The curse of interesting times is upon us yet again.
The United States has roped in all the core nations of the international community in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to give an ultimatum to Pakistan: comply with all its terrorism-specific demands or step into the “grey list” and face the prospect of financial sanctions next June. This would be a prelude to being shoved into the “black list”, with seriously adverse consequences for Pakistan’s political economy.
Meanwhile, in response to being disqualified as President of PMLN, Nawaz Sharif has defied the Supreme Court of Pakistan by becoming “the great leader, or Quaid, of the PMLN for life”. He has buried speculation of unfathomable rifts in the Sharif family by blessing the election of Shahbaz Sharif as the new President of the PMLN and future Prime Minister of Pakistan. He has also nudged Mariam Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif to pose for the gallery, hugging each other in affection. There is some genuine cheer in the tea leaves for Mariam too: the foreign expert on the Calibri font has turned out to be a weak witness for the prosecution, implying that Mariam’s claim of being an innocent Trustee of the London flats rather than a guilty Beneficiary is generally established and she may be off the hook. In other words, as the general elections come nearer, the Sharifs may be down but they are not yet out. No wonder, then, that some anxious SC judges have felt the need to publicly insist that their judgments are not politically biased or motivated, giving grist to the mills of their pro-Nawaz detractors who retort that “the judges do protest too much”.
Suddenly, the powerful Miltablishment is also looking a little lost. It had embarked on a grand strategy to knock out Nawaz Sharif by manipulating “the system” to do its bidding. This goal was to be achieved on the basis of some internal and external assumptions: Imran Khan’s popularity would rise in proportion to a decrease in that of Nawaz Sharif so that the PMLN was denied a majority in the next elections; the SC’s credibility would not be dented by its anti-Nawaz judgments; and India, Afghanistan and the United States would not up the ante and distract the Miltablishment from its domestic mission.
But evidently none of these hopes has quite materialized.
Nawaz is fighting tooth and nail and is determined to claw his way back to office. Imran’s popularity has declined partly because of his inability to build an effective party machine that can capitalize on Nawaz’s misfortunes and partly because some of his personal decisions, like his second and third marriages, have gone down badly with his supporters. Meanwhile, the SC’s credibility has unfortunately plunged as the perception has grown that it is an integral part of the Militablishment and its “get-Nawaz” campaign. The external factor, too, has suddenly become relevant to the internal power struggle underway. Although both US and Afghanistan have expressed a desire to continue the dialogue with Pakistan, and the Miltablishment has announced that it is ready to recalibrate foreign policy with regard to its eastern and western borders in accordance with new realities, the chances of any great “breakthrough” in the short term are remote. In other words, the Miltablishment cannot expect much relief on that score. In fact, if the FATF threat materializes into concrete sanctions that have an adverse impact on the economy just when elections are called, Nawaz Sharif would be provided with another peg to blast the Miltablishment and lay the woes of the people at its door. Significantly, he seems to have sensed an opening already, and has blamed the SC for exchange rate depreciation and resultant inflationary pressures owing to the uncertainty created at home and abroad by its destabilizing judgments.
The Miltablishment’s strategy is now pinned on NAB delivering a lethal blow to the Sharifs. But that too could turn out to be a double-edged sword. If the NAB court judges Nawaz and/or Marium to be guilty, it will have to sentence them to prison, a sure shot recipe for more rather than less popularity in the given circumstances when a perception has been created that the Sharifs are being unfairly targeted. Indeed, the boot would be on the other foot if, as is most likely, the President of Pakistan, a Nawaz loyalist, exercises his power to “pardon” the Sharifs and spring them out of prison. Defiance and resistance would serve to make them more popular as has been the case so far.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of the Miltablishment to have its way in the final analysis. There are too many ifs and buts both in the run-up to the elections and in the post-election scenario to predict which way the wind will finally blow. In other words, the curse of interesting times is upon us, good and proper.
The United States has roped in all the core nations of the international community in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to give an ultimatum to Pakistan: comply with all its terrorism-specific demands or step into the “grey list” and face the prospect of financial sanctions next June. This would be a prelude to being shoved into the “black list”, with seriously adverse consequences for Pakistan’s political economy.
Meanwhile, in response to being disqualified as President of PMLN, Nawaz Sharif has defied the Supreme Court of Pakistan by becoming “the great leader, or Quaid, of the PMLN for life”. He has buried speculation of unfathomable rifts in the Sharif family by blessing the election of Shahbaz Sharif as the new President of the PMLN and future Prime Minister of Pakistan. He has also nudged Mariam Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif to pose for the gallery, hugging each other in affection. There is some genuine cheer in the tea leaves for Mariam too: the foreign expert on the Calibri font has turned out to be a weak witness for the prosecution, implying that Mariam’s claim of being an innocent Trustee of the London flats rather than a guilty Beneficiary is generally established and she may be off the hook. In other words, as the general elections come nearer, the Sharifs may be down but they are not yet out. No wonder, then, that some anxious SC judges have felt the need to publicly insist that their judgments are not politically biased or motivated, giving grist to the mills of their pro-Nawaz detractors who retort that “the judges do protest too much”.
Suddenly, the powerful Miltablishment is also looking a little lost. It had embarked on a grand strategy to knock out Nawaz Sharif by manipulating “the system” to do its bidding. This goal was to be achieved on the basis of some internal and external assumptions: Imran Khan’s popularity would rise in proportion to a decrease in that of Nawaz Sharif so that the PMLN was denied a majority in the next elections; the SC’s credibility would not be dented by its anti-Nawaz judgments; and India, Afghanistan and the United States would not up the ante and distract the Miltablishment from its domestic mission.
But evidently none of these hopes has quite materialized.
Nawaz is fighting tooth and nail and is determined to claw his way back to office. Imran’s popularity has declined partly because of his inability to build an effective party machine that can capitalize on Nawaz’s misfortunes and partly because some of his personal decisions, like his second and third marriages, have gone down badly with his supporters. Meanwhile, the SC’s credibility has unfortunately plunged as the perception has grown that it is an integral part of the Militablishment and its “get-Nawaz” campaign. The external factor, too, has suddenly become relevant to the internal power struggle underway. Although both US and Afghanistan have expressed a desire to continue the dialogue with Pakistan, and the Miltablishment has announced that it is ready to recalibrate foreign policy with regard to its eastern and western borders in accordance with new realities, the chances of any great “breakthrough” in the short term are remote. In other words, the Miltablishment cannot expect much relief on that score. In fact, if the FATF threat materializes into concrete sanctions that have an adverse impact on the economy just when elections are called, Nawaz Sharif would be provided with another peg to blast the Miltablishment and lay the woes of the people at its door. Significantly, he seems to have sensed an opening already, and has blamed the SC for exchange rate depreciation and resultant inflationary pressures owing to the uncertainty created at home and abroad by its destabilizing judgments.
The Miltablishment’s strategy is now pinned on NAB delivering a lethal blow to the Sharifs. But that too could turn out to be a double-edged sword. If the NAB court judges Nawaz and/or Marium to be guilty, it will have to sentence them to prison, a sure shot recipe for more rather than less popularity in the given circumstances when a perception has been created that the Sharifs are being unfairly targeted. Indeed, the boot would be on the other foot if, as is most likely, the President of Pakistan, a Nawaz loyalist, exercises his power to “pardon” the Sharifs and spring them out of prison. Defiance and resistance would serve to make them more popular as has been the case so far.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of the Miltablishment to have its way in the final analysis. There are too many ifs and buts both in the run-up to the elections and in the post-election scenario to predict which way the wind will finally blow. In other words, the curse of interesting times is upon us, good and proper.