The central difference between Western approaches to ‘aid’ and Chinese ones is that the former is fueled by adherence to one particular ideology, that of neoliberalism. This three-pronged approach to development, i.e. privatize-liberalize-deregulate, is Gospel; enshrined in the Washington Consensus of 1989.
Virtually all projects that are peddled by US-dominated international financial institutions are laced with its objectives and thrusted upon countries in the Global South as ‘conditionalities’, deviation from which means immediate suspension of further tranches. On the other hand, China’s aid tends not to infringe upon the sovereignty of recipients vis-à-vis stringent prescriptions (instructions) – particularly in terms of macroeconomic policy direction – that are expected to be adhered to. This is reflected most broadly in the fundamentally different historical relationship that Pakistan has had with China as compared to the USA – the former being a stable, mutually respectful, if not beneficial, one that has accounted for contingencies and contextual details whereas the latter has followed a transactional, fair-weather pattern.
Since the security apparatus is the central partner and de facto execution body, initiatives under the CPEC have also functioned to financially empower the domineering institution and slow down – even obstruct – the process of democratic transition in Pakistan.
Where the Chinese approach to development assistance falls short is in its top-down, largely centralized orientation that fails to include local communities, who are frequently displaced, sidelined, or outright disregarded. Indigenous populations are not seen or engaged with as stakeholders in this process; their needs, desires, and grievances rarely accounted for. This is particularly true in the incubation phase, when projects are tabled and their design, objectives, and ultimate outcomes decided. The tendency has exacerbated tensions between not only federal and provincial domains, but also provincial and regional ones. Since the security apparatus is the central partner and de facto execution body, initiatives under the CPEC have also functioned to financially empower the domineering institution and slow down – even obstruct – the process of democratic transition in Pakistan.
While Chinese officials claim that this is in line with their principle of respecting the political sovereignty of partner countries (indeed, several actors from its civil society domain have claimed that it is the responsibility of Pakistani intellectuals and social activists of the progressive bent to push for higher levels of freedom domestically), this approach is identical to Western multilateral agencies, which claim that their interventions are purely ‘technical’ in nature.
The central focus of CPEC initiatives thus far has been in areas of energy, infrastructure, and special economic zones. To list a few, the 1320 MW power plant in Sahiwal, 1320 MW power plant in Port Qasim, 1320 MW power plant in Balochistan, 660 MW ‘power project’ in Thar, and 1000 MW solar park in Bahawalpur stand out as major projects that have undoubtedly expanded energy capacity in Pakistan. On the other hand, however, the majority of these are based on fossil fuels, thus harming the environmental ecosystem, and run by international power producers, which are guaranteed a certain rate of return regardless of fluctuations in oil prices or exchange rate, thus contributing to accumulating sovereign debt.
Secondly, in the domain of road infrastructure, the CPEC is responsible for the Karakoram Highway, Peshawar-Karachi Motorway, Orange Line Metro in Lahore, optical fiber cable covering Gilgit-Baltistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab, as well as the Hakla – D.I. Khan Motorway. These initiatives have created thousands of jobs, promoted tourist activity, enhanced urban inclusivity for the underprivileged, and facilitated trade with neighboring countries. On the flip side, however, road infrastructure projects are bound to benefit the privileged, i.e. those with access to vehicles, and it is unclear whether ‘easing trade’ in this manner has actually led to tangible benefits for Pakistan in terms of its balance of payments position – which continued to worsen in the 2016-2018 period, when most of these projects were completed. This suggests that it likely takes more than simple construction work to promote trade.
There seems to be a disconnect between the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological roots, based on the empowerment of ordinary citizens, i.e. peasants and laborers most broadly conceived, and its approach to foreign aid.
Finally, a series of industrial cooperation and special economic zones have been established under the CPEC umbrella. These include the Rashakai SEZ, Allama Iqbal Industrial City, Dhabeji SEZ, and Bostan SEZ. The idea for these is to foster a ‘business-friendly environment’ that enhances foreign direct investment and creates inter-regional synergies due to their strategic locations. Furthermore, a wide array of sectors – including textiles, engineering, electronic, chemicals, food processing, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and more – are being targeted, which is laudable. It is yet to be seen if this initiative produces businesses that are globally competitive and can spearhead industrial revival in Pakistan, a domain that saw premature divestment from during the late 80s onwards. Concerns about clarity in SEZ initiatives are also a reality, e.g. the lack of a defined policy or regulatory framework, operational concerns with One-Stop-Shops, weak monitoring and evaluation systems, and poor levels of contract enforcement.
There seems to be a disconnect between the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological roots, based on the empowerment of ordinary citizens, i.e. peasants and laborers most broadly conceived, and its approach to foreign aid. This is even more alarming when Mao’s Cultural Revolution is taken into account, arguably the seminal event that led to a hard reset of Chinese society and placed it on the path of growth and sustained prosperity. One of the key facets of the Chairman’s messaging during that time was a commitment to rebuilding the nation in a manner that was not reliant on external assistance – which always came with strings attached.
Instead of operating under the pretense of ‘technical’ and ‘apolitical’ aid, the Chinese leadership would be well advised to focus on promoting democratic objectives in exchange for its economic cooperation. This may include political decentralization, empowerment of unions and associations, and the mainstreaming of a culture that respects and participates in the free flow of ideas and exchanges. Rather than opportunistically clinging to an institution that may ‘get the job done’ in the immediate future, a long-term approach that incubates popular representation and puts in place leaders that are more responsive to their constituencies, less concerned with personal wealth accumulation, and aware of the costs and benefits of agreements being signed into would ensure both internal stability and the mutual benefit of both nations.
China has a great opportunity to act as a global leader in fostering a system of aid that serves as a legitimate escalator for various developing countries, but in order to do that it must pause and reflect on its current orientation: rushed, exclusionary, and containing the seeds of imperialism. For all its rhetoric about Marxism, it must adhere to it in all domains – not least of all in aid.