Major progress in US-India defense ties has clear implications for Pakistan’s security situation. The concept of “integrated deterrence” - vis-à-vis China’s military and political assertiveness in the region and on the international stage - put forward by US strategists will certainly influence the state of bilateral deterrence between Pakistan and India. This bilateral deterrence has been described in different terms, suited to different stages and phases of nuclear relations between two South Asian rivals, but after the May 1998 tit-for-tat tests by two countries, experts have come to define this relation as full-fledged nuclear deterrence. However, both Pakistan and India have so far desisted from putting their weapons on delivery systems or putting delivery systems on alert, as was the situation during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States.
The high-profile visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Washington will see forward movement in US-India defense ties that could include defense purchases, joint production and transfer of technology at an unprecedented scale and will have the potential to destabilize the conventional military balance in South Asia. Pakistan needs to be watchful about the possibility of the concept of “integrated deterrence” taking concrete shape during Modi’s visit. The concept gives India greater military capability, and a role in deterring Chinese assertiveness and possible military aggression. An American expert has described US plans to equip India with state-of-the-art military weapons systems and equipment as part of the plan for making the concept of “integrated deterrence” functional.
During the last 15 years, India has purchased weapons worth $20 billion from Washington. India plans to sign an agreement for the purchase of drones worth $3 billion dollars during Modi’s trip. This generosity could not be explained as part of the US military-industrial complex’s hunger for profit, “especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated tens of billions of dollars in European purchases in 2022 alone.” India is certainly emerging as a recipient of American military assistance on a large scale to make it a partner, if not a military ally, in deterring Chinese military assertiveness in the region, as well as the international stage.
Sameer P. Lalwani and Vikram J. Singh of the United States Institute of Peace, in a recent analysis have pointed that Washington is expecting, “a more effective collaborative deterrence (that) requires more complex military exercises, more frequent use of logistics arrangements, more presence in different theaters, and greater access and overflight, all of which keeps China guessing.” More frequent employment of already signed logistics arrangements — such as ship-to-ship underway replenishment or US maritime patrol aircraft refueling in Port Blair — can add to this uncertainty, “What the United States seeks from India is greater operational cooperation to share the burden of deterring aggression by any major power, including China. Indigenous Indian capabilities help, but the key is more effective deterrence activity that complicates adversary planning, increases their uncertainty and creates hesitation. Sowing doubt is key to convincing your foe to delay military aggression for another day.” All this will come with a comprehensive package of transfer of military technology, surveillance equipment, joint production and state of the art weapons systems.
We have reached a point in history where we will have to ask whether these new weapons will make us more secure or add new vulnerabilities to our already complex security situation? Will it be wise now to ignore the lessons of history, which are available to everyone with a curious mind, that weapons have never made Pakistan any more secure? Will it be wise to spread one-sided folklore in our society that the Indians are too afraid of our nuclear weapons and their fear stands to make our defenses impregnable? Or will it be wise to ignore the Indian response to our development of tactical nukes?
To put it simply, will it be wise to ignore whether the introduction of these weapons have made us more secure militarily, or if these weapons have added new vulnerabilities to our already existing complex security situation? International experts are pointing out the indications in official Indian discourse that they are about to abandon their stance of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. At a more complex level, the Indians have purchased or are in negotiations to purchase the latest intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and precision strike aircraft that would make Pakistani strategic targets more vulnerable to Indian attacks, “a particularly grave concern is that if India pursues its policy to achieve technical superiority in ISR and precision targeting, this will provide India the capability to effectively locate and effectively destroy strategically important targets in Pakistan,” wrote Peter R. Lavoy, internationally recognized nuclear expert, almost 15 years ago.
We simply cannot afford to ignore the outcome of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, especially to the extent it will reveal the future directions of US-India defense ties. American experts and policy makers are mostly talking in terms of enhancing Indian conventional military capabilities. There is no mention of nuclear weapons or assisting India in enhancing their nuclear capabilities. But is it possible to ignore nuclear weapons from China-India relations? Is it possible to restrict the concept of “integrated deterrence” to conventional military capability only? Any future military relations between China and India cannot ignore the nuclear factor: both China and India possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems, although so far there has been no nuclear confrontation between two nations. It, however, doesn’t mean that there will be none in future. Much will depend on how the concept of “integrated deterrence” will take shape and how China will respond to it. Moreover, Pakistan will continue to remain a factor in China-India military relations. We do not know what plans US strategists have for Pakistan in the concept of “integrated deterrence,” since there is not a word in official assertions or strategic analyses carried out by think tanks in Washington.
