China has had a complex history since it was converted to a People’s Republic of China in 1949, two years after Pakistan’s founding. It was ruled by the Great Helmsman, Mao Zedong, through 1976. His tenure was marked by ideological purity and economic stagnation. As things began to fall apart, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 which led to much chaos, violence, and millions of deaths.
A couple of years after Mao’s passing, a man who had been humiliated during the Cultural Revolution rose to the top. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the de facto leader of China. He brought the spirit of capitalism into China, and set it on the road to economic prosperity. Since 2012, Xi Jinping has been at the helm.
What has been the dominant motif in China since 1949? Sulmaan Wasif Khan, a professor at the Tufts University, has published a book about China with the very revealing title, ‘Haunted by Chaos’. The subtitle of the book is, ‘China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping’. The watchful eyes of Mao and Xi grace the cover.
Khan argues that China’s grand strategy has always been a blend of ideology, and pragmatism but not always skillfully practiced. Indeed, the common thread running through China’s history is that its global ambitions are marked by a deep-rooted sense of insecurity. It appears to be stronger than it really is and its leaders know that quite well.
To counter its insecurity, it has not hesitated to reach out to smaller nations, such as Pakistan. It regards their partnership as crucial to fulfilling its global ambitions.
In the 1950s, he says, China had a tough time understanding why Pakistan had entered into multiple military alliances with the US against China, when China had done no harm to Pakistan. Pakistan kept saying to China that these pacts in Pakistan’s view were the only mechanism it had to counterbalance India.
China’s premier, Zhou Enlai, came to the conclusion that “as long as China maintained a relationship with Pakistan, they might eventually be able to talk it out of the American embrace.”
While Pakistan is much smaller than India, it plays a key role in China’s grand strategy, both in how it acts as a counterweight to India, and because it acts as a bridge to the Muslim world. At times, it has also acted as a bridge to the US.
In the 1950s, India, proud of its non-aligned status, and China were good friends. Pakistan was squarely in the US camp, often being called its “most allied ally”. It was a member of the CENTO and SEATO military alliances and also had a bilateral defense treaty with the US.
The Sino-Indian border war in 1962 upset the equation. The US started arming India, and alarming Pakistan. In the 1965 war, the US did not side with Pakistan. It maintained a studied neutrality and put an embargo on combatants, which mostly hurt Pakistan, whose army and air force were heavily equipped with American weaponry.
Pakistan started to move more toward China after the 1965 war. Chinese arms, including T-59 tanks and MiG-19 fighters, much more primitive than their American counterparts, started to flow towards Pakistan, which had until then relied heavily on the US arms. After the Tashkent Agreement in 1966, Pakistan also acquired some Soviet arms, primarily heavy artillery.
The two countries began to construct a highway through the Karakoram mountains, intending to renew the ancient Silk Road. It was the beginning of a long journey. The two neighbours would often talk about their “all-weather friendship”.
However, China stayed quiet during Pakistan’s disastrous encounter with India in 1971, which resulted in the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. In the spring of 1999, when Pakistan attacked Indian positions in Kargil, Kashmir, China once again stood by. China has only paid lip service on the Kashmir issue, and has been reluctant to take specific actions to push India to hold a plebiscite in the disputed territory.
Khan provides an invaluable, behind the scenes look at these events. He says, China did not militarily assist Pakistan in its wars with India because they had little to do with China’s security. However, the book does not delve deeper into why the Chinese did not support Pakistan militarily during the wars.
There is no mention of the fact that India, thinking that a war with Pakistan would become inevitable once Pakistan’s military had launched a full-blooded attack on the Bengalis in East Pakistan, signed a defense pact with the USSR in August 1971. The Soviets then moved several army divisions to the border with China in Manchuria. When Pakistan reached out to the Chinese for assistance, they were politely told that “Russia is not afraid of China”. Pakistan should have seen this coming, because earlier in the year the Chinese had told President General Yahya Khan to resolve the situation in East Pakistan peacefully through negotiations. Instead, the army action triggered a full-scale civil war which led eventually to war with India.
Decades later, China launched its global Belt and Road Initiative, which Khan says is, “more concept than reality”. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) extends the Karakorum Highway all the way down to the Arabian Sea. The deep-water port at Gwadar, which had long been a fishing village, would give China access to the sea if the Americans were to blockade Chinese ports on the Pacific.
While Pakistan can be an asset in many ways to China, it can also be a liability. Khan says the Chinese know that “The Pakistanis are not easy to deal with. Money invested there has a way of paying badly; they are always asking for more, and the security they provide for workers is appalling.”
Chinese are aware that the CPEC “annoys the Indians… undercutting Xi’s attempts to reach an understanding with that neighbor. It annoys the Baluch… they signal their displeasure by abducting and killing Chinese workers sent to Pakistan.”
Khan’s book is a cautionary tale about what Pakistan can expect from China in a future crisis involving India. China will not provide military assistance to Pakistan unless its own national security is at risk or bail out Pakistan from crises of its own making.
A couple of years after Mao’s passing, a man who had been humiliated during the Cultural Revolution rose to the top. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the de facto leader of China. He brought the spirit of capitalism into China, and set it on the road to economic prosperity. Since 2012, Xi Jinping has been at the helm.
What has been the dominant motif in China since 1949? Sulmaan Wasif Khan, a professor at the Tufts University, has published a book about China with the very revealing title, ‘Haunted by Chaos’. The subtitle of the book is, ‘China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping’. The watchful eyes of Mao and Xi grace the cover.
Khan argues that China’s grand strategy has always been a blend of ideology, and pragmatism but not always skillfully practiced. Indeed, the common thread running through China’s history is that its global ambitions are marked by a deep-rooted sense of insecurity. It appears to be stronger than it really is and its leaders know that quite well.
To counter its insecurity, it has not hesitated to reach out to smaller nations, such as Pakistan. It regards their partnership as crucial to fulfilling its global ambitions.
In the 1950s, he says, China had a tough time understanding why Pakistan had entered into multiple military alliances with the US against China, when China had done no harm to Pakistan. Pakistan kept saying to China that these pacts in Pakistan’s view were the only mechanism it had to counterbalance India.
China’s premier, Zhou Enlai, came to the conclusion that “as long as China maintained a relationship with Pakistan, they might eventually be able to talk it out of the American embrace.”
Khan argues that China’s grand strategy has always been a blend of ideology, and pragmatism but not always skillfully practiced. Indeed, the common thread running through China’s history is that its global ambitions are marked by a deep-rooted sense of insecurity.
While Pakistan is much smaller than India, it plays a key role in China’s grand strategy, both in how it acts as a counterweight to India, and because it acts as a bridge to the Muslim world. At times, it has also acted as a bridge to the US.
In the 1950s, India, proud of its non-aligned status, and China were good friends. Pakistan was squarely in the US camp, often being called its “most allied ally”. It was a member of the CENTO and SEATO military alliances and also had a bilateral defense treaty with the US.
The Sino-Indian border war in 1962 upset the equation. The US started arming India, and alarming Pakistan. In the 1965 war, the US did not side with Pakistan. It maintained a studied neutrality and put an embargo on combatants, which mostly hurt Pakistan, whose army and air force were heavily equipped with American weaponry.
Pakistan started to move more toward China after the 1965 war. Chinese arms, including T-59 tanks and MiG-19 fighters, much more primitive than their American counterparts, started to flow towards Pakistan, which had until then relied heavily on the US arms. After the Tashkent Agreement in 1966, Pakistan also acquired some Soviet arms, primarily heavy artillery.
The two countries began to construct a highway through the Karakoram mountains, intending to renew the ancient Silk Road. It was the beginning of a long journey. The two neighbours would often talk about their “all-weather friendship”.
However, China stayed quiet during Pakistan’s disastrous encounter with India in 1971, which resulted in the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. In the spring of 1999, when Pakistan attacked Indian positions in Kargil, Kashmir, China once again stood by. China has only paid lip service on the Kashmir issue, and has been reluctant to take specific actions to push India to hold a plebiscite in the disputed territory.
Khan provides an invaluable, behind the scenes look at these events. He says, China did not militarily assist Pakistan in its wars with India because they had little to do with China’s security. However, the book does not delve deeper into why the Chinese did not support Pakistan militarily during the wars.
There is no mention of the fact that India, thinking that a war with Pakistan would become inevitable once Pakistan’s military had launched a full-blooded attack on the Bengalis in East Pakistan, signed a defense pact with the USSR in August 1971. The Soviets then moved several army divisions to the border with China in Manchuria. When Pakistan reached out to the Chinese for assistance, they were politely told that “Russia is not afraid of China”. Pakistan should have seen this coming, because earlier in the year the Chinese had told President General Yahya Khan to resolve the situation in East Pakistan peacefully through negotiations. Instead, the army action triggered a full-scale civil war which led eventually to war with India.
While Pakistan can be an asset in many ways to China, it can also be a liability. Khan says the Chinese know that “The Pakistanis are not easy to deal with. Money invested there has a way of paying badly; they are always asking for more, and the security they provide for workers is appalling.”
Decades later, China launched its global Belt and Road Initiative, which Khan says is, “more concept than reality”. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) extends the Karakorum Highway all the way down to the Arabian Sea. The deep-water port at Gwadar, which had long been a fishing village, would give China access to the sea if the Americans were to blockade Chinese ports on the Pacific.
While Pakistan can be an asset in many ways to China, it can also be a liability. Khan says the Chinese know that “The Pakistanis are not easy to deal with. Money invested there has a way of paying badly; they are always asking for more, and the security they provide for workers is appalling.”
Chinese are aware that the CPEC “annoys the Indians… undercutting Xi’s attempts to reach an understanding with that neighbor. It annoys the Baluch… they signal their displeasure by abducting and killing Chinese workers sent to Pakistan.”
Khan’s book is a cautionary tale about what Pakistan can expect from China in a future crisis involving India. China will not provide military assistance to Pakistan unless its own national security is at risk or bail out Pakistan from crises of its own making.