most important key to dominating the power structure of the country. Whoever dominates the power structure will dominate politics as the military is doing right now. The two most important activities the Pakistani state engages in are internal and external security. Both these activities are beyond the capacity of civilian structures to manage. How can they even dream about dominating politics? The factor of the masses, the people, becoming increasingly assertive in political games is increasingly becoming relevant in power politics with each passing day. The rise of PTI PMLN and other popular political forces is a manifestation of this reality. For reasons that should be obvious by now, this factor cannot bring positive change in the power configuration in Pakistani society. This factor, however, can disrupt the delicate balance that is keeping the Pakistani state intact.