US experts are even instigating Indian planners to take into account the situation in the Taiwan Strait, where the chances of military confrontation are ever present, “Discussions with US interlocutors on potential Taiwan scenarios will not tie Indian hands, commit it to send ships to the Taiwan Strait or take up arms against China during a crisis. India might also initiate more serious internal assessments about the likelihood and consequences of a Taiwan crisis and its direct effects on India and the region, which could be far more severe than the terrible impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” reads a suggestive analysis by US experts.
Why does Pakistan never figure in such analyses? If the US builds up Indian conventional military capabilities, the development is likely to impact Pakistan’s perception of the conventional military balance in the region. There will be genuine military concerns that will emerge in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Ironically, neither Pakistanis nor Americans are talking about these concerns. How will it impact the conventional military balance in the region? How will it impact Pakistan's nuclear deterrent capability?
US and Indian talks for enhancing military capabilities for the latter have been going on for years. Modi’s Washington visit will be the culmination of these talks. All this reminds one of the Cold War era, when the US was providing military assistance to Pakistan. Nehru and India threatened to cut off ties with Washington when the US announced a military assistance package for Pakistan. The US went to great lengths to appease New Delhi then. It appointed a US special representative which used to sit in our Defense Ministry to make sure that all the weapons that the US provided to Pakistan would go to its western border and not towards the Indian border. Nehru had a point then that the US certainly complicated South Asia’s security environment by providing weapons to Pakistan. It is once again committing the same mistake by providing weapons to India to deter China, while completely ignoring how it will complicate the situation for Pakistan.
The China-India military equation cannot be separated from the Pak-India military equation. All three states are nuclear weapons powers. All three keep a close eye on each other’s nuclear assets and deterrence capabilities. How a conventional military build-up that India is carrying out will impact the security environment in South Asia is not very difficult to judge. How it will impact Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent should be our main concern after Modi’s visit to Washington.
The high-profile visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Washington will see forward movement in US-India defense ties that could include defense purchases, joint production and transfer of technology at an unprecedented scale and will have the potential to destabilize the conventional military balance in South Asia. Pakistan needs to be watchful about the possibility of the concept of “integrated deterrence” taking concrete shape during Modi’s visit. The concept gives India greater military capability, and a role in deterring Chinese assertiveness and possible military aggression. An American expert has described US plans to equip India with state-of-the-art military weapons systems and equipment as part of the plan for making the concept of “integrated deterrence” functional.
We have reached a point in history where we will have to ask whether these new weapons will make us more secure or add new vulnerabilities to our already complex security situation? Will it be wise now to ignore the lessons of history, which are available to everyone with a curious mind, that weapons have never made Pakistan any more secure?
During the last 15 years, India has purchased weapons worth $20 billion from Washington. India plans to sign an agreement for the purchase of drones worth $3 billion dollars during Modi’s trip. This generosity could not be explained as part of the US military-industrial complex’s hunger for profit, “especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated tens of billions of dollars in European purchases in 2022 alone.” India is certainly emerging as a recipient of American military assistance on a large scale to make it a partner, if not a military ally, in deterring Chinese military assertiveness in the region, as well as the international stage.
Sameer P. Lalwani and Vikram J. Singh of the United States Institute of Peace, in a recent analysis have pointed that Washington is expecting, “a more effective collaborative deterrence (that) requires more complex military exercises, more frequent use of logistics arrangements, more presence in different theaters, and greater access and overflight, all of which keeps China guessing.” More frequent employment of already signed logistics arrangements — such as ship-to-ship underway replenishment or US maritime patrol aircraft refueling in Port Blair — can add to this uncertainty, “What the United States seeks from India is greater operational cooperation to share the burden of deterring aggression by any major power, including China. Indigenous Indian capabilities help, but the key is more effective deterrence activity that complicates adversary planning, increases their uncertainty and creates hesitation. Sowing doubt is key to convincing your foe to delay military aggression for another day.” All this will come with a comprehensive package of transfer of military technology, surveillance equipment, joint production and state of the art weapons systems.
We have reached a point in history where we will have to ask whether these new weapons will make us more secure or add new vulnerabilities to our already complex security situation? Will it be wise now to ignore the lessons of history, which are available to everyone with a curious mind, that weapons have never made Pakistan any more secure? Will it be wise to spread one-sided folklore in our society that the Indians are too afraid of our nuclear weapons and their fear stands to make our defenses impregnable? Or will it be wise to ignore the Indian response to our development of tactical nukes?
To put it simply, will it be wise to ignore whether the introduction of these weapons have made us more secure militarily, or if these weapons have added new vulnerabilities to our already existing complex security situation? International experts are pointing out the indications in official Indian discourse that they are about to abandon their stance of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. At a more complex level, the Indians have purchased or are in negotiations to purchase the latest intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and precision strike aircraft that would make Pakistani strategic targets more vulnerable to Indian attacks, “a particularly grave concern is that if India pursues its policy to achieve technical superiority in ISR and precision targeting, this will provide India the capability to effectively locate and effectively destroy strategically important targets in Pakistan,” wrote Peter R. Lavoy, internationally recognized nuclear expert, almost 15 years ago.
We simply cannot afford to ignore the outcome of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, especially to the extent it will reveal the future directions of US-India defense ties. American experts and policy makers are mostly talking in terms of enhancing Indian conventional military capabilities. There is no mention of nuclear weapons or assisting India in enhancing their nuclear capabilities. But is it possible to ignore nuclear weapons from China-India relations? Is it possible to restrict the concept of “integrated deterrence” to conventional military capability only? Any future military relations between China and India cannot ignore the nuclear factor: both China and India possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems, although so far there has been no nuclear confrontation between two nations. It, however, doesn’t mean that there will be none in future. Much will depend on how the concept of “integrated deterrence” will take shape and how China will respond to it. Moreover, Pakistan will continue to remain a factor in China-India military relations. We do not know what plans US strategists have for Pakistan in the concept of “integrated deterrence,” since there is not a word in official assertions or strategic analyses carried out by think tanks in Washington.
US experts are even instigating Indian planners to take into account the situation in the Taiwan Strait, where the chances of military confrontation are ever present, “Discussions with US interlocutors on potential Taiwan scenarios will not tie Indian hands, commit it to send ships to the Taiwan Strait or take up arms against China during a crisis. India might also initiate more serious internal assessments about the likelihood and consequences of a Taiwan crisis and its direct effects on India and the region, which could be far more severe than the terrible impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” reads a suggestive analysis by US experts.
The China-India military equation cannot be separated from the Pak-India military equation.
Why does Pakistan never figure in such analyses? If the US builds up Indian conventional military capabilities, the development is likely to impact Pakistan’s perception of the conventional military balance in the region. There will be genuine military concerns that will emerge in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Ironically, neither Pakistanis nor Americans are talking about these concerns. How will it impact the conventional military balance in the region? How will it impact Pakistan's nuclear deterrent capability?
US and Indian talks for enhancing military capabilities for the latter have been going on for years. Modi’s Washington visit will be the culmination of these talks. All this reminds one of the Cold War era, when the US was providing military assistance to Pakistan. Nehru and India threatened to cut off ties with Washington when the US announced a military assistance package for Pakistan. The US went to great lengths to appease New Delhi then. It appointed a US special representative which used to sit in our Defense Ministry to make sure that all the weapons that the US provided to Pakistan would go to its western border and not towards the Indian border. Nehru had a point then that the US certainly complicated South Asia’s security environment by providing weapons to Pakistan. It is once again committing the same mistake by providing weapons to India to deter China, while completely ignoring how it will complicate the situation for Pakistan.
The China-India military equation cannot be separated from the Pak-India military equation. All three states are nuclear weapons powers. All three keep a close eye on each other’s nuclear assets and deterrence capabilities. How a conventional military build-up that India is carrying out will impact the security environment in South Asia is not very difficult to judge. How it will impact Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent should be our main concern after Modi’s visit to Washington.