Rapidly advancing military technologies incentivizing first-strike capabilities have stamped the balance of terror in South Asia so hard that they have rendered second-strike capability redundant. The introduction of multiple independent targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), which can deliver multiple warheads, aiming at the same or different targets in a single missile, is going to haunt regional stability. Nonetheless, in order to reign in the balance of terror in South Asia, the key is to establish and maintain first-strike and force-posture stability.
The introduction of MIRVs signifies a diverse, adaptable, and penetrable force posture; however, there are several trade-offs inherent in MIRV design. To enable a single missile to carry multiple warheads, the design not only gives greater punch to adversaries and hedges against defences with greater penetrability, but also makes MIRV-equipped missiles an attractive and expensive target. To decrease this vulnerability, dispersion, colocation, and hardening are the options, but colocation is a risky option, because one Indian strike can cause significant erosion of a mix of forces and infrastructure. Moreover, to accommodate several warheads, the design requires smaller, but more accurate warheads so as to adjust to the overall weight capacity of the vehicle.
MIRV-equipped missiles are cost-effective in terms of one missile carrying several warheads instead of one missile carrying one warhead. They simply multiply the advantages of speed, precision (smaller warheads), and range with mass; however, they significantly shrink the existing limited window to react. Between the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad, this further complicates nuclear command and control (NC2). Moreover, the reliability of the design is also important, because the consistent and enhanced reliability of MIRVs can significantly put the reliability of the adversary's missile inventory and second-strike capability in doubt.
India and Pakistan demonstrated major technological progression—the development of MIRVs (Ababeel and Agni V)—in their strategic forces that is yet to find its space in their existing ambiguous doctrines of nuclear use. Nonetheless, the deployment of MIRVs in South Asia incentivizes and asserts first-strike, either for disarming, or damage limitation, or asymmetric escalation.
In order to assess the incentives of the first strike in South Asia, the works of scholars such as James Fearon, Robert Powell, Bahar Leventoglu, Branislav Slantchev, A. F. K. Organski, Steven Beard, and Joshua Strayhorn are insightful and instructive.
In MIRV deployed South Asia, India and Pakistan have sufficiently large advantages that tremendously reduce the bargaining range. In the presence of overwhelming first-strike advantages and incentives, neither side can commit not to attack in order to shift the advantage and power to the other side.
The geographical close proximity between India and Pakistan, as several scholars have reasoned, renders the assumption of tactical, battlefield, or demonstrative nuclear use inadequate, or, in other words, the argument states stating that any nuclear use at any time in the South Asian nuclear environment is or will be considered strategic. However, technological developments in perfecting counterforce, first-strike, and offensive capacities do not conform to this line of argument. One does not need to be irrational to strike first, because the advantages of a first strike, such as surprise, offence, and preemption, can comfortably offset the gains one can receive by foregoing the strike.
Considering the record of crises in South Asia post-overt nuclearization, both nuclear-armed rivals have proven to be risk-acceptant, and now they have developed capabilities that offer first-strike or offensive advantages. Hence, the risk of them engaging in quid pro quo, fait accompli warfighting is greater. The development of enhanced first-strike capabilities allows early and quick mobilisation, as well as a greater punch—all factors that can shape their engagement in a quid pro quo manoeuvre, for instance.
With modernization, both states are not only establishing first-strike advantages, but also illustrating that they are racing to sufficiently increase their expected payoffs from warfighting if they were to strike first. This implies a loss of confidence in the survivability of their second-strike capabilities, but, at large, it also signifies serious commitment difficulties on both sides, leading to a bargaining breakdown.
In MIRV deployed South Asia, India and Pakistan have sufficiently large advantages that tremendously reduce the bargaining range. In the presence of overwhelming first-strike advantages and incentives, neither side can commit not to attack in order to shift the advantage and power to the other side. Such commitments are simply not credible.
Therefore, in a first-strike environment, stability can be maintained if both sides make an unbreakable vow not to exploit the advantage, no matter how tactical in nature, that a devastating first-strike offers. To enter into and maintain such a vow is challenging, because the shift of advantage and power in this environment is rapid, hence tempting. However, to maintain first-strike stability, both India and Pakistan will have to willingly forego the option of surprise, as well as maintain an adaptive and diversified force posture.
Foregoing surprise, strategic or tactical, is a huge sacrifice. It is also important to highlight here that surprise does not always prove decisive in ending a crisis or war. For instance, commonly cited strategic surprises such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 and the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in 1973 are considered indecisive in the course of wars, whereas tactical surprises such as the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki bombings proved decisive in ending the war. In order to render the advantage of surprise ambiguous in a particular engagement, a state has to achieve a zero probability of collapse, or a probability of collapse that is significantly lower than that of its adversary.
Keeping in view the progressive exploitation of surprise in the India-Pakistan context, it is possible that India preempts any future non-state actor’s attack on its territory or prevents an escalation by striking first. Undoubtedly, first-strike capabilities offer such freedom of action to New Delhi, along with the compulsive commitment to reap an advantage by striking first.
Can India and Pakistan achieve such a probability? In 1999, India was caught by a surprise Pakistani force buildup in Kargil, but the surprise proved indecisive as New Delhi responded with a large-scale counter-offensive, yet maintained restraint by not crossing the Line of Control (LoC), which resulted in heavy Indian casualties. In 2019, the surprise crossing of the LoC into Pakistani territory by the Indian Air Force during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis was swiftly retaliated by Pakistan’s air operation. In both crises, the surprise proved indecisive, because the probability of collapse was significantly low; nonetheless, the crossing of the LoC in response to a non-state actor’s attack during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis has raised the ante for the Indian response to a future attack of this kind on its territory.
Keeping in view the progressive exploitation of surprise in the India-Pakistan context, it is possible that India preempts any future non-state actor’s attack on its territory or prevents an escalation by striking first. Undoubtedly, first-strike capabilities offer such freedom of action to New Delhi, along with the compulsive commitment to reap an advantage by striking first. In MIRV-deployed mode, given conventional asymmetries, an Indian first- or counterforce strike is going to cause substantial military losses for Pakistan, resulting in an escalation. To respond to such an offensive, Islamabad possesses a mobilization advantage that can guide its defence against New Delhi’s offensive. These advantages are challenging to maintain; however, they are essential to establishing first-strike stability. But they also tend to make this stability fragile at the same time.
Notwithstanding the first-strike advantages they offer, MIRVs are likely to boost impulsive behaviour, resulting in inadvertent nuclear launch or use. A challenge for NC2 in the region is that it is more accustomed to managing and prevailing in a state of mutual vulnerability. Therefore, the balance of terror on which South Asian strategic stability rests needs to be restored.
One way to do that is for both India and Pakistan to agree to ban MIRVs and defences in the region, for which they would need to find themselves in a political environment conducive to such dialogue and negotiations. At present, such an environment is at a distance, but that does not bar both sides from continuing to strive in that direction. Otherwise, both sides enter into an agreement not to strike first with MIRVs, to allow mutual vulnerability to prevail and live happily ever after under the reign of terror. The second option appears relatively feasible. However, for this option to be feasible, both sides need to enter into an unbreakable vow.