Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s emergency heart surgery in a London hospital has created unforeseen political consequences. His absence from Pakistan has stalled talks between the opposition and government on mutually acceptable Terms of Reference for Panamaleaks. It has sown confusion in Pakistan’s foreign policy because Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, the interior minister, has stepped into the vacuum with undue enthusiasm. It has also taken the sting out of the combined opposition’s plans to overthrow him. Everybody, blind loyalist as well as passionate detractor, is praying for his wellbeing and speedy recovery. Even archenemy Imran Khan has sent a bouquet of flowers to cheer him up in hospital. Under the circumstances, Mr Sharif has veritably got a new lease of life!
At the outset, there is deadlock in negotiations over the proposed TORs for investigating corruption and money laundering. The opposition wants to focus exclusively on targeting Mr Sharif even though he is not named personally in Panamaleaks. Naturally enough, the government wants to investigate everyone of any disrepute except Mr Sharif. The opposition wants quick results. The government wants to delay matters as much as possible. With Ishaq Dar, the government’s chief negotiator on Panamaleaks preoccupied with budget issues and Mr Sharif also out of action all of June, the government can validly claim delays and frustrate the opposition’s desire to raise the political temperature. Therefore June is likely to be inconsequential. Indeed, if Imran Khan tries to cut short the negotiations in July and revert to street agitation, he may not find too many takers in the opposition.
The confusion in foreign policy is indicative of the PMLN’s personalized approach to decision making. Despite the presence of Sartaj Aziz as advisor on foreign affairs and Tariq Fatemi as special assistant on foreign affairs and Khawaja Asif as defense minister, it fell to Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, the interior minister, to comment on the US drone strike that killed Mullah Akhtar Mansoor two weeks ago. Unfortunately, the good Chaudhry has only served to muddy the waters. First he thundered against the US for violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. Then he said he wasn’t sure the man killed was Mullah Mansoor. A week later, after the US had reconfirmed the identity of their target and the Taliban had elected a new Amir, he admitted this fact of life. He also woke up to claim that Pakistan’s air space was not violated by American drones because they were operating over Afghan airspace! While all this was going on, the Foreign Office called in the US ambassador and duly ticked him off for crossing red lines, and His Excellency called on the army chief, General Raheel Sharif, to apologise and make amends. Chaudhry Nisar also saw fit to slip into the robes of the defense minister and thunder against GHQ’s decision to hand over the management of a border post to the Afghan army. Can a “full time” foreign minister better manage foreign policy as advocated by many analysts (“too many cooks are spoiling the broth”) when a full time defense minister cannot better manage military matters and a full time National Security Advisor cannot better manage national security? The problem is not the absence of a full time foreign minister for formulating foreign policy but the ubiquitous dominance of the military establishment in implementing foreign and national security policy. In fact it can be argued that the military establishment prefers to exploit multiple centers of influence in the ruling part’s hierarchy because it gives GHQ greater leverage to pull strings and have its way on the ground. Of course, Mr Sharif’s style of personalized decision making and reliance on family and personal loyalists rather than professionally competent managers and advisors exacerbates the problem.
When Mr Sharif returns to Pakistan after the end of Ramazan, he will be thinking primarily of how to survive in office the next couple of months. He knows that if the “third umpire” remains neutral, Imran Khan’s street movement will not amount to much. But if he senses some undesirable stirrings amongst the generals in their labyrinth, he may take steps to thwart such ambitions. General Raheel Sharif’s replacement can be announced by end August, thereby making him a lame duck. Or the government may float new legislation aimed at giving the post of army chief a four-year tenure, thereby extricating General Sharif from his public commitment not to seek an extension whilst placating him at the same time.
All this will pass, surely. What will remain debatable is the primacy or relevance of notions of corruption and morality in the body politic of Pakistan. Both issues are important in the mind of the urban middle classes even though they don’t muster many votes in elections that are still dominated by considerations of caste, biradari, dharra, creed or party loyalty instead of concrete issues. Even more suspect is the frustrated notion that a military intervention is the true cure of corruption.
At the outset, there is deadlock in negotiations over the proposed TORs for investigating corruption and money laundering. The opposition wants to focus exclusively on targeting Mr Sharif even though he is not named personally in Panamaleaks. Naturally enough, the government wants to investigate everyone of any disrepute except Mr Sharif. The opposition wants quick results. The government wants to delay matters as much as possible. With Ishaq Dar, the government’s chief negotiator on Panamaleaks preoccupied with budget issues and Mr Sharif also out of action all of June, the government can validly claim delays and frustrate the opposition’s desire to raise the political temperature. Therefore June is likely to be inconsequential. Indeed, if Imran Khan tries to cut short the negotiations in July and revert to street agitation, he may not find too many takers in the opposition.
The confusion in foreign policy is indicative of the PMLN’s personalized approach to decision making. Despite the presence of Sartaj Aziz as advisor on foreign affairs and Tariq Fatemi as special assistant on foreign affairs and Khawaja Asif as defense minister, it fell to Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, the interior minister, to comment on the US drone strike that killed Mullah Akhtar Mansoor two weeks ago. Unfortunately, the good Chaudhry has only served to muddy the waters. First he thundered against the US for violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. Then he said he wasn’t sure the man killed was Mullah Mansoor. A week later, after the US had reconfirmed the identity of their target and the Taliban had elected a new Amir, he admitted this fact of life. He also woke up to claim that Pakistan’s air space was not violated by American drones because they were operating over Afghan airspace! While all this was going on, the Foreign Office called in the US ambassador and duly ticked him off for crossing red lines, and His Excellency called on the army chief, General Raheel Sharif, to apologise and make amends. Chaudhry Nisar also saw fit to slip into the robes of the defense minister and thunder against GHQ’s decision to hand over the management of a border post to the Afghan army. Can a “full time” foreign minister better manage foreign policy as advocated by many analysts (“too many cooks are spoiling the broth”) when a full time defense minister cannot better manage military matters and a full time National Security Advisor cannot better manage national security? The problem is not the absence of a full time foreign minister for formulating foreign policy but the ubiquitous dominance of the military establishment in implementing foreign and national security policy. In fact it can be argued that the military establishment prefers to exploit multiple centers of influence in the ruling part’s hierarchy because it gives GHQ greater leverage to pull strings and have its way on the ground. Of course, Mr Sharif’s style of personalized decision making and reliance on family and personal loyalists rather than professionally competent managers and advisors exacerbates the problem.
When Mr Sharif returns to Pakistan after the end of Ramazan, he will be thinking primarily of how to survive in office the next couple of months. He knows that if the “third umpire” remains neutral, Imran Khan’s street movement will not amount to much. But if he senses some undesirable stirrings amongst the generals in their labyrinth, he may take steps to thwart such ambitions. General Raheel Sharif’s replacement can be announced by end August, thereby making him a lame duck. Or the government may float new legislation aimed at giving the post of army chief a four-year tenure, thereby extricating General Sharif from his public commitment not to seek an extension whilst placating him at the same time.
All this will pass, surely. What will remain debatable is the primacy or relevance of notions of corruption and morality in the body politic of Pakistan. Both issues are important in the mind of the urban middle classes even though they don’t muster many votes in elections that are still dominated by considerations of caste, biradari, dharra, creed or party loyalty instead of concrete issues. Even more suspect is the frustrated notion that a military intervention is the true cure of corruption.