Lieutenant General (R) Faiz Hameed is a typical character in Pakistan’s political history. There is nothing unique or exceptional about him; he represents a long line of top military spymasters who have repeatedly intruded in the political realm. The type of spymaster Faiz Hameed represents behaves more like an unfettered and unabashed gangster rather than a serious-minded spy chief who spends sleepless nights monitoring his networks, guarding the internal and external frontiers of the state. I remember visiting Faiz Hameed’s hometown, Chakwal, weeks before the 2018 parliamentary elections.
I interviewed several candidates, both from PML-N and PTI, and political observers from the town. Faiz Hameed was serving in the ISI, as head of internal security. Several PML-N and PTI candidates, as a matter of routine, informed me that Faiz was instrumental in securing PTI tickets for them. One of the PML-N candidates was personally threatened by Faiz Hameed to quit the PML-N ticket and join PTI, which he obediently did. These things were discussed in Chakwal’s political and social circles as routine matters. I was actively serving as a reporter for a political magazine then, and diligently but extremely carefully, prepared a report on matters which came to my knowledge as part of my visit to Chakwal. However, my editor refused to publish the story. Obviously, he too, was being extra careful. I do not blame him after I put into context the situation in those days.
In 2019, Faiz Hameed was appointed DG ISI by Prime Minister Imran Khan; he continued to behave like a gangster. He epitomized the military’s control over the coercive machinery of the state. During the nine years rule of General Pervaiz Musharraf, the military was engaged in an incessant fight against militant groups, both in Punjab and the northwestern parts of the country. In many places, the military assumed policing powers which were not their prerogative under the constitution. Besides, the military’s control of the coercive machinery of the state had been gradually intensifying under Musharraf’s tenure.
The police, investigative agencies and the lower judiciary, and to some extent, the higher judiciary were all falling in line under the increasing influence of the Pakistani military. Faiz Hameed, as a top spymaster not only unabashedly exercised this control, but he also made it a point to show off about it. The stories about how General Faiz asserted his control over the coercive machinery of the state started making the rounds in the media and the political circles of Islamabad. General Faiz became a go-to person for Prime Minister Imran Khan, who was dreaming about consolidating his hold on power by entering a long-term alliance within the most powerful institutions in the country, that includes the Pakistani military and premier intelligence agency, ISI.
General Faiz Hameed was not a loner. He represented a deep rooted malice within the military, which compounded the effects of Bonapartist tendencies within the military. You cannot expect to end this tendency by instituting a court martial proceeding against one individual. It is a product of years of the military’s direct involvement in politics. But Bonapartist tendencies are nourished by the political class when its leading lights demonstrate to the generals all of the ways they can manipulate the political process.
The strongest indication that the military leadership is intoxicated by the force they possess and by misconceived notions about their institutional capacity is the fact that the specter of Bonaparte—epitomized by officers like Lt General Faiz Hameed—is still active in the military.
Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif are both prime culprits in facilitating the Bonapartist tendencies in the military. What we see now is not simply a matter of the military’s interference in politics. It is equally a problem of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan using their connection with the military and intelligence services to get access to the power corridors of the state. Prolonged exposure to political life has fundamentally transformed the internal dynamics of military organization and behaviors of the general staff.
The generals have not only been exposed to political wrangling, they have been exposed to direct interaction with society in geographical settings where extremism, militancy and terror groups have held sway. Their use of brute force against hapless civilians in troubled areas, and their success in making things happen with the use of sheer force has created a false impression that the military as an institution is a go-getter. Their success in making things happen in the semi-rural troubled areas with use of brute, naked force led some in the military to misconstrue this as their ability to bring about ideal political change. They started to perceive themselves as a force which can fix Pakistan’s political malaise. Their utter failure in managing the political system has been on display since 2014, and their glaring failures have led to a political and security situation where anarchy and chaos always seem to be right around the corner. Each time they manipulated the system, the situation got even worse. We have started to get closer and closer to anarchy and uncontrollable chaos.
The strongest indication that the military leadership is intoxicated by the force they possess and by misconceived notions about their institutional capacity is the fact that the specter of Bonaparte—epitomized by officers like Lt General Faiz Hameed—is still active in the military. What the coercive machinery of the state has been doing with the PTI and its founder since his ouster from power is a repeat of what Faiz Hameed did to the PML-N.
The Pakistani political class is either suspended in a deep slumber, or they lack the mental faculties to look beyond their immediate petty political interests. The system is clearly firing warning shots for them to pay heed. Even a blind man with an elementary understanding of politics would have discerned the necessity of far reaching reform in our security structures and in our military systems. Two warning shots should have been enough to wake us from our deep slumber and complacent attitude. The first warning was visible on the night of 12 October 1999, when the Pakistan military’s general staff stood divided on the night of the coup. The Prime Minister was successful in securing the support of part of the general staff, who were arrested by the coup making authorities. If anyone has any doubts, they should read General Pervez Musharraf’s autobiography. The second warning shot came in the days leading up to the appointment of the incumbent COAS, General Asim Munir. How Imran Khan managed to garner support from some top generals and attempted to manipulate this division within the military to his own advantage just at the time of the appointment of General Munir as COAS, is still a story hidden behind many curtains. It takes courage to narrate this story, which nobody has gathered so far.
Our political class is too timid, too powerless and too barren intellectually to come up with a reform agenda that can save the military as an institution, and as a corollary, would save the political system itself, which is clearly under persistent threat from the Bonapartist tendencies within the military.
The Pakistani political class has tried many tools to exert control over the military. Appointing a man of their choice as COAS has failed miserably every time, as exemplified by General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervaiz Musharraf’s appointment by the elder Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif respectively. General Qamar Javed Bajwa was again appointed by Nawaz Sharif, and Sharif later complained that Bajwa was instrumental in ousting him from power. A second tool was tried by Nawaz Sharif in October 1999, when he secured the support of top generals against the serving COAS, General Pervez Musharraf. This failed when the top general failed to execute Sharif’s plans to fire General Musharraf, and in his stead appoint a new COAS. Imran Khan’s attempt in November 2022 to scuttle the appointment of General Asim Munir by fomenting division within the general staff, also failed.
In a serious political culture, these two warning shots would have been enough to attract far reaching reforms in the military system. Our political class is too timid, too powerless and too barren intellectually to come up with a reform agenda that can save the military as an institution, and as a corollary, would save the political system itself, which is clearly under persistent threat from the Bonapartist tendencies within the military.
In fact, our political class could be accused of criminal negligence or willful criminal offense of endangering the security of the country by ignoring these warning shots and indulging in creating divisions within the military. Here I would like to bring in a little history. In the post second world war demobilization of the British land forces which fought in the European and African theatres, the British brought thousands of Indian soldiers back to their homeland of undivided Punjab in British India. These former soldiers, both Muslims and Sikhs, were the main culprits in the carnage that took place in Punjab in the wake of an ill-conceived and hurried partition plan executed by the fleeing British colonial government. Creating divisions in the military for petty political gains could prove to be catastrophic for Pakistani society.
Faiz Hameed is an individual, and court martialing him would not solve the problem. We must reform our military system, which has a tendency to act as a praetorian guard every ten years or so, where the Bonapartist tendencies are deep rooted, and functions as an institution which has demonstrated deep divisions among the top brass. Here, public scrutiny of the military system through parliamentary institutions is a must. Secondly, leaders like Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif must be forced to make a public commitment to not dragging the military into politics. They must commit to a project of creating an enabling environment that ensures that the military will act as a completely neutral institution, burying the specter of Bonaparte in Pakistan. Only then will punishing Faiz Hameed serve any real purpose.