In the increasingly unstable and chaotic landscape of global technology and international trade, the rivalry between the United States and China in semiconductors has emerged as a critical and far-reaching contest. Historically, the United States has been the leader in semiconductor technology, and boasts a vibrant ecosystem of companies like Intel, AMD, and Qualcomm that have driven the industry’s progress. However, China recognizes the strategic significance of semiconductors, and has embarked on an ambitious mission to build its domestic semiconductor capabilities. Under initiatives like “Made in China 2025,” China has poured substantial resources into semiconductor research, manufacturing, and talent development.
Last month, President Joe Biden of the United States enacted an executive order that imposed significant limitations on the capacity of American enterprises to engage in investments within the sectors of “semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and artificial intelligence.” These restrictions specifically target countries deemed “countries of concern.” Although not directly stated within the executive order’s main text, the intended recipients of the imposed limitations are identified in the concise appendix, which specifies the countries of concern as China, along with its administrative areas of Hong Kong and Macau.
This recent action by the Biden administration represents its ongoing efforts to restrict China’s acquisition of advanced technologies crucial for achieving dominance in the 21st century. Since August of last year, the administration has implemented measures to limit China’s importation of computer chip manufacturing machinery. In December of 2022, a prohibition was implemented on using communication equipment manufactured by Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE in newly established infrastructure ventures. However, the endeavor is not confined solely to technological advancements. President Biden has chosen to uphold the extensive tariffs implemented on China by his predecessor, former President Donald Trump. These policies possess the capacity to bring about the cessation of economic globalization in its current form, posing a fundamental question: what is the rationale behind the United States’ implementation of trade limitations on China under President Trump’s and President Biden’s leadership? There exist three potential explanations.
The core issue concerns whether the US is willing to cede global preeminence. While the US and China can pursue their interests and collaborate where they align, Washington’s primary concern centers on the potential transformation of China’s economic might into military power.
One objective is to safeguard American employees who have experienced job losses due to Chinese imports and the relocation of manufacturing by US companies to China. Indeed, numerous sectors, particularly those in the manufacturing industry, saw adverse effects due to the significant impact of the “China shock” during the early 2000s. This phenomenon emerged when the United States witnessed a substantial increase in trade with China, accompanied by a surge in outsourcing activities to the country.
Moreover, from a global perspective, the United States has long championed the rules-based international order, a fundamental tenet of its foreign policy since the end of World War II. This commitment revolves around fostering a framework for open and liberalized economic interactions. It has entailed advocating for expansive global trade agreements and establishing a transparent and inclusive trade system. However, the US has consistently accused China of flouting the principles underpinning this international economic order. In a 2022 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which represents U.S. concerns, China’s actions, including subsidies, overcapacity, intellectual property theft, and protectionist nonmarket policies, contribute to global economic distortions. The United States is implementing countermeasures to address these infractions, aligning with its commitment to preserving the rules-based international order.
The third perspective underscores international power dynamics as a key driver of US-China trade restrictions. These measures are designed to hinder the rise of a formidable challenger on the global stage. Numerous great powers coexist in today’s multipolar world, yet they don’t possess equal influence or capabilities. The United States, still the preeminent global player by various metrics such as economic and military strength, faces questions about the sustainability of this position, particularly in the face of China’s projected growth.
The core issue concerns whether the US is willing to cede global preeminence. While the US and China can pursue their interests and collaborate where they align, Washington’s primary concern centers on the potential transformation of China’s economic might into military power. This concern is reflected in trade restrictions, especially targeting China’s high-tech sectors with dual-use capabilities, signifying their potential for civilian and military purposes.
The Obama administration endeavored to implement a strategic shift towards Asia to safeguard the United States’ regional dominance from being overtaken by China. Similarly, both the Trump and Biden administrations have undertaken measures specifically designed to prevent a global power transition of this nature.
In light of enduring conflicts between China and significant US allies, such as Japan and Taiwan, a prevailing apprehension arises regarding the inevitability of potential confrontations between an expanding China and an established United States. This concept delves into the core of what is commonly referred to as the “Thucydides Trap” by Graham Allison, a renowned scholar in the field of international affairs. The trap suggests that a conflict leading to war becomes inevitable when a rising power emerges alongside an established one.
However, during the past decade, the United States government has been undertaking ongoing endeavors to counter and address Beijing’s increasing global influence. The Obama administration endeavored to implement a strategic shift towards Asia to safeguard the United States’ regional dominance from being overtaken by China. Similarly, both the Trump and Biden administrations have undertaken measures specifically designed to prevent a global power transition of this nature. The rationale for the policies of Biden’s administration and those of Trump and Obama can be best understood through the lens of power politics.
These measures concerning China will probably persist, independently or as a component of a more comprehensive “de-risking” approach that the United States is pursuing alongside its G7 counterparts. Ultimately, the primary contenders for the upcoming United States presidential election the following year are the two men, Biden and Trump, who bear the greatest responsibility for the present policies. If neither Biden nor Trump assumes the presidency in 2025 due to unanticipated circumstances, the American populace widely perceives China as a formidable contender and even a potential menace to the interests of the United States. Any future president is likely to align with this prevailing sentiment. Consequently, an increase in presidential directives and trade restrictions can be expected. Beyond its economic dimensions, trade will remain a significant battleground in the ongoing conflict between the United States and China, the two major global powers.