The House of Saud is flexing its muscle in the Middle East and beyond. After the installation of a pro-US Shi’ite regime in Iraq in 2003, it extended support to the Sunni opposition led by Al Qaeda’s Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Following the Arab spring in 2011-12, it intervened aggressively in Syria by supporting extremist Sunni forces against the Baathist regime. Last year, it went into Yemen all guns blazing against the Shi’ite Houthis. Last week it executed Nimr-al-Nimr, a Shi’ite cleric in its eastern oil rich Shi’ite province for demanding greater rights. Now it has severed diplomatic relations with Iran for protesting Nimr’s execution.
Saudi Arabia has cobbled a 34 nation Sunni alliance against Shi’ite “terrorism” and is pressurising Islamabad for material support. How should Pakistan respond?
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran were once, like Pakistan, US-partners in the cold war against Soviet communism. But after the Iranian revolution in 1979, they became sworn enemies when the Saudis backed Saddam Hussain’s war with Iran for a decade in the 1980s. Pakistan wisely stayed out of the conflict, but Iran was cool, suspecting Islamabad of being a Trojan horse for the Saudi-American conspiracy to overthrow the Iranian regime. In 1987, there were riots during Hajj in which over 400 Shi’ite Iranians were killed, provoking Iranian mobs to attack the Saudi embassy in Teheran and compelling the Saudis to cut diplomatic relations with Iran after it began to threaten the oil lanes in the Gulf. Relations improved for a while under the moderate Iranian regime of President Hashmi Rafsanjani in the 2000s but nosedived again following reports of Iranian attempts to build a nuclear bomb. The Saudis then went so far as to encourage the US and Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear installations even as the international community was desperately trying to avoid inflaming the Middle East by negotiating a nuclear freeze with Teheran. Hajj riots in 2015 in which over 2000 people were killed, including over 400 Iranians, strained relations once again. Why is Saudi Arabia so anti-Shia?
The problem lies at home. The oil rich eastern seaboard provinces of Saudi Arabia are overwhelmingly Shi’ite. Since the Iranian revolution they have been emboldened to demand greater freedom and economic rights from the House of Saud. Instead of pacifying them, the House of Saud has chosen to opt for repression at home and military dominance and intervention in the region against Shi’ites. It has also unleashed its extremist Wahhabi clergy and ideology against Shi’ism all over the world. In short, the House of Saud has irrevocably embarked on a strategy to fuel a sectarian war in the region and beyond.
Until now, the Saudi influence in Pakistan has been limited to funneling money to extremist Sunni mullahs, mosques and non-state actors/groups. The jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan was exclusively led by Sunni groups and parties. The Saudis were active partners with Pakistan in recognizing the Sunni Taliban regime in 1997 and only backed off when the Taliban openly lent support to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda that was hostile to the Faustian bargain between the House of Saud and the USA – oil for Sunni-Wahhabi ideology. The backlash of these policies manifested itself in the rise of anti-Shia militias and Lashkars in Pakistan which eventually extended their tentacles and alliances into the domain of Al Qaeda, Taliban and now ISIS.
This has created a potentially volatile situation in Pakistan. The government of Nawaz Sharif has been prodded by the military under General Raheel Sharif to unfurl a National Action Plan to combat all forms of terrorism, including sectarianism, that pose an existential threat to state and society. According to General Sharif, sectarian-IS poses the greatest danger to Pakistan and the military will not allow it to take root. Therefore the military is encouraging the PMLN government to resort to extra judicial measures to degrade and eliminate the sectarian Lashkars. It is in this context of its geo-strategic sectarian agenda that any Pakistani alliance or cooperation with the House of Saud must be seen.
The Sharif government has wisely stayed out of the conflict in Yemen despite Saudi pressure because it was able to hold a debate in parliament that demonstrated a national consensus against any such interventionism that could lead to terrible sectarian backlash at home. Now it is on the horns of another dilemma when faced with the challenge of reconciling its long-term friendship and economic interests in Saudi Arabia with the grim prospects of dealing with the sectarian challenge at home that is bound to get a fillip if Pakistan enters the anti-Shia alliance brokered by the Saudis.
Pakistan must not get embroiled in the sectarian wars of the Middle-East. We are already facing problems on both borders with India and Afghanistan. Extreme Sunni ideologies are undermining our state and society. It is time to look inward and consolidate our gains in the war against extremism instead of renting ourselves out again to foreign powers for short term material gains.
Saudi Arabia has cobbled a 34 nation Sunni alliance against Shi’ite “terrorism” and is pressurising Islamabad for material support. How should Pakistan respond?
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran were once, like Pakistan, US-partners in the cold war against Soviet communism. But after the Iranian revolution in 1979, they became sworn enemies when the Saudis backed Saddam Hussain’s war with Iran for a decade in the 1980s. Pakistan wisely stayed out of the conflict, but Iran was cool, suspecting Islamabad of being a Trojan horse for the Saudi-American conspiracy to overthrow the Iranian regime. In 1987, there were riots during Hajj in which over 400 Shi’ite Iranians were killed, provoking Iranian mobs to attack the Saudi embassy in Teheran and compelling the Saudis to cut diplomatic relations with Iran after it began to threaten the oil lanes in the Gulf. Relations improved for a while under the moderate Iranian regime of President Hashmi Rafsanjani in the 2000s but nosedived again following reports of Iranian attempts to build a nuclear bomb. The Saudis then went so far as to encourage the US and Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear installations even as the international community was desperately trying to avoid inflaming the Middle East by negotiating a nuclear freeze with Teheran. Hajj riots in 2015 in which over 2000 people were killed, including over 400 Iranians, strained relations once again. Why is Saudi Arabia so anti-Shia?
The problem lies at home. The oil rich eastern seaboard provinces of Saudi Arabia are overwhelmingly Shi’ite. Since the Iranian revolution they have been emboldened to demand greater freedom and economic rights from the House of Saud. Instead of pacifying them, the House of Saud has chosen to opt for repression at home and military dominance and intervention in the region against Shi’ites. It has also unleashed its extremist Wahhabi clergy and ideology against Shi’ism all over the world. In short, the House of Saud has irrevocably embarked on a strategy to fuel a sectarian war in the region and beyond.
Until now, the Saudi influence in Pakistan has been limited to funneling money to extremist Sunni mullahs, mosques and non-state actors/groups. The jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan was exclusively led by Sunni groups and parties. The Saudis were active partners with Pakistan in recognizing the Sunni Taliban regime in 1997 and only backed off when the Taliban openly lent support to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda that was hostile to the Faustian bargain between the House of Saud and the USA – oil for Sunni-Wahhabi ideology. The backlash of these policies manifested itself in the rise of anti-Shia militias and Lashkars in Pakistan which eventually extended their tentacles and alliances into the domain of Al Qaeda, Taliban and now ISIS.
This has created a potentially volatile situation in Pakistan. The government of Nawaz Sharif has been prodded by the military under General Raheel Sharif to unfurl a National Action Plan to combat all forms of terrorism, including sectarianism, that pose an existential threat to state and society. According to General Sharif, sectarian-IS poses the greatest danger to Pakistan and the military will not allow it to take root. Therefore the military is encouraging the PMLN government to resort to extra judicial measures to degrade and eliminate the sectarian Lashkars. It is in this context of its geo-strategic sectarian agenda that any Pakistani alliance or cooperation with the House of Saud must be seen.
The Sharif government has wisely stayed out of the conflict in Yemen despite Saudi pressure because it was able to hold a debate in parliament that demonstrated a national consensus against any such interventionism that could lead to terrible sectarian backlash at home. Now it is on the horns of another dilemma when faced with the challenge of reconciling its long-term friendship and economic interests in Saudi Arabia with the grim prospects of dealing with the sectarian challenge at home that is bound to get a fillip if Pakistan enters the anti-Shia alliance brokered by the Saudis.
Pakistan must not get embroiled in the sectarian wars of the Middle-East. We are already facing problems on both borders with India and Afghanistan. Extreme Sunni ideologies are undermining our state and society. It is time to look inward and consolidate our gains in the war against extremism instead of renting ourselves out again to foreign powers for short term material gains.