The Government of Pakistan uses some very specific terminology when referring to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a 3,000 kilometer long route connecting China to the Arabian Sea and drastically reducing Beijing’s import time and costs. CPEC is a game-changer, an economic take-off, a golden opportunity, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, and all of it is true at the macro level. However, Pakistan has historically suffered from the blight of oversimplification of very complex, intricately interconnected problems. This is no different.
The CPEC has the potential to save Pakistan from economic and ideological meltdown. The sheer amount of investment in the project helps build Gawadar Port, highways and other infrastructure, power plants and coal mining projects, upgraded railways and road and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) is very important. The SEZs are especially pertinent because they offer a boon to local economies, both in the form of job creation and infrastructure development under a laissez-faire approach. Towns and locales along the CPEC will benefit from these zones immensely. Trade will improve, the economy will be reinvigorated, the energy sector will flourish, and China will take the very first step towards a Pan-Asia where the transport of goods, people, and currency is streamlined, effortless and free from the restrictions of international boundaries. In this, the government is absolutely correct.
However, the problem lies with the approach. The CPEC had three initially proposed routes – western, central and eastern. The Western Route is the shortest, cutting across the bulk of Balochistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, while the Eastern Route banks sharply to the East, moving along much of Sindh and Punjab. At present, the Eastern Route is being constructed, which has caused politicians from the Western provinces to call foul.
It is important to fundamentally understand the various issues that work against the Western Route. First, the CPEC is one of six planned roads under the greater Chinese vision for a unified, interconnected Pan-Asia. The success and timely completion of the CPEC will set the agenda for the next project in the series: Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM), and everything that follows. In short, there is a lot at stake for the Chinese who have taken a chance with Pakistan, and they wish to see this project to its logical conclusion.
Second, the Chinese subscribe to the idea of “low-hanging fruits”, where projects are prioritized based on what can be completed on an accelerated track. This is an important point because it ties in directly with the decision to prioritize the Eastern Route. This route has some pre-existing road infrastructure that can be minimally upgraded to serve the purposes of the CPEC.
Third, at the time this idea was conceived and launched formally in Pakistan by the Chinese president Xi Jinping, the province of Balochistan was in the middle of a full-blown nationalist insurgency, the fifth since the country’s independence. Simultaneously, the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had suffered for nearly a decade-and-a-half, bearing the brunt of militant retaliation against the state in hundreds of attacks and raids, and suffered not only from collective trauma, but crumbling infrastructure. The CPEC could hardly wait until Pakistan cleaned up its act and fixed the macro problems in these two provinces, both intimately tied to insurgencies, before launching the project. It made better sense to go the longer route, because it is arguably safer, than risk the multi-billion-dollar investment.
All of this makes sense. But the government’s biggest sin is a distinct lack of transparency regarding the selection of the route. This stems partially from the fact that the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) suffers from an institutional sense of ownership when it comes to matters of the government, being run by a historic third-term prime minister. It also stems from the fact that the Eastern Route greatly benefits Punjab province, the voter stronghold of the PML-N, further bolstering the most (relatively) prosperous, developed and modernized province in the country. This also causes significant angst for leaders from Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – areas historically neglected, or exploited, by the center.
The only way forward for this embattled government is to find a way to dramatically increase transparency and take representative political parties into confidence. This does not imply that they need to be placated or satisfied, as this would be an impractical objective. Instead, the detractors should have a very clear idea of why the Eastern Route is being prioritized and how, over time, it will benefit the Western provinces.
The author is a journalist and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad
Email: zeeshan[dot]salahuddin[at]gmail.com
Twitter: @zeesalahuddin
The CPEC has the potential to save Pakistan from economic and ideological meltdown. The sheer amount of investment in the project helps build Gawadar Port, highways and other infrastructure, power plants and coal mining projects, upgraded railways and road and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) is very important. The SEZs are especially pertinent because they offer a boon to local economies, both in the form of job creation and infrastructure development under a laissez-faire approach. Towns and locales along the CPEC will benefit from these zones immensely. Trade will improve, the economy will be reinvigorated, the energy sector will flourish, and China will take the very first step towards a Pan-Asia where the transport of goods, people, and currency is streamlined, effortless and free from the restrictions of international boundaries. In this, the government is absolutely correct.
However, the problem lies with the approach. The CPEC had three initially proposed routes – western, central and eastern. The Western Route is the shortest, cutting across the bulk of Balochistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, while the Eastern Route banks sharply to the East, moving along much of Sindh and Punjab. At present, the Eastern Route is being constructed, which has caused politicians from the Western provinces to call foul.
It is important to fundamentally understand the various issues that work against the Western Route. First, the CPEC is one of six planned roads under the greater Chinese vision for a unified, interconnected Pan-Asia. The success and timely completion of the CPEC will set the agenda for the next project in the series: Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM), and everything that follows. In short, there is a lot at stake for the Chinese who have taken a chance with Pakistan, and they wish to see this project to its logical conclusion.
Second, the Chinese subscribe to the idea of “low-hanging fruits”, where projects are prioritized based on what can be completed on an accelerated track. This is an important point because it ties in directly with the decision to prioritize the Eastern Route. This route has some pre-existing road infrastructure that can be minimally upgraded to serve the purposes of the CPEC.
Third, at the time this idea was conceived and launched formally in Pakistan by the Chinese president Xi Jinping, the province of Balochistan was in the middle of a full-blown nationalist insurgency, the fifth since the country’s independence. Simultaneously, the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had suffered for nearly a decade-and-a-half, bearing the brunt of militant retaliation against the state in hundreds of attacks and raids, and suffered not only from collective trauma, but crumbling infrastructure. The CPEC could hardly wait until Pakistan cleaned up its act and fixed the macro problems in these two provinces, both intimately tied to insurgencies, before launching the project. It made better sense to go the longer route, because it is arguably safer, than risk the multi-billion-dollar investment.
All of this makes sense. But the government’s biggest sin is a distinct lack of transparency regarding the selection of the route. This stems partially from the fact that the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) suffers from an institutional sense of ownership when it comes to matters of the government, being run by a historic third-term prime minister. It also stems from the fact that the Eastern Route greatly benefits Punjab province, the voter stronghold of the PML-N, further bolstering the most (relatively) prosperous, developed and modernized province in the country. This also causes significant angst for leaders from Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – areas historically neglected, or exploited, by the center.
The only way forward for this embattled government is to find a way to dramatically increase transparency and take representative political parties into confidence. This does not imply that they need to be placated or satisfied, as this would be an impractical objective. Instead, the detractors should have a very clear idea of why the Eastern Route is being prioritized and how, over time, it will benefit the Western provinces.
The author is a journalist and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad
Email: zeeshan[dot]salahuddin[at]gmail.com
Twitter: @zeesalahuddin