As the dust finally settles on one of the most fiercely contested elections in Indian history, the results have come as a pleasant surprise, if not a shock to most observers.
Before the elections, the Bhartiya Janita Party (BJP) boasted that they would get a supermajority by winning more than 400 seats out of the legislature's total of 543, securing the power to implement any of their desired legislative changes. It felt as if nothing could stop Modi this time. Instead, despite having the government machinery, campaign finances, and media on its side, the BJP experienced a net loss of 63 seats. Even though BJP remains the largest political party, it was still able to form the central government with the help of its allies, and Modi retained his position as India's prime minister; the party fell so far short of its predictions that it made the outcome smell a lot like an electoral defeat.
BJP's overconfidence and vanity were based on a two-pronged strategy that they thought was perfectly suited to secure a landslide victory. First, the BJP promoted an image of India as a major rising power on the world stage, a rapidly developing nation, the first country to send a mission to the moon's far side, a challenger to China, the darling of the G-7 countries, and a hot rival investment destination to China. Second, the BJP used the politics of hate and polarisation by promoting Hindu nationalism. They implemented nationalist policies to leverage strong nationalist sentiments within the Hindu-majority country, aiming to gain popularity and secure a majority of Hindu votes in the election.
The rest of the article largely draws from the data analysis presented by Professor Deepankar Basu, an expert on Indian political economy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, to develop a broader idea of how the people of India responded to BJP's two-pronged strategy. The election results clearly show that more people have voted against the BJP than expected. But who are these voters? Why did they decide not to vote for the BJP? Why did the BJP's strategy of propaganda, image-driven development, and politics of hate backfire, and what do the people of India - divided over various caste and class issues - actually want?
The income inequality levels in India are now worse than under extractive British rule. Therefore, economic reasons indeed played an important role in steering people away from the BJP
In the 2024 elections, the BJP won 240 seats, compared to the 303 it had won in 2019. On the other hand, the Indian National Congress (INC) won 99 seats this time versus 52 seats in 2019. To better understand BJP's performance, Professor Basu divides Indian states into two groups: a) the core BJP stronghold states, mostly in the North, Central, and Western regions of India, and b) other non-core states.
The BJP suffered a net loss of 73 seats in the core states (its heartland); this time, it won 178 seats compared to 251 in 2019. In the other non-core state, the BJP managed a net gain of 10 seats, winning 62 this time compared to 52 in 2019. In its core states, the vote share of the BJP declined from 51% to 42% for the seats lost in the core states that it had previously won in 2019. So, the major takeaway is that BJP saw a significant decline in its core states while it performed slightly better elsewhere. This clearly shows that people moved away from the BJP in its core constituencies.
A recent survey conducted by CSDS Lokniti, a well-reputed research institute in India specialising in electoral studies, indicates that both, economic and caste-based religious factors, significantly contributed to voters shifting away from supporting the BJP. Their results show that more than 50% of those who voted against the BJP did so for economic reasons. Inflation and unemployment were the biggest economic concerns for people voting against the BJP. According to the survey, households whose economic conditions did not improve have overwhelmingly voted against the BJP, and conversely.
The economic growth we did see in Modi's era is heavily tinted with crony capitalism, benefiting India's burgeoning billionaires at the expense of the poor. In a recent study by the World Inequality Lab, coauthored by renowned French economist Thomas Piketty, the income inequality levels in India are now worse than under extractive British rule. Therefore, economic reasons indeed played an important role in steering people away from the BJP.
BJP's combinatory strategy seems to have reached its limits. The recent election results suggest that the BJP can be challenged and effectively contested in its stronghold states
As the Indian elections are conducted in multiple phases spanning more than a month in total, incidents of hate speech and polarising rhetoric against Muslims and Dalits surged significantly with each successive phase. Muslims were denounced as 'infiltrators' and were increasingly persecuted along with other minorities on various grounds. According to Professor Basu, this surge appears to be a desperate yet futile attempt to court and win anti-minority ultra-nationalist votes, as it became increasingly evident to the BJP that they were losing seats from the very beginning. Resultantly, religious minorities and lower castes like Muslims, Dalits, and Other Backward Casts (OBCs) voted for the INC and its allies, who focused on issues of economic inequality, social justice, and minority rights. BJP's share of the Muslim vote fell by 20 percentage points; those votes were cast in favour of the INC and its allies instead. The BJP's vote share among Hindu Dalits fell by seven percentage points, among upper OBCs by 11 percentage points, and lower OBCs by seven percentage points. Overall, we can see a move of marginalised social and religious categories away from the BJP and towards INC and its allies.
Everywhere, politics around local issues played a significant role in the voting patterns, contrasting with the previous two elections, which were dominated by pro-Modi nationalism that obscured people's real problems. In Punjab, for example, due to the anti-farmer laws and policies of the BJP government, its popularity halved in terms of constituency-level vote share compared to 2019 for the same constituencies. The farmers disallowed BJP candidates from entering their villages and campaigning for the polls.
In conclusion, here are the key takeaways, informed by Professor Basu's analysis, that I would like to highlight: Modi's persona of electoral invincibility has been severely undermined, if not shattered. The previous two elections gave us cause to fear that the combination of economic and religious nationalism was seductive enough to give the BJP an assailable hold on power in India. However, the BJP's combinatory strategy seems to have reached its limits. The recent election results suggest that the BJP can be challenged and effectively contested in its stronghold states.
It further indicates that to defeat the BJP, it is not necessary, as the Congress often did in the past, to appease the bigoted aspects of Hindu majority sentiments. This election result has shown that inclusive and robust politics based on secularism, economic justice, and social justice can beat the BJP, even in some BJP heartland constituencies. However, the BJP did gain ground beyond its traditional strongholds, underscoring the formidable challenges ahead for the opposition. Despite this, the overall outcome is a significant win for democracy against the politics of hate, bigotry, and polarisation